5. On Konrad Lorenz On Aggression

  1. Existence is in the impression of individual perception; but human groups stay together because individual sensorial impression is homogenized to some extent and regulated, though never completely (because exclusively singular, corporeal reality is the real priming force of the need for some degree of homogenization, in the first place.)
  2. With this it becomes necessary to postulate physiologically sensory homogenization as the foundation of identity; that is also a form of meaning and rationality, albeit not yet of a conceptual nature.
  3. And further, also must the relationship between group permanence and the need for nascent identity for individuals be posited, given that human groups can only illusorily be considered a single, whole unity, making the individual’s real belonging to the group and assumption by it only physiologically possible and in regards to sensory perception, but never in a physical sense; evolutionary survival, in the history of human, physical experience, however, has only ever taken place in groups.
  4. Further, increasingly complex logical posits and elaborations made by the group itself, become mandatory points of support for culturally-bound paradigms of individual self-understanding, making the individual’s possibility of interpretation and rational synthesis of her own sensory experience, artifact and domain of that specific group in regards to which she is in fact an individual. That is, her individuality is a product of her physical and physio-sensory dependence on the group, first and foremost.
  5. Finally, the changes imposed on human groups by sedentary circumstances, and specifically agriculture, are to be understood as also the cause for the need for more elaborate, conceptually-rich forms of individuality, given that the decrease, collectively, of physical movement by no means implies that the need for physiological and physio-sensory engagement also decreases.
  6. And it is primarily, then, moral dilemma itself that comes to the aid and benefit of sedentary human groups as a form of physiologically rational and sensory invigoration in compensation for the absence of previous, physiological contexts that were themselves also physical;
  7. It is this cleavage between the physical and the physiological, then, that forces the need for more physiologically invigorated forms of collective experience that are, however, physically obstructed in the sedentary circumstances of any form of civilization as we know it.
  8. Moral dilemma requires a different, more conceptually elaborate form of individuality, specifically in the individual´s capacity (that is in fact patrimony of the group) to synthesis her own physiologically sensory experience:
  9. That the powers of rational—or at least socially congruent —analysis make socially construed, opprobrium-configured individuality in this sense possible for an individual who is no longer sure she can in fact consider herself as appropriately belonging to the group at all, can be conceptualized as a necessity agriculture did not impose on human beings (biological opprobrium originates, phylogenetically, much earlier), but rather exploited primarily as something of a proxy source of physiological sensorial invigoration for individuals, specifically to make the confines of sedentary existence more bearable—that is in fact an essential element of the very functionality of agrarian-based, human existence.
  10. Such a premise is inexorably founded on the human need for sensory engagement, in addition to the other, oft-mentioned primary needs of contemporary biological theories.
  11. How is defiance key to individuality? Social Individuality hinges on the group’s rationality of which physio-corporeal individual can avail herself; but social or cultural individuality is not simply the assumption of logical assertions opprobically imposed on the culturally-bound, perceiving subject: it is rather an assumption through opposition to the force of biological opprobrium, more than just compliance with it. Given that the individual can never physically be anything else but what she singularly is, the physiological and physiologically sensorial force of the group over the individual (felt bodily as in fact a vague but certain threat and terror of expulsion, or bodily destruction at the hands of one’s own peers) constitutes an immediate and violent internal conflict with one’s own deeper, core physical entity, for at the root of the power of biological opprobrium is in fact the individual’s will to self-preservation, which can know no compromise whatsoever with regard to its own self-imposition.
  12. Thus, physiologically sensorial experience and impression (that is part and parcel of biological opprobrium) can be morally real and relevant for the perceiving individual, but not necessarily socially (nor much less politically) real. The force of biological opprobrium is of a physiological and physiologically sensorial nature—it is an intimate part of the individual’s physiological process of mind, but is not in itself an event or even an act that can be publicly observed—and thus can be described as anterior to rational and command thought.
  13. Towards achievement, then, of greater heights of invigorated tension against the physical and physiologically sensory limitations of sedentary experience, the corporeal individual´s belonging to the group through a culturally rational self can only be understood as ultimately a form of defiance, to more or lesser degrees, and as a latent, sub-rational violence of conformity, due once again to the foundational paradox of the anthropological self in that I am physiologically you—on the opprobrium plane of human group survival—but never physically can you be me.


6. Physiological Resources and the Simulacra of Anthropology

1) The physiological substance of human experience within sedentary contexts, takes place in higher, rationally constructed contexts of social congruence and agency; that is, bodily individuality lives in the sensory impression, but the social possibility of the physio-sensory, through time, is founded on the homogenization of physiological experience by means of what we know as rationality, but that is better conceptualized above all—and whether mythological, or in the form of a cultural positivism—first and foremost as socially congruent.

Such a social congruence, in conjunction with the physio-metabolic impetus of the physical individual under the permanent drive of biological opprobrium, combines to force the inexorable conceptualization of the cultural self as a dependent paradigm of the group, in regards to which the singularly physical-physiological, bodily individual forges a socially congruent mode of individual, corporeal being.

