10. Anthropological Individuality


1.Anthropological Individuality and Structural Logics of Human Groups

2.Physio-semiotic, Anthropological Atrezzo

3.Retorno a la belleza. Obras maestras del arte italiano de entreguerras

4.Anthropological Outsiders on the Other Side of Individuality

5.Jean Baudrillard, Cultura y simulacro (1978)

6.Una semiótica aparente y su fisiología (y el orden fisiológico establecido de la racionalidad cultural o de grupo)

7.Moral-conceptual weight in pictorial compositions

8.Constantin Guys (1802-1892) and Totemic Political Being

9.Physiologically Rational Atrezzo in Human Group Anthropology

10.Logical Dead Ends as Starting Points of The Rational

11.In Defense of Anthropological Simulacrum

12.Spectator Morality and Socio-Physiological Order in Sedentary Anthropology

13.Absence of Malice (1981)


15.Anthropology and the Human Circumstances of Simulacrum

16.The Myth of Main Street (Luis Hyman, NYT 12apr17)

17.La vida es sueño porque es simulacro

18. El mundo por dentro, de Quevedo

19. Physiological Resources and the Simulacra of Anthropology




Notes on Anthropological Individuality

From these two components of anthropological experience two different standpoints emerge from which individuality can in fact approach itself, that is, from a physiologically extrinsic, culturally rational experience in regards to the more immediate physiological, corporal self; and from that of physiologically invigorated experience in regards to the more physio-structurally mediated, cultural self. And a form of physio-rational synthesis is indeed possible from both to some extent, and in regards to alternately both a more physical as well as cultural (opprobrium regulated) individual experiencing of the physiologically sensory.


Anthropological individuality is thus something of a continuum between two points of physiological transit in a relatively permanent state of flux and surely variable as response ultimately only because of individual’s age, metabolism and particular psychological entity. And thus, the importance of the particular group’s rationality and the individual’s physiological, physiologically rational assumption of it, becomes to a great extent the individual’s very possibility of rational self-comprehension, that is, the only possible awareness of self as a necessarily cultural, group-configured self from which singularly individual, rational synthesis of physio-sensory experience becomes possible; that is the very possibility of self as in fact a dictate of the group and originally as of the group’s anthropological need towards permanence through the physiologically semiotic regulation of its singularly physical members.


And the recourse to a collectively understood group rationality, initially in regards to the ordering of physiological experience, through time, becomes posteriorly the need for a culturally rational sense of the physical self; finally, human language, as a form of physiological atrezzo around which more elaborate forms of group rationality can take hold, becomes a medium towards an even greater consolidation of the expression of self and in fact human subjectivity as we know it—and that clearly is above all a culturally possible subjectivity.







1.Anthropological Individuality and Structural Logics of Human Groups


  • Structural integrity and permanence of human groups, through time in the physiologically semiotic.


The Physiologically Semiotic:

-The Totemic


-Group-posited rationality

-Group-defined and enforced, individual physiological projection

-Group and culturally sanctioned mechanisms of physio-rational invigoration.

-The broader realm of the physiologically sensory and culturally virtual.


  • Physical and bodily vulnerable realm of bodily rational, bodily moral


The realm of the physiologically immediate (and potentially inter-personal), that is physio-sensory, physiologically rational experience in real time and much more physically integrated, away from the physiologically rational abstraction of the culturally virtual and opprobic (although not, of course, completely beyond it).



Anthropological contexts remain vigorously sound and stable as long as 1) does not completely override, subvert or stifle 2); or similarly, group resilience and elasticity can also be jeopardized in the case that 2) is unable to effectively challenge 1). Science, because it is a form of physiologically rational imposition that specifically removes itself form the realm of opprobrium-configured, opprobrium-enforced, human group rationality as a methodology, and then in the force of its spectacular historical results, can be especially vulnerable to an anthropological distortion here described—and this particularly in the contradiction and central paradox of a self-proclaimed objectivity that inevitably only takes place also in the realm of the human, physiologically rational, that becomes thus in itself a physiology of imposition, but intrinsically (formally and in its own technical self-understanding) outside necessarily of the socio-genetic contexts of anthros that is our own bio-genetic and socio-genetic fabric of opprobrium.


Because the objectivity of empirical science is exactly this removal of itself form the socio-genetic substance of human experience, a lack of scientific self-restraint is clearly (intrinsically) to be horrendously feared as, at the psycho-anthropological level, a potential form of the greatest violence conceivable by the individual in regards to, against and over the group—eventually, other human groups; that is of course an Icarus-like figure beyond the very limits of her own anthropological individuality; a limitation as in fact definition that can ultimately come from nowhere else but the group itself.