Because the physiological self is situationally outside and primer to the cultural self, it remains experientially opaque to the culturally rational sphere of meaning—or, that it is, the better part of physiologically sensory experience, in its technical subjection to the very possibility of the culturally rational, must necessarily remain divided from its socially congruent counterpart;

But, although a rationally elusive, physiological mode of knowing is indeed possible—that is the aesthetic itself, for instance—the anthropological existence of a socially congruent, rational understanding in fact exists because part of physiologically singular individuality is excluded, towards the structural permanence of the group, through time.

In this way, the resilience of physical self-perseveration only an individual can know, is in some sense transferred to the cryptic heart of human group stability; and thus from outside is the culturally rational sphere of physiological homogenization invigorated through its silent partner of the very much socially incongruent, very much non-negotiable individual will to life, at all costs.

And such a physiological invigoration of the sedentary, rational self, comes eventually through a form of physio-moral titillation the bodily individual experiences as the force of biological opprobrium in all her socio-genetic, corporeal fibers; but effectively has the physical world been all but substituted by a morally relevant, physiologically sensory simulacrum of the mind.

Against such a structural fortification of only physio-mental experience, sedentary anthropological stability then positions physiologically immediate interaction between physical individuals as its supreme force of counterbalance to its own opprobrium-configured artifice of guaranteed human group permanence, through time;

For, quite logically, the foundation of any form of the socially congruent can ultimately only be in the body itself, even if—or specifically because—the structural entity of sedentary human groups must, paradoxically, curtail, homogenize and make remote, part of physiologically singular, body experience.

And thus physiologically immediate, social experience not only compensates for the physio-opprobic structural requirements of sedentary, human groups, but it could in fact be conceptualized as the very working possibility of that structural stability, and in the exo-rational (to some extent exo-cultural) reinforcement of the bodily singular but socio-genetic, living individual,

Specifically and most powerfully in physiologically immediate others.*



*An objectification of the separation of living individuals, mediated by images (Baudrillard)

-“In proposing to relate symbolic language to self-understanding, I think I fulfill the deepest wish of hermeneutics. The purpose of all interpretation is to conquer a remoteness, a distance between the past cultural epoch to which the text belongs and the interpreter himself. By overcoming this distance, by making himself contemporary with the text, the exegete can appropriate its meaning to himself: foreign, he makes it familiar, that is, he makes it his own. It is thus the growth of his own understanding of himself that he pursues through his understanding of others. Every hermeneutics is thus, explicitly or implicitly, self-understanding by means of understanding others.”[35]

Paul Ricœur

2) Further historical development of positivist cultural spaces and the expanded means of human communication eventually also allowed for alternative morally relevant, physiologically sensory contexts of individual, opprobrium-configured invigoration, and what constitutes a physically remote, representational form of reaffirmation of the anthropological self—by no means in substitution for physiologically immediate social interaction, but most certainly as an auxiliary space of simulacrum and physio-sensory exercise for the sedentary, anthropological individual.

In such an historical evolution to compensate for the progressively less physical, positivist cultural experience, the possibility of auxiliary physiological spaces—in the form of representation (artistic and political), entertainment, and sports—proceeded physiologically towards higher forms of simulacrum (texts, images, film, radio, eventually television) creating ultimately a form of spectator being, as an opprobrium-configured (so morally relevant), physiological exercise of anthropological individuality that in fact might very well be understood as inexorable in regards to sedentary experience itself; for the problem of a necessary rational sphere of the socially congruent is, once again, dependent on the impetus of physiological individuality that eventually must make physiological use of culturally rational development itself, as what could be understood as permanent need to restore myth to positivist cultural contexts.

Naturally, such a restoration of the mythological takes place on the fringes or outside altogether of rational understanding—specifically, in a physiologically aesthetic, subcultural realm of sensory invigoration, often so subtle that is seldom rationally approached at all—except for professionals of the image (including writers or other artists) or by individuals and organizations in fields in which the culturally rational self is object of physiological and behaviorist tactics of persuasion, pressure and conditioning.

In regards to sedentary experience, the physiological but rationally opaque reality of individuals and their dependence on the group, becomes a physiological and physiologically sensory necessity of the impression itself, as a subcultural adjacency to the socially congruent—but that, in the structurally mutual interdependence between both, is only fleetingly noticeable, really in the influence of one on the other.

And thus the argument also can be made that, in regards to non-sedentary, human experience, in which physical movement is imbricate with need itself and the group’s ability to achieve states of comfort, a need for the rational is consequentially less—whereas sedentary cultural spaces, as of agriculture, however, exploit human sensory physiology to cater to the same, underlying physiological reality: the physiological, bodily origin and circumstances of the socially congruent becomes, in this sense, a resource.





Collective physiological contexts are viable because progressively more complex forms of physiological dichotomies arise and mutually define themselves; physiological opposition and interdependence in this sense becomes the foundation of the culturally rational. But states of structural stability will always require further episodes of invigoration necessitated by the deeper essence of human physiological and physiologically sensorial experience. That is, the structures of meaning or congruence created through physiological opposition, while creating physiologically rational contexts people come to depend on, are contexts that will also themselves need to be physiologically exercised and invigorated—such is the deeper reality of human corporeal, physio-sensory experience.