Inexorably must we then infer that human rationality is only a realm of the physiological itself; that we effectively live in what constitutes an anthropological supremacy of the physiological we, however, do not rationally understand and thus do not recognize—which is precisely what makes our rational sense of identity and cultural self-understanding vulnerable to our physiological vitality and substance of being that, even in our intellectual understanding of it, must inevitably always take priority:


So that culture can effectively rise to its functional purpose of preserving group integrity and permanence, through time—specifically in the individual’s physiologically rational-moral, and opprobrium-enforced (‘group-imposed’) capacity of some form of self-restraint.


Science, in our contemporary understanding of it, can be what it is because it places itself outside the opprobic realm of the culturally rational, that is effectively a positioning of itself in the bodily rational, bodily moral side of anthropological individuality, and this, paradoxically, as of the Renaissance when the body secretly imposed itself on a Mediterranean and catholic semiotics of an already religious—but rationally cryptic—supremacy of the body, specifically in a iconography of the physical Christ; an anthropological security that inevitably becomes the context from which Galileo is able, at least initially, to place everything conceptually in the hands of God and then simply behold the physical world as it appears in our perception of it;


But it is also true that the Dialogues of Galileo revolve intensely around the thinking of the Ancient Greeks, who he at one point suggests could only regard the truth of the physical world and its observation much in the way he himself does. And a further inference here might then be that coherent anthropological contexts are more explicitly (although not completely) body-centered anthropologies, that thus effectively achieve a better balance with and tethering of the physiologically sensory and opprobrium-configured virtuality of the cultural edifice and the human group’s physiologically rational morality.


Because human personality becomes physically and physiologically specific experience very much compelled itself towards the group’s physiological and physiologically rational terms of definition (through the bio and socio-genetic force of opprobrium), its most intrinsic, defining feature is its very violence and intensity of being through its own imposition—that becomes structurally crucial as the true bearer of the weight of the physio-opprobic and virtual realm of the group and its physio-cultural edifice; as also the deeper, cryptic challenger and charger of a structural tension the culturally rational actually depends on to be in its own exercise and enforcement.





2.Physio-semiotic Anthropological Atrezzo

Need to ascribe group-functional meaning to common physio-sensory experience that is a collectively technical knowing what we are as a group, so that individuals can know how to keep themselves from being excluded—that thus becomes the very need to in fact be an individual on the group’s terms and, finally, in a cultural sense as at least a paradigm of cultural individuality required of all singularly physical members of the group.







The Sea

King Kong

The Sun/The Moon/The Stars

The Aura Borealis






Human spectacles of physical violence and cruelty

The Human Corpse;

Eventually, human language itself.


Are all physio-sensorial experience in the human sensorial contemplation of them; and in the physiological impact on our perception is their force in us of physiological, physio-sensory awe. Our impulse and will to synthesis as imposition over physiological experience (for how else is the group ultimately to remain together?) leads towards the positing of some form of logic on to such physio-sensory experience, through recourse to another realm of our physiology that is our physiologically cognitive process of mind; in regards specifically to natural phenomena as mentioned, that, because of spatial remoteness and our sensorial limitation to actually apprehend, any logic posited on them cannot be contradicted, and thus only has to be congruent only in a collectively social sense to effectively maintain group entity.


-Group integrity is achieved, but individual physio-rational impulse and will to conceptual synthesis as imposition remains, despite the establishing of collectively physiological-semiotic mechanisms of group rationality.


-Sedentary contexts thus must define themselves in a physio-semiotic sense, both in an afferent and efferent direction, within culturally elastic contexts that effectively (albeit cryptically) cater to individual physiologically sensory, corporeal nature.


-To effectively cater to the deeper physio-sensory, physio-rational and moral nature of corporeal individuals (as in fact the true but cryptic moral possibilities of the group itself) sedentary contexts must be conceptualized as intrinsically unstable and thus in a very much not-immediately-obvious tension; as almost a subjacent state of in fact non-definition, from the standpoint of deeper singularly physical, singularly physiological and corporeal individuality, which then forces on our understanding of sedentary, agrarian-based anthropologies a certainly illusory quality of the culturally rational itself, additionally to the notion that sedentary human experience can only be collectively viable if it is permanently invigorated through means that are generally outside the realm of what is rationally understood by culture.


-The permanence and effective force of the culturally virtual thus defines itself on this very subcultural and physiological impetus of physical individuality, as the true life force of the culturally rational itself (that is, as the very need for culture to be culture), but that is unfortunately relegated to a cryptic realm of shadow and auxiliary support of the cultural edifice and its rationality.


-More technically coherent cultural contexts thus end up defending more explicitly the bodily itself, and necessarily to some extent against cultural rationality—anyway they structurally can afford, through what we can only understand as paradox, but that is in no way absurd, rather only the logic of a different and opposing anthropologically structural plane.