In the case of strictly adversarial contexts of physiological impetus between opposing parts, conflict in itself becomes all-important as the deeper pillar and foundation of anthropological stability; permanent strife is not constantly possible, of course, but the real engagement living individuals are dependent on (as in fact their life force and vitality) must inexorably renew conflict as a physiologically existential meaning of life. Indeed, such a physiological significance of intense impression for the experiential self—and in the individual’s eventual dependence on it—becomes at least structurally, already a form of meaning:


Physiological opposition and dichotomies create contexts of physiological interdependence between entities that are (even for animals) a form of meaningfully defined and ordered, collective physiological opportunity to life, that, over time, becomes a sustainability of physiological substance of experience for multiple, mutually dependent, living entities.


Crucially however, order and nascent meaning that arise from physiological opposition are originally auxiliary to simply physiological possibility itself; order as meaning in this sense, however, is lived by singular, physiologically corporeal individuals as only ultimately a form of invigorated comfort through permanent cycles of varying, sensory impression.   


For human beings development of meaning as of physiological dichotomies—in conjunction with more and more sedentary circumstances—leads to the creation of a strictly sensorial realm of existence that is physiologically real, though not necessarily objectively real. But such a physiologically sensorial realm of at least a physiological reality must also sustain itself of invigorated cycles of activity, elation and rest.


The exercising of such a physiologically sensorial realm of physiological though not objective reality, is by means of moral dilemma itself; and the game of being a culturally rational, culturally specific, singularly corporeal individual, is the greatest, most permanent pursuit the anthropological individual takes part in necessarily through the better part of her natural life: the invigorated stability of more sedentary anthropological contexts in fact depends on it.


But the possibility of moral dilemma for anthropological individuals and the groups they are dependent on, ends up requiring physiological opposition not only between individuals, but also in regards to opprobrium-configured, physiologically relevant, conceptual entities human groups impose totemcially, first on the objective circumstances that surround them and that comprise their natural, physical and spatial worlds. Such anthropological atrezzo constitute in fact logical dead ends that are useful specifically in that no logical contradiction is effectively possible, allowing human groups to posit whatever causality—eventually concepts and systems of belief—they choose, and as part of an original social congruence individuals have no option but to opprobically relate to as singularly corporeal individuals who eventually can no longer always be entirely sure they indeed actually belong to the group, or not.


The individual’s circumstance of opprobically relating to conceptual posits that are socially congruent and so socially enforced, becomes a physiological relevance of those concepts for the individual in regards to which she is anthropologically coerced to define herself; such a definition in this sense of the singular, physio-corporeal self produces the other side of anthropological individuality, that is the also socially congruent, social or cultural self.


Certain nuances of the concept of nihilism, therefore, are problematic for the contemporary, rational and positivist observer, given that it is really physiological and physiologically sensory experience that is the core of our cultural being and which it is channeled, over time, into higher-tiered structures of social and opprobrium-configured congruence derived of 1) physio-corporeal opposition between singularly physical entities, and 2) conceptual posits that acquire opprobrium-configured, physiological relevance for the individual. But the moral connotations of the notion of nihilistic behavior would seem to obstruct the understanding of the nature of the individual’s living, corporeal sensuality ( almost a form of hedonism) as the real brick and mortar of what later becomes socially congruent rationality itself; a rationality that is effectively independent in a certain sense from our physiological entity, given that social congruence becomes something like a product of physiological substance of experience in collective circumstances, but does not exist anthropologically in its own right (except, of course, as a methodology of the practice of science.)


To further complicate this situation and the state of separation ultimately between our physiologically sensorial, body life, and the socially congruent order we live in—through which we in fact understand ourselves—the socially congruent, cultural self is also forever still a physiologically corporeal self that exist in the permanent need also of physiological and physiologically sensorial engagement— in spite of and very much against the stable, anthropological complacency social congruence eventually affords us.


It is perhaps from the standpoint of such a complacency that purely invigorated, physiological engagement appears to us as nihilistic, and so subject to the inquisitional scrutiny of the opprobrium-configured, socio-genetic force of our own and individual will to belong to the group; and of course conceptually do we also duly construe the rational arguments necessary to understand and safeguard us from the ultimate consequences of physiological anomie (as generally all religions have historically done). In this way, it is easier—and more collectively efficient—if individuals have available to them the conceptual logics human groups have always used, in one form or another, to in some way transcribe the physiological predicament their collective experience and survival is based on.


In fact, cultural individuality could be understood as exactly that which arises in such logical contexts afforded to singularly physical individuals, but underpinned by the opprobrium force of specific, living human groups; and in just such circumstances of especially sedentary human groups, individuals are indeed obliged to assume a quite specific paradigm of the physiologically homogenized, cultural self.


The indeed physical origin of morality in this sense, is thus also similarly the possibility of socially congruent rationality upon which the history and evolution of different human groups has edified, over the centuries and millennium, the necessary conceptual instruments to in fact synthesize and know their physiologically corporeal and sensory selves—according to whatever particular, functional logic that becomes a specific control mechanism against the physiological towards what we understand simply as a specific cultural identity.


But even though morality is identity in regards to the physiological substance of individual, physio-sensory experience, logical thought borne originally also of moral possibility, similarly serves individuals towards a physiological control of a greater integration of both sides of anthropological individuality, rather than just repression by one side over the other—and it is Ulysses who could be considered (at least in the western tradition) as truly one of the first heroes in this sense. For when he did not renounce the sensorial delight of the song of the sirens, but also assured his physical survival by plugging the ears of his crew, he dealt with the physiological predicament of human groups another way and perhaps in reverse, in the individual’s sensorial embrace of reality while the group steels itself against it; but either way, it is the group that must prevail in what is clearly the unresolvable paradox of the group’s own sensorial reality, perceived nevertheless by singularly physical individuals.


Knowing our physio-corporeal, sensory selves?

The inchoative nature of anthropological stability, as a state of sustained tension in favor of collective, physiological possibility and substance of experience–but that only really supports itself in the structural order of the conjugation of its own collective, rational congruence–renders any complete and definitive knowing ourselves impossible and a structural contradiction of terms: for it is the rational opacity of the collectively corporeal and sensory that which requires of our rational selves—the very reason, in fact, of our need to be rational. Human beings are rational because the evolutionary survival of human groups depended on above all the group’s permanence over time, and through the lives of the individuals that composed it; it is actually the group’s physiological, physiologically sensory appropriation of individuality the individual understands as her own rational self. How then could she thoroughly know herself and still be rational in her physio-corporeal subjection to the group (that is in fact the foundation of her own rational awareness, in her not knowing and a culturally imposed distance from, her only physiologically corporeal, sensory substance of experience?)


Knowing ourselves, then, on the structural plane of group permanence and stability through time, but from the standpoint of the physiological substance of our bodily experience, becomes a living and renewed exercise of anthropological individuality, for a physiologically rational, corporeal entity that only through collective congruence itself can ever aspire to logically synthesize her own substance of bodily being in sensory perception. But the simulacrum that is the cultural self (in regards to singularly corporeal experience that is however, deferred by the structural urgency of the collective group) is only the functional homogenization—through biological opprobrium—of a physiological reality and substance of experience, but is not itself ever definitively physical, nor finally ever unequivocally delimited; it is rather only opprobically impinged upon perception that is capable of judging—hence interpreting—not only what is good or bad (big or small, etc.), but also what really is, or not; for is not only morality that is founded in the opprobrium-configured reality of our physiologically corporeal, sub-cultural (so, sub-rational) body life, but so is the foundation of meaning itself.


Existential non-definition and ambiguity in this sense is living opportunity for the physiologically corporeal, but-also-culturally-rational individual, who, because she is a cultural (so rational) self, can in fact seek to know her deeper, physiologically corporeal reality through the very rational protocol of mind that is her own cultural definition. That is, cultural rationality that inexorably still must anchor itself in physiologically corporeal and sensory experience of bodily perception, resorts to that very physiological substance of experience now available to it, to effectively expand, in a certain sense, its own physiological possibility of experience in a realm now culturally available of the physiologically conceptual. A realm that, in the very impetus of the individual’s own culturally specific, physiologically rational imposition, will inexorably be refined, built upon and enlarged: for the deeper physiological substance of our being means we cannot help it but to invariably push forward in our physiological imposition, through whatever recourse the living, cultural present we happen to be born into offers us.


Perhaps it is in regards to this circumstance of our physiological nature in expanse (that is itself only really in a form of imposition as expanse), that another kind of nihilism arises more dangerous than the original nihilism mentioned herein. This second type of nihilism more than just a physiological nihilism, is physiologically rational nihilism, that is a physiological substance of experience that, however, takes place in a strictly sensorial realm of also the rationally conceptual, where the individual benefits, of course, form a much broader margin of physiological freedom and fantasy—given that objectively real, physical consequences are not, at least initially, to be expected nor feared.


But the reality of only physiologically sensorial and conceptual experience is still to some degree a physiologically relevant (‘opprobrium-configured’) reality the cultural self is not completely immune or oblivious to; moral transgression in the realm of only the physiologically sensorial and conceptual, is a form of sometimes very intense stimulation the cultural self in fact uses to re-affirm itself—that is a recourse structurally anthropological contexts also rely on as an individually experienced mortification through only sensorial perception (in the form of cultural representation or the actual witnessing of morally relevant phenomena), but that is effectively a collective mortification of a specific, anthropological individuality in itself.


But in our physio-corporeal and sensory invigoration lies the real possibility of anthropological, human group stability for especially sedentary human experience; that is a rationality perennially reaffirmed through the physiologically sensorial need to consolidate itself, once again, in its own living, social congruence—as part of the long and universal saga of our own history as a species and the thwarting of the threat of demise of the group through its own physiological anomie.


Finally, nihilism could be considered positive as human physiological impetus that requires only of rational pretext to collectively sustain itself, through time; but it is surely negative when a posterior, culturally evolved plane of the physiologically rational and semiotic, continues, however, to relate physiologically to in its own only conceptual, intellectual nature; and especially when science, in the form of technology, crosses form the physio-sensory realm of the culturally conceptual, and semeiotic, into the realm of physical reality ultimately obliviousness, however, to its own physiological substance of entity: anthropological stability maintained its very equilibrium in historically not allowing this to happen so abruptly, if at all, throughout most of the millennium of human history and its social evolution. Scientific man as of quite some time ago, however, can no longer afford to relate only physiologically—or even perhaps anthropologically at all—to our own technical power of imposition over life on earth.