3.Retorno a la belleza. Obras maestras del arte italiano de entreguerras



3 MAR 2017 – 09:20 EST

Retorno a la belleza. Obras maestras del arte italiano de entreguerras. Sala Fundación Mapfre

…Y, sí, aquí están, de nuevo, Sironi, Campigli, Casorati, Donghi…, todos más bien novecentistas y, por tanto, pretendidos restauradores de una especie de clasicismo o eternidad del tiempo que, paradójicamente, acabó resultando profundamente histórica. Pero hay también, pocos aunque suficientes, ejemplos de la metafísica que, en torno a la revista Valori Plastici, no tuvo nada de restauradora ni de regresiva, sino, precisamente, mucho de melancólica y angustiada por una toma de conciencia particularmente aguda de la imposibilidad de ese retorno. De pronto y tras despertar del sueño vanguardista, una extrañeza espectral parecía haber atacado a los seres, los espacios y las cosas de la realidad cuando la pintura quiso de nuevo representarlos con las herramientas tradicionales, inquietantemente ajenos a cualquier lógica narrativa, pero también a los procedimientos tradicionales de leer mediante sus signos y figuras cualquier significado.

Es entonces cuando la nota informativa más convencional de la exposición nos pone por sorpresa en el camino de la comprensión, a poca suspicacia con que leamos que estos artistas “dirigieron su mirada a la tradición, pero en un sentido moderno”. Porque seguramente no habrá más remedio que reconocer que ese sentido “moderno” no es otro, justamente, que el sinsentido, no ya el obrado por la guerra (las primeras pinturas “metafísicas” son anteriores), sino el “descubierto”, según De Chirico, por el “polaco Nietzsche” en el corazón de lo real, una vez que se presentaba, justamente, en lo que el propio De Chirico llamó “la soledad de los signos”, o sea, huérfano de argumento, desasistido de los relatos o historias a cuyo amparo habían encontrado, precisamente, sentido las figuras en la tradición, errantes ahora por atrios, arrabales y cuartos desolados, más fantasmales cuanto más nítidos y aparentemente objetivos. Muy atentos observadores de la época (Simmel, Roth, Guardini…) supieron ver que la encarnadura de la vida había sido suplantada por la mecánica anónima de los procesos técnicos. De ahí los muchos cuerpos desnudos y abandonados, pero aún más los muchos arlequines (el de Picasso es de 1916) y maniquíes de los que se había llenado la pintura al tiempo que se había vaciado de humanidad. Eran cuerpos y figuras sin refugio, sin salvación, trazadas desde luego contra el tiempo que progresa, pero también, trágicamente, como aparecidos bajo el lema de que nada vuelve.


[16mar17] El momento del presente vivo es fisiológico por esencia y precisa, por tanto, de ser sujeto a un sentido eminentemente funcional, esto es, sobre todo, un sentido susceptible de ser socialmente comprendido, según la vertiente funcional de lo que llamamos simplemente ¨lo racional¨. De ahí que no resulte sorprendente que los espacios culturales echan mano de todo lo que puedan en este sentido, respecto del pasado sobre todo, puesto que la misma individualidad nuestra, como precisamente aquella parte de nosotros que vive frente a y en síntesis conceptual sobre lo fisiológico, no tiene más remedio que definirse inicialmente a partir de los resortes lógicos-conceptuales de su comunidad humana de dependencia; comunidad o grupo que de hecho, y para ser efectivamente funcional como colectivo, obliga a los componentes singularmente físicos y corporales a asumir un paradigma de individualidad según las circunstancias y necesidades estructuralmente antropológicas de la unidad grupal, en su propia labor colectivo y permanencia como grupo, a través del tiempo.

Precisamente en este contexto el arte deviene espacio de expansión fisiorracional posible, disponible para la individualidad más corporalmente racional (y por tanto menos socialmente mediatizada) que es la parte de la individualidad antropológica que funciona como verdadero sostén velado y críptico (esto es, de forma ´opaca´ respecto de la racionalidad cultural), y verdadera piedra angular por tanto de la arquitectura cultural racionalmente consagrada como tal; precisamente porque el arte, aunque de naturaleza fisiológicamente real, y moralmente relevante, por tanto, no busca imponerse sobre la racionalidad ya culturalmente consabida, y que no atenta, por tanto, contra la estabilidad lógico-conceptual del momento cultural presente y fisiológicamente vivo, y en su estabilidad y definición colectivas.

En cierto sentido pues, el momento vivo del presente fisiológico humano siempre carece de sentido, y que tal carencia no puede entenderse sino como la fuerza en verdad causal universal del ímpetu cultural humano en sí, y aquello que de hecho requiere de la racionalidad cultural, y como verdadera razón de ser estructural de ésta.