8. Hitchcock’s MacGuffins

Is a conceptualization of sorts of physiological and physio-sensorial pretext, over rationality itself! Or, that is, the notion of rational pretext in favor ultimately of physiological, physio-rational, invigoration…


The Birds (1963)

Certain comments made by character’s, and Hitchcock’s repetitive visual emphasis on the female human body under savage attack, lead one to question the seriousness of the actual birds at all; as if the threat of invasion of the small town and our way of life, had really something more to do with heinous criminal violence itself—in the story Cathy Brennon tells of her brother’s work as a lawyer defending a man who shot his wife in the head six times, because (we later are told) there was a ballgame on TV and his wife changed the channel; and in regards to most of his clients Cathy refers to as hoods (because, she says, that is what her brother calls them.) And the symbol of the encaged love birds which seem to perhaps represent the nature of couples versus the hostility of the world, and for whom, additionally to themselves, there is the recourse to humor—and perhaps the invigoration of serious moral outrage—but not a whole lot else in the growing social and physio-social confines of 1960s Western civilization;


That is, perhaps the bird war on man as portrayed in the film is itself a MacGauffin that allows for an indirect contemplation of the what seems to be in fact our dependence on the idea of crime and, specifically, its violence (a theme Hitchcock goes back to again and again), and that would benefit us in the physiologically sensory exhilaration the idea—and its imagery—affords us, which in some sense is the real, deeper imagery content of The Birds.


-Rod Taylor, at the height of the bird onslaught—and once that there is no option whatsoever to war—is presented wearing a dinner jacket in regards to his upper body, while waist down he is dressed in olive-drab combat fatigues, as if this image were the true revelation of civilized man and our Janus-faced ambivalence of etiquette and simultaneous violence.


-And it would seem survival is really a matter of a needed invigoration through which all the central characters seem to realize themselves in one way or another, as if the experience itself were a form of ultimate good fortune in at least its outcome, and assuming you physically survive. A sort of wholesomeness in fact between the remaining, surviving individuals is formed in the kiln, so to speak, of the ordeal.


Historically, of course, the film coincides with rising crime rate in at least the United States of that time, and compared with data from the 1940s and 50s. Although Hitchcock could be said to have based his work as director, from in fact his professional beginnings of the 1920s, on violence and society’s relationship with it, does this 1963 film really question what has changed, suddenly, about human nature, rather than psychotic starlings, seagulls or crows?


In any case, the protruding and supreme image in the viewing experience of this film–that exercises its physiologically sensory dominance over our sedentary, civilized eye, and  which prevails over our visually stimulated emotions—is the mangled and hued, human corpse of especially a woman’s. And thus, explicit in this film is what was only suggested in Shadow of a Doubt (1943), Stranger’s on a Train (1951), Rear Window (1954), Vertigo (1958)—all films in which the only implied elliptical idea of a woman being strangled then supports the plot of each respective film. But unlike Psycho (1960) which is, of course, also famously explicit, The Birds seems to create something of a cover argument in the actual birds themselves fronting, so to speak, the real source of terror that drives human beings, it would seem, to bigger versions of their own person, just as the characters here end up psychologically going beyond and overcoming themselves through the turmoil depicted; and perhaps even as something of a political statement, it seems the director is suggesting that this dilemma—that of greater growth in some sense as human beings through hardship, strife and turmoil—is a conundrum of a consumer society, only somewhat more manageable, of course, because of film itself, no doubt!




9. After the Definitive Fall of Myth

And after the definitive fall of myth, they had no choice but to return through the desert whence they had come, back to their original group and the conflict that was, once again, awaiting them as itself a form of embrace…

In the desert of the real, outside the embrace of physio-sensory representation and the contexts of physiologically conceptual expanse it affords, human groups still have each another and, crucially, the enemies or rivals through and against whom they are in fact able to define themselves. For there is succor in the physiological itself on strictly the physical and spatial plane of physical conflict, if physiologically sensory and representational invigoration is not culturally available.

In the absence of more developed semiotic spaces for physiologically rational-conceptual expanse, a certain degree of communion with our deeper physiological entity lies in conflict itself, for in the physiological invigoration of our sensory, corporeal selves there is the anesthesia of an adrenaline-charged mode of being and of knowing one’s self that is, of course, intensely physical and all-enveloping—to the point that higher forms of culturally representational being are not necessary. Adversarial contexts of physiological meaning based inevitably on some degree of physical conflict (or at least the threat of it) come to supplement, or even substitute all together, higher modes of physiologically semiotic projection the individuals in agrarian-based, sedentary contexts are inexorably compelled to live in.


-But physiological substance of sensory experience is a form of communion with the deeper, corporeal and socio-genetic self; the succor of physiological-sensory invigoration then, because it is opprobrium-based, can only take place in the company of other human beings, for construed entities of the mind projected on to the contours of the spatial world are never physically perceived, leaving the anthropological individual ultimately cleaved and separated from, the physical component of our own rational possibility.

-Because human sensory entity is opprobrium-configured, it exists in some sense prior to actual physical community. That is to say (as Jose Luis Pardo affirms), the city in regards to human history is an anterior posterity (una posterioridad anterior) in that what is already motivating human experience in its socio-genetic foundations, in itself a form of purpose pre-existent to specific historical, technological cause.

-Physio-sensory representation in the form of spectacle has always existed (it could be argued that all human perception is a form of representation in the mind); and so has spectacle always ended up serving as mode of deferring physical reality for human groups, or at least the violence of that reality. For through spectacle, physiological and physiologically sensory invigoration is achieved, albeit without jeopardizing the integrity of the group. And crucially, human-group sanctioned spectacle, mirrors the underlying mechanism of anthropological individuality that is the channeling of individual physiological response into a group-imposed congruence (that is, the group’s very rationality, if only initially of a physiological and sensory nature).

But of course, all human groups eventually do impose some sort of conceptual logic (myths, narratives, group-understood ideas) in regards to the physiologically sensory substance of their own experience, through time. And it is no surprise then, that elder members of the group, in their condition of steadily waning physical prowess as compared to the younger generation, become the natural guardians and real executers of that corpus of conceptual understanding, as the knowers of what needs effectively to be known if one is indeed a member of the group, and as the very semiotic structure the younger group members must subject their own physiologically sensory selves to.

Physiologically sensory spectacle, thus, is key to the diachronic permanence of the group because it is sensory-intense, but not, however, necessarily physically demanding for the onlooker. And the communion of physio-sensory entity that spectacle is, becomes a force of really physical unity and reinforcement of the group, through time and in regards to the different ages and physiological states of varying, individual ontologies.

And finally, the physiological reality of specifically narrative for human groups constitutes itself a form of purely physiologically sensorial representation, and so could be understood as mechanism of removing physical spectacle—the exercising of anthropological, human group individuality it affords—to the realm of sensory simulacrum that is, nevertheless, physiologically real and, above all, morally relevant for opprobrium-configured, anthropological individuality; and originally such a capacity of human groups as of the development and progressive evolution of language, could only be considered a serious force of group permanence, and ultimately power.


10. Logical-Conceptual Possibility from Socio-Genetic Physiology

1.Transcription of Human, Socio-Genetic Physiology into Logical-Conceptual Meaning:

Very much probably so that people continue to live ultimately in the mystery of their own physiological entity in the underlying, invigorated complacency the group provides, and until the impetus of physiological individuality reaches progressive degrees of maturity, then declining into the senectud of individual ontogeny. Moral dilemma (in a Judeo-Christian logic, for example) weights itself precisely against a phylogenetically established, physio and socio-cognitive, human nature, in itself a resource available to sedentary anthropological contexts towards their own tension and invigoration, and given that a formerly more hostile and dire physical world that conditioned such a phylogenetic evolution no longer exists in the same way…


The culturally rational self is based on and primed by, the intimacy of the corporeally physiological, opprobrium-configured self. That is, the culturally rational, moral life of human groups is, in this working sense, due to a secrecy (or ‘opacity’) of individual corporeal, body life—under and peripheral to, the collective congruence of our rational understanding of ourselves. Established semiotic stability (atop the opprobrium-configured, physio-corporeal realm of human groups) ultimately must preserve itself in the stimulated invigoration of the very physiological complacency it provides anthropological individuals by recourse, once again, to the physiological—especially sensorial—realm of the body. By implication, then, any state of living definition of the culturally rational is also an inchoative state of still-to-be-projected physio-semiotic impetus of individual physiological energy and vitality, that only supports itself of a broader, opprobrium-configured, semiotic and conceptual structure, at a distance so to speak, while remaining in itself only a living, potential projection of individual, bodily vigor.


  1. Revision of Unabomber´s Revision

The notion of being somehow displaced in regards to our phylogenetic essence and technological change, goes back even further in our past to the transition from nomadic to sedentary human groups. This is in fact the foundation of culture itself as we know it, particularly religion—long before somebody the likes of the Unabomber. The story of Cain and Abel—for example—is the transcription of a paradox of sorts between a previous state of semi-sedentary human groups and agriculture; and that the unresolvable dilemma of agricultural (or sedentary) man becomes our physiological and physiologically sensorial entity whose violence is only manageable for us in the projection of our physiological vitality in the form of labour and the different professions, due to the fact that we no longer live simply in movement itself; for it is Cain’s decedents who found not only cities, but the artisanal professions of leather crafts, music, and metallurgy as what constitute really proxy activities into which human beings can violently throw themselves, in all their energy and fury, albeit collectively secure in the conceptually moral framework the sedentary individual is compelled to live in and effectively know herself through.  And the logic itself of not being lazy, for example, is really because of the problems our physiological nature causes in sedentary circumstances (1), if we cannot project our vitality through some culturally congruent, physiologically semiotic channel: the day to day security of collective, sedentary anthropological contexts depends on it.



(1)Lorenz, Konrad; On Aggression (1963); Routledge Classics, 2002; pg. 245: Clearly, the task of compensation devolving on responsible morality increases at the same rate at which the ecological and sociological conditions created by culture deviate from those to which human instinctive behaviour is phylogenetically adapted. Not only does this deviation continue to increase, but it does so with an acceleration that is truly frightening.