4.Anthropological Outsiders on the Other Side of Individuality

I am in my perception of what I know I am not—so, I am in my NOT being what I perceive; so I am in fact me as long as I am not what is around me (in regards to the inanimate, physical world). Being for me is thus being something else—and I am in a state of remaining separation from what I perceive is around me:


-I deal violently with what is around me because it is self-affirmation I feel in my power over it, and over the desolation that is at the core of my way of relating to the world (that is, as an ontological negative); and I therefore am above all in my imposition over my surroundings.


-It is no surprise, then, that I impose logics on the world that in some way allow me the benefit of a certain margin of evasion from the deeper reality of my physio-sensorial emptiness, as a fabricated, at least physiologically rational belonging according to enveloping structures of cause and effect; and, in regards to realms of experience that cannot be contradicted, I am free to impose whatever logic I need to give a complexity to my own understanding of myself that allows me to elaborate greater possibilities of ultimate comfort, once again in regards to—because of, against and perhaps in compensation for—the deeper hollowness of my bodily rational nature.


-And I counter this physical-rational conundrum I am beset by in my bodily rational entity, utilizing my physiology and its social, human group congruence to elevate myself above the definition of my physical limitation—the reason why I must live in the movement of doing, and physio-representational stimulus, as experience in some sense away from my deeper condition and nature;


-Such an elevation is the very socio-genetic mettle of my being that, additionally, drives me permanently to the embrace of others, although I only know this above all in my physiological nature, and therefore I frequently live in cultural contexts that tend to exclude from their socially congruent, rational understandings this other, deeper logic of the nature of my singularly physical experience.


-Clearly, then, culture as the human group’s physio-sensory regulation of singularly physical individuality—in its ritual, language and very rational understanding of itself—is a form of the greatest comfort I can know as in fact an imposed paradigm of my own definition and identity as an individual, that then becomes a being as finally belonging, my deeper physio-sensorial nature of physiological, and physiologically rational imposition impels me ceaselessly towards.


-But I belong ultimately to something akin to a physiological virtual reality of culturally defined (group and opprobrium-regulated) physio-sensory experience on which all our physical experience and its potential depends—a conceptually ordered, semiotic stability and limitation our individual physiological projection can in fact take place in and that more sedentary—ultimately agrarian based—anthropological contexts end up requiring. And it becomes my singularly physical and singularly physiological, bodily entity that is forever—and logically—to some degree excluded:


Because that is the deeper, socially non-appropriate— ‘socially less congruent’bodily self I inevitably remain in only my perception of the physical world, through only my own singularly physical entity; and because this other, less culturally mediated but physically singular side of me is also a structural necessity of culturally rational stability itself—that which pressures cultural rationality to be in fact functional in its very collective congruence and quality of potentially universal comprehension.


And so, it is the outsider in this sense and as part of anthropological individuality that cryptically charges culture to in fact be culture—and in some sense as the physical bearer of culturally rational order itself, who lives, however and necessarily, in some degree of rational blindness in regards to her own, deeper entity, simply because collective congruence and the other culturally virtual realm of culturally mediated experience is that which my physical entity, structurally, is cryptic primer to, but on the outside and from an exterior point of rational opacity,


Ultimately, because I cannot be you;


And am therefore banished behind the back so to speak of my own rationality, to a forced exile of a physical and physiologically sensory experience I cannot readily share with others nor thoroughly understand myself—a blindness structural anthropology ends up appropriating towards the group’s survival as a force finally of physiological titillation and structural tension through the ongoing turmoil of individual moral dilemma, and a never completely culminated process of individual self-definition.


For the socio-genetic force of opprobrium that impels me forever towards being me in the eyes of the others, denies the only true me I have ever experienced and yet have no—or in fact very few—words and concepts through which I can know, that is my singularly physical and physiologically sensory entity; and thus the violence of my most primary sensorial and physical self, that truly is in imposition over what I perceptually know I am not, is ultimately uprooted, made opprobically extrinsic and transplanted to a physio-sensorial and cultural virtuality of my own physiological, physiologically rational entity—in my mind, so to speak, and forever at the expense—at least rationally—of my corporal reality.


But my violence is also ontological also on the anthropological plane of my individuality, in the self-affirmation culture forces me to live as the paradox of needing to belong, but at the exclusion of my deeper and bodily rational, bodily moral, singularly physio-sensory entity—and so requires of me that I live in a deeper and subcultural defiance of that which I need to belong to, to physically survive, but that is also in fact the matrix of my own possibilities of rational understanding, of even myself, and the very force of my own culturally rational definition:


The human group I am a product of and, also in my own rationality, dependent on.