  1. Myth itself is constant re-presentation of our physiological, socio-genetic and sensorial essence:

But becomes an object of logical-conceptual contemplation for us and is therefore a form of rationality in the social, collective congruence it constitutes. And in reference to it can one avail herself towards one’s own notion of the socially congruent self; that is, as an individuality who understands herself because of the physio-conceptual, physio-rational definition she can bestow on herself through resource to physio-social congruence, and in conjunction, of course with the force of biological opprobrium and its impingement on—that is in fact the true supporting foundation of—our physiologically rational, sensory experience (how she believes others see/regard her). And so collectively congruent, physiological and physio-sensorial entity becomes itself a form of physio-corporeal congruence, previous to whatever form of logic culture later imposes on it! Such a physiological entity is, in a sense, a form of underlying tautology….



11.Against the Current(1979) Isaiah Berlin (Princeton University Press,2001)

 The Divorce Between Sciences and The Humanities


(Pg.81) It is not surprising that the this view was most strongly held and most influential in the hour of the greatest triumph of the natural sciences—surely a major, if not the major, achievement of the human mind: and especially, therefore, in the seventeenth century in western Europe. From Descartes and Bacon and the followers of Galileo and Newton, from Voltaire and the Encyclopedists to Saint-Sion and Comte and Buckle, and, in our own century, H.G. Wells and Bernal and Skinner and the Viennese positivists, and their ideal of a unified system of all the sciences, natural and humane, this has been a programme of the modern Enlightenment; and it has played a decisive role in the social, legal and technological organization of our world. This was perhaps bound sooner or later to provoke a reaction form those who felt that constructions of reason and science, or of a single all-embracing system, whether it claimed to explain the nature of thins, or to go further and dictate, in the light of this, what one should do and be and believe, were in some way constricting—an obstacle to their own vision of the world, chains on their imagination or feeling or will, a barrier to spiritual or political liberty.

(pg.82) This is not the first occasion on which this phenomenon occurred: the domination of the philosophical schools of Athens in the Hellenistic period was attended by a noticeable increase in mystery cults and other forms of occultism and emotionalism in which non-rational elements in the human spirit sought an outlet. There was the great Christian revolt against the great organized legal systems, whether of the Jews or the romans; there were medieval antinomian rebellions against the scholastic establishment and the authority of the church—movements of this kind from the Cathars to the Anabaptists are evidence enough of this; the Reformation was preceded and followed by the rise of the powerful mystical irrationalist currents. I will not dwell on more recent manifestations of this—in the German Strum und Drang, in the romanticism of the early nineteenth century, in Carlyle and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and the vast spectrum of modern irrationalism both on the right and on the left.



  1. “Positivist” cultural contexts (defined in fact as staving off opprobic force of human biology from one’s vision of reality) are always historically compensated through the “resurrection of myth” (physiologically relevant vision’s of the real), probably because man’s imagination allows us not to have to live in only the misery of the physically real and immediate. The luxury of physiologically rational, sensory expanse is too important to human need in the context of sedentary life to forego.
  2. Social Congruence of whatever nature (positivist, mythological, religious…) to be structurally viable through time, must allow for the invigoration of individuals in a living present; thus if culturally rational identity is to remain in effect, individuals must live in the possibility of their own physiologically rational and efferent imposition—and structural stability anchored in the past becomes simply the platform for living human groups who then live in their own physiologically rational expanse; resilient anthropological structures allow for this possibility (gain in fact their very stability from physiologically rational invigoration of individuals in this sense).
  3. Science founds itself only on what it already has established rationally; all new phenomena can be considered explained only if subjected exclusively to the corpus of established knowledge. This is to say, the limitations of established knowledge define how we rationally (and culturally) approach our own physiologically sensorial being, but very much extrinsically to our actual experience (that is inevitably the essence of the socially congruent and rational). Culture stability, however, requires some form of collectively recognized authority, and science especially because of its limitations severs that purpose very well, for our experiencing of the sensorial is only transcribable so to speak, to the rational, but is itself broader than just our rational voice (because rational capacity and cultural voice is a mechanism of imposition of limits on physio-sensory and corporal impression—that is the origin of the need for the socially congruent and rational, and the relatively specific cultural individuality the corporeally singular individual must assume).
  4. Following also Bruno Snell* and what constitutes a theory on man’s living, physiological need to impose on his world—conceptually, if physical experience is eventually limited—points to a vision of human existence as inchoative in nature, consisting of a being in imposition itself: Homer’s metaphors constitute a form of physiologically rational aggression against the limits of our physical experience, and given that conceptual forms of rational imposition had yet to be culturally developed (core notion to Snell’s thesis); but metaphor and the process of analogy it is based on can only be understood itself as a form of primitive or proto rational process, that is very probably still for us today at the foundation of our cognizance, although we live culturally in a much broader force of rational-conceptual imposition developed over the millennium since Homer (and since the higher Greek culture that succeed him)—a mode of rational imposition that today tends to remove us from our deeper physiologically corporeal essence, as culture is of itself a process of deferring to some extent physical experience, anyway.
  5. Homer, then, lived and thought physiologically; and so still do we, but the positivist mode of cultural stability we live in, because it removes itself from the opprobic, must compensate for this through the physiologically sensorial exercise of the physio-corporeal individual within the natural confines of our socio-genetic and opprobic physiological constitution—exaclty that which science has freed itself from, or at least in its technical praxis. The divorce of Science is really in regards to this point: technical thought is rational, but we live in more of a physiologically rational mode of relating to the world our bodies depend on. But divorces always go better as a mutally understood agreement between the parts, which historically, in regards to science and the humanities—or between science and the reality of our socio-genetic, physiological nature—has not been the case.