But permanently, it seems, anthropological individuality avails itself of the possibility of physiologically immediate communion with other physical individuals, in regards to the opprobic rigors of its own definition within the group—so that through direct physiologically immediate, inter-personal connection with others, the culturally virtual realm of physio-sensory and physiologically rational definition can be circumvented, to some degree, and towards the at least passing alleviation of the burden and weight of anthropological stability itself.


As if in fact because I cannot be you in my own physical entity, I live also forever in the imperious need to be with you, in body—actually more than in mind.


Though in the company of others one does not entirely free oneself of the rigors of the cultural self, its physio-sensory grip on the bodily rational, body moral self, recedes to some extent in favor indeed of a greater integration of both sides of anthropological individuality—and in the eyes of the individual in front of you can you in fact find your way out of your own mind and its physio-cultural rationality, back into your physically real, social embrace of yourself.


And a collectively understood congruence between different, physically present individuals who can see, speak to—and potentially touch—one another, is more easily maintained in the immediately direct, physical agency of the individual,


Who of course can directly judge the perception of others—and who can than revise, rectify or otherwise explain herself, right there and on the spot; who thus wields a power of self-affirmation, in the eyes of others, the cultural self need not in, that moment, control or suppress,


For you are in fact your own master, in your own physiologically immediate power and agency—and so require, in that context, only a minimum of physiologically extrinsic, physio-cultural and opprobic oversight your cultural self of the mind, so to speak, normally exercises.


In such a context, the other physically real and physiologically immediate individual seems to in fact eclipse the cultural and physio-sensory self almost altogether:


Then pretty much You are all that remains.




Two sides of Anthropological Individuality:

Bodily rational-moral self–VERSUSPhysio-opprobic cultural self

Cultural Evolution of Anthropological Individuality

Physiologically rational synthesis of experience as of progressively formed, cultural self:

-Collectively Afferent

-Opprobrium Imposed


Bodily rational, bodily moral, physically opprobic self


-Physio-semiotically efferent

-Outside culturally rational

-Silent partner to and mystery for the cultural self;

-Becomes a form of invigorated “dilemma of individuality” for the culturally rational self, both as dual parts of a greater realm of anthropological individuality:

-Combination as conjunction provides a physio-moral and conceptual titillation in regards to anthropologically structural.

Silent Partner specifically because it has no rational voice itself—that is domain of the other, culturally rational side and so is in fact the very reason for being of the culturally rational self.

-But the bodily rational, bodily moral self is the self of physical—and moral—preservation necessarily in opposition to the human group, and therefore becomes the deeper, cryptic and guardian side of ultimate group survival as that force which tethers the group’s will towards overcoming the physical, as all human group anthropological contexts, universally and to some degree or another, present.

-The Physio-Opprobic hero of human groups is that perceived and representational form of individual triumph over the group—perhaps in a physical sense, but also in regards to moral-conceptual feats—that individuality as category is universally sensitive to in all human group contexts; this deeper physio-sensory sensitivity is a natural corollary to the individual’s need to belong ma non troppo and never, paradoxically, at the ultimate expense of one’s own physical entity (and if human perception is indeed sensitive to an imagery of crowds, it would then be logical that individual perception were also sub rationally—sub culturally—sensitive to an imagery of the hero as exactly that which reflects and accounts for the physio-anthropological reality of individuals in regards to and against the human groups the culturally rational self is dependent on.)


The Conjunction of both sides of Anthropological Individuality

Bodily rational, Bodily moral


Culturally Rational, Social Self


Opposition in which one is the invigorator of the other; where one is also the rational synthesizer of the other.


Empty Matryoshka Doll or empty box effect of culture is perhaps because of the fact that one side of what is just physiological experience, holds up and supports the other side of the culturally rational (that is itself another kind of just physiological experience), being each one the pillar of the other—making us and our experience ethereal, except of course for the material, as perhaps the real force and drive in us towards the material world, that is specifically, the very insubstantiality we are in our experiencing of ourselves.


The Role of Biological Opprobrium in Our Socio-Genetic Nature

Opprobrium allows for a physio-sensory extrapolation of physical circumstances into physio-cognitive process of the individual’s mind, anthropological individuality ends up requiring in regards to the problem sedentary contexts become for human physiological nature.


Opprobrium is thus common cornerstone to both sides of anthropological individuality and is what allows for the relationship of interdependence between both.


















  1. Jean Baudrillard, Cultura y simulacro (1978)

Las fases sucesivas de la imagen serían éstas:

— es el reflejo de una realidad profunda

— enmascara y desnaturaliza una realidad profunda

— enmascara la ausencia de realidad profunda

— no tiene nada que ver con ningún tipo de realidad, es ya su propio y puro simulacro.

1)En el primer caso, la imagen es una buena apariencia y la representación pertenece al orden del sacramento. En el segundo, es una mala apariencia y es del orden de lo maléfico. En el tercero, juega a ser una apariencia y pertenece al orden del sortilegio. En el cuarto, ya no corresponde al orden de la apariencia, sino al de la simulación.

[Fisológicamente real que hace de lo racional un mero pretexto a su propio ejercicio y verdadera supremacía fisiológicos; y que por tanto no admite ni se presta a la contemplación racional respecto de sí mismo ni, en realidad, respecto al mundo real, aislándose de hecho de éste. Y por tanto puede tener, respecto a otras realidades de más peso, un efecto narcotizador quizá analgésico; es asimismo y desde el aspecto de control y gestión sistémicos, una forma de poder que tiende hacia lo totalización puesto que pretende definir de hecho el medio humano fisiológico y a través del tiempo, mediante una necesaria reducción del espacio racional libre de los individuos (y puesto que es la racionalidad como aquello que todos colectivamente somos capaces de comprender lo que asegura igualmente las posibilidades fisiológicas colectivas  civilmente ordenadas.)]


Finalmente, se serviría más intensamente del oprobio biológico (que es el armazón mismo y profundo del hecho racional colectivo) en detrimento de los posibles espacios fisiorracionales más amplios y, efectivamente, de naturaleza más física y singularmente individual en su propia racionalidad y moralidad corpórea, y en la que de hecho se basa la posibilidad misma de lo fisio-cultural colectivo y virtual.



.2)Cuando lo real ya no es lo que era, la nostalgia cobra todo su sentido. Pujanza de los mitos del origen y de los signos de realidad. Pujanza de la verdad, la objetividad y la autenticidad segundas. Escalada de lo verdadero, de lo vivido, resurrección de lo figurativo allí donde el objeto y la sustancia han desaparecido. Producción enloquecida de lo real y lo referencial, paralela y superior al enloquecimiento de la producción material: así aparece la simulación en la fase que nos concierne —una estrategia de lo real, de neo–real y de hiperreal, doblando por doquier una estrategia de disuasión.

[Parece sugerir que la simulación entendida como una especie de suspensión fisiológica que pende crucialmente de una definición-e inexorable por tanto estrechamiento de-lo racional (que es el armazón técnico-estructural del hecho fisiológico colectivo, complejo en sí) puede quedar miserablemente ahuecada para los seres humanos de todo verdadero ímpetu fisio-moral, fisiorracional, que es lo mismo que si dijéramos que nos han eliminado la sal complemente de los platos que, día tras día nos obligan a comer; y que respecto la individualidad antropológica viene a suponer la imposibilidad de ser individualmente en ese nivel más singular y visceralmente corporal que es la verdadera integración de ambos lados de la individualidad antropológica, en la vigorización opróbica del individuo físicamente singular frente a y en contra de esa otra parte de sí que es su individualidad físio-sensorial y cultural igualmente opróbica; parece indicar, digo, que la antropología como simulación y en su entidad sistémica tendrá que servirse una vez más de la naturaleza fisiológica y sensorial de las personas para efectivamente hacer que vivan vigorizadas en el mismo estímulo de su propia naturaleza sensorial y de percepción, siendo el recurso en este sentido fisiológico del miedo el más primario:


Pues el vivir uno en el espanto de la anticipación de perder lo que se tiene es efectivamente una estrategia siempre efectiva de que el individuo quede finalmente conforme de hecho con lo que posee y con lo que es en su propia cotidianidad; el terror físiorracional (esto es, fisiológicamente sensorial pero también auxiliado por un soporte conceptual) vivifica la limitación física-real que de hecho define nuestras vidas como una forma simulada pero fisiosensorialmente real de superarla e ir más allá de las cuatro esquinas más immediatas a nosotros y de las que depende vital y quizá patéticamente nuestros cuerpos.]


Lo kitsch, lo cursi y los simulacros: todos se basan en la reducción de las dimensiones-y por tanto del peso-de la contemplación racional más ardua y sus consecuencias; todos ellos efectivamente se radican en exclusivamente lo fisiológico, en el signo de la impresión sensorial, y que se proponen todos la misma autofortificación en lo fisio-estético o físio-semiótico y conceptual frente a las implicaciones racionales mayores que no se ciñen al marco ya disponible y de pretexto a su propio hecho fisiológico.