(pg.97) But, Vico maintains, if you read primitive utterances (Latin and Greek antiguities, which he new best, provide him with the majority of his examples) you will soon realise that what we call metaphorical speech is the natural mode of expression of these early men. When we say that our blood is boiling, this may for us be a conventional metaphor for anger, but for primitive man anger literally resembled the sensation of blood boiling within him; when we speak of the teeth of ploughs, or the mouths of rivers, or the lips of vases, these are dead metaphors or,at best, deliberate artifice intended to produce a certain effect upon the listener or reader. But to our remote ancestors ploughs actually appeared to have teeth, rivers, which for them were semi-animate, had mouths: land was endowed with necks and tongues, metals and minerals with veins, the earth had bowels, oaks had hearts, skies smiled and frowned, winds raged, the whole of nature was alive and active. Gradually, as human experience changed, this, once natural speech, which Vico calls poetical, lingered on as turns of phrase in common speech whose origins had been forgotten or at least were no longer felt, or as conventions and ornament used by sophisticated versifiers. Forms of speech express kinds of vision; there is no universal, ‘literal’ speech which denotes a timeless reality. Before ‘poetical’ language, men used hieroglyphs and ideograms which convey a vison of the world very different from our own—Vico declares that men sang before they spoke, spoke in verse before they spoke in prose, as is made plain by the study of the kinds of signs and symbols that they used, and the trypes of use they made of them.


Giambattista Vico (B. Giovan Battista Vico, 23 June 1668 – 23 January 1744)



-Otra forma de enfocar esto es suponer que la forma normal de razonamiento humano es por medio de la analogía que es exactamente lo que son las metáforas en su base y fondo; pero como estas sociedades antiguas aún no se habían desarrollado formas lógicamente sintetizadas de expresar y comprender las cosas, se comunicaban ¨`poéticamente¨ y por metáforas. Pero nosotros, aunque vivimos conceptualmente de la síntesis racional posterior, seguimos siendo capaces de una sensibilidad poética y fisio-sensorial, puesto que es la sensorialidad humana subyace de forma permanente a la congruencia social y es por tanto el agente principal críptico de nuestra propia racionalidad conceptual, mientras que para las sociedades anteriores este vivir conceptual no se había desarrollado aun (tesis de BRUNO SNELL). Pero hoy en día seguimos necesitados de un estímulo auxiliar fisio-sensorial que nos proporciona los medios audiovisuales, paralelamente a la conceptualización racional-empírica que desde la ilustración nos define. De esta manera se ha de considerar que nosotros seguimos siendo ellos, salvo que vivimos de una concepetualidad que, paradójicamente, no concibe su componente subyacente aun hoy original, de sensorialidad propia y fisiológicamente corpórea. Esto es, el hombre racionalmente sintetizador y empírico que somos nosotros vive a espaldas de su propia esencia fisiológicamente sensorial; sigue siendo sensible de hecho a ella, mas no tiene medio de vivir conceptualmente esta circunstancia puesto que su racionalidad es producto de y contrapeso respecto a su propia esencia fisiológica-sensorial. Pero, claro está, las sociedades conceptualmente primitivas (Homero) tampoco contemplaban conceptualmente su propia transcurrir fisiológica y sensorial: no tenían los instrumentos para ello, sino que forzaban los limites solo poéticamente de su propia capacidad cognitiva-semiótica.



La literatura en la forma contemporánea en la que la concebimos nosotros, abarca ambos lados o ámbitos de la individualidad antropológica: se sirve de géneros socialmente congruentes para estructurarse al mismo tiempo que se funda en la sensorialidad fisiológica humana de la impresión (o sea lo que se conoce por la estética); en este sentido la consabida verdad que contiene la literatura se debe al hecho moral que representa, en la relevancia fisio-opróbica que impone, por una parte, al tiempo que se puede y se debe utilizar para alguna forma de síntesis racional, de contenido en última instancia conceptual o que se puede trasladar al mismo mediante la interpretación finalmente intelectual. Es decir, que en la literatura frente a la ciencia, sobrevive un modo de saber que es sustancialmente fisiológoco-sensorial, anclado en el basamento mismo corpóreo de los grupos humanos vivientes que se yerguen oprobicamente ante la realidad circundante-y sobre todo y siempre para nosotros- sensorial.  08SEP17



–Such lingering turns of phrase are really our deeper physio-sensory sensitivity to the imagery of the body, its power, weakness or fragility. In fact, we use even today language in this sense and connotation especially as dominance or the subtle nuance of it, but in regards to language that is fully contemporary in its structure.


* Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought (Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Hamburg, 1946, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer, 1953)