And so to some extent reference as physiologically semiotic activity of human cognizance—and hence expanse—supplements for the clearly hermetic quality of cultural rationality within anthropologies of excessive simulation that are founded precisely on a reduction of higher rational experience in favor of the physiological, but that eventually become in themselves a denial of the corporeal, where in fact man’s deeper, singularly individual entity of rational-moral being takes place. All anthropological contexts, however, base themselves on some degree of curtailment (as in fact definition) of the rational in such a way as to better support collective congruence and stability of physiological experience, through time.


  1. Una semiótica aparente y su fisiología (el orden fisiológico establecido de la racionalidad cultural o de grupo)

Eso era todo, Antonio Muñoz Molina


(1)De lejos todo es más. A diferencia de la mirada, la imaginación agranda el tamaño de las cosas según van alejándose. En los años ochenta muchos jóvenes con antojos o ambiciones de modernidad queríamos mirar lo más lejos que fuera posible porque lo que teníamos cerca lo veíamos pequeño y estrecho, lo mismo nuestras vidas que nuestras ciudades. Cuanto más distantes los resplandores, más nos deslumbraban.Veníamos del agobio de lo cerrado, lo consabido y lo autóctono. En los últimos setenta, en los primeros ochenta, el mundo se abría delante de nosotros de par en par, pero casi todo lo que nos mostraba solía encontrarse muy lejos, (2)tan fuera de nuestro alcance que se confundía con las fábulas de nuestra imaginación, o con las historias de las películas y los libros. Veníamos del vasallaje hacia el pasado, impuesto en parte por la dictadura, en parte por nuestra lícita nostalgia republicana. El futuro lo habíamos concebido sobre todo como irrupción utópica, como la llegada de un paraíso intemporal. La democracia, sobre todo cuando se pasó el miedo al golpe militar y el primer Gobierno socialista consolidó una normalidad inusitada, era un presente respirable que no habíamos conocido nunca. Por primera vez en nuestras vidas no estábamos uncidos a un pasado fósil ni condenados a una espera de incertidumbre o de esperanza apocalíptica.

Entre la gente inquieta apenas existía entonces la adhesión a lo identitario y lo propio y lo cercano que llegaría luego. Era legítimo, y habitual, detestar el sitio donde uno había nacido o donde le había tocado vivir, y manifestar el deseo de irse de allí a toda prisa y no volver nunca. El orgullo local, el amor por las tradiciones, era una cosa de juegos florales franquistas, de coros y danzas. Lo moderno era amar lo lejano y marcharse en su busca, o si no se marchaba uno, por falta de posibles, recrearlo en su vida, en su manera de vestir, en los bares a los que acudía. Hasta en las más lejanas capitales de provincia y cabezas de comarca había bares nocturnos que eran como túneles virtuales de huida, maquetas esforzadas y en general menesterosas de lo que la imaginación nos aseguraba que existía en el mundo lejano, en el mundo real. Se podía ser cosmopolita sin salir de tu provincia abrigada escuchando música pospunk y bebiendo ginebra de garrafón hasta las tantas entre la niebla de Ducados y Fortuna de un bar que se llamara, por ejemplo, Skyline, o Baltimore, o La Factory. (3)Las lejanías sucesivas provocaban grados diversos de agigantamiento. La noche de Granada era legendaria vista desde la noche de Jaén, pero en la noche de Granada los más fantasiosos añoraban la noche de Madrid, y la noche de Madrid estaba llena de gente que cimentaba su prestigio en el hecho, cierto o inventado, de su conocimiento personal de la noche de Londres o de Nueva York.

  • El ser humano ha superado lo fisicamente inmediato siempre en el recurso que tenemos a una profundidad conceptual que de hecho precisa la naturaleza fisiológica de nuestra experiencia, sobre todo a partir los contextos humanos por naturaleza grupales y progresivamente más sedentarios; y si bien es respecto una geografía remota y solo de oídas (o por medio de la representación fisiosensorial), se hace igualmente en la imposición fisiorracional nuestra sobre cualquier punto solo parcialmente conocido por nosotros que, respecto al mismo, cualquier lógica que asentamos en cualquier modo y grado de utilidad para nosotros no puede efectivamente contradecirse, lo que nos permite al menos una base solo funcional de asertos lógicos posteriores, lo cual simplemente resulta de gran utilidad para mantener los grupos humanos antropológicos vigorosamente unidos mediante una lógica que todos los individuos no tiene más remedio que abrazar, que es la definición misma de pertenencia, finalmente y aquello que designamos como racionalidad en cuanto funcionalmente aglutinante a nivel de grupo y sin prejuicio, naturalmente, de que sea o no empíricamente real;
  • Aunque a nivel individual este ámbito así constituido de lo fisiológicamente sensorial, fisio-estético y conceptual, permite a su vez que los individuos también sean capaces de generar asertos fisio-cognitivos y racionales propios; esto es, que lo que constituye una funcionalidad colectiva hacia un sostenimiento estructural del grupo a través del tiempo, lo es de forma aún más estable y fisiológicamente arraigada por cuanto concede finalmente un espacio de ejercicio fisio-conceptual y de imposición a la individualidad misma que es en rigor la verdadera fortaleza estructural mayor, en esta acomodación de la individualidad fisiológica, fisiocognitiva dentro del espacio de lo estructural-grupal, fisiológicamente semiótico; lo que viene a ser una especie de cuadratura del círculo en la supremacía y sostenimiento del grupo, a través del tiempo, sin embargo mediante la incorporación de una verdadera autonomía fisio-sensorial y conceptual de individualidad. Lo que quiere decir que lo antropológicamente estructural y colectivo comparte con la singularidad física del individuo la misma sustancia fisio-sensorial y virtual de racionalidad cultural y sus posibilidades de una fisiología fisicamente ausente, hasta cierto punto, que es, al menos en la semiótica, fisiológicamente real, fisiológicamente moral en su representación finalmente mental porque es, en la sustancia de su imaginería socio-genéticamente posible y al menos inicialmente racional (esto es, a partir de una configuración colectivamente comprensible, o al menos potencialmente.)

3)   Jaen is to Granada as Granada is to Madrid is to New York or London…

But what is a posited space of physiologically rational expanse and exercise, beyond the limits of physical definition, for the people of New York or London at that time?

-Europe (and other NY-remote parts of the world);

-Popular music and film

-The learning, exercise and cultivation of foreign languages.

-Higher forms of intellectual refinement


But also,


-The watching of sports


-Different, bigger exo-fears that invigorated-ly sustain us in our conformity to the physical, cultural limitation of our own definition; fears that physio-conceptually create a physiological illusion of our own choice towards security and comfort—that, because physiological, is physiologically real (so rational-moral in the socio-genetic nature of individual physiological experience)and so no illusion, in a certain sense, at all!

-A physiologically conceptual conviction the individual lives in of possibility somewhere out there on the horizon of a social experience one cannot directly apprehend as of just singularly physical definition, but that one knows, however, is out there in our conceptual understanding of the market, the city (or the country), the generations (previous, present and future); the peoples of the world and their cultures; or a greater, systemic notion of cause and effect in regards to the broad categories of human health, the nature of crime, greed, violence, love, families…all of which are based on and propped up by an atrezzo of representation (media, statistical, artistic, academic and intellectual) we have no reason not to regard as real, for even in possession of an alternatively rational explanation and finally intellectual credence, the physiological substance of our nature and experience would still take priority over ideas and our very cognizance itself; and despite such alternatively presented logics, the physical experience of our bodies would still be vulnerable, and so also subject to the imperious need in regards to the groups we are dependent on of a rational-moral order of the physical. And at that point, it would be in the physiologically sensorial, once again, where we would seek to impose some form of commonly understood proposition, if only in a functional sense, individual physiology can exercise itself around towards the group´s sustained permanence, through time and over the successive generations of indivduals who make up the group. 


Una semiótica solo aparente, respecto también un plano físico en cierto sentido ausente, o fuertemente reducido; lo que obliga a una conceptualización de lo real según una vertiente también puramente fisiológica y fisio-sensorial (que de forma virtual constituye el espacio fisiológicamente racional-moral del hombre finalmente sedentario, aquello que forma las propias capacidades nuestras de descodificación de lo percibido según el contexto socio-genético de nuestra fisiología individual y singularmente física).




  1. Moral-conceptual weight in pictorial compositions: How it is achieved.

-The human figure (or apparent reference to it, even through the figures of animals)

-The human face (or apparent reference to it)

-Crowds, groups, families, psycho-affective interconnection (or a series of similar, inanimate objects as also physio-aesthetic, generally sub rational, reference to groups)

-Objects (or symbols) that only denote human physio-anthropological experience:

houses, cities, perpendicular-lined grids, architecture, traffic; rows and columns of chairs, shoes, bottles, etc.; or the symbols human societies live under and articulate some form of meaning (‘value’) around (money, brand names, political symbols, status symbols, cultural—semiotic references).


-Or the absence, specifically, of all of the above, can also become a mode and recourse to a remote referencing of the human.

-The physio-sensory, aesthetic effect of emotion on the beholder as of whatever of pictorial composition is in itself an invigoration of the individual´s sense of self that, of course, can only really be physio-sensorially perceived as of the generally unconscious, sub-cultural impositions of the group and the relationship of socio-genetic dependence it imposes on the singularly physical individual—that thus effectively becomes a form of more remote connection to in fact the rationally moral or its possibility.


How does La generación del 27 maintain moral reference in regards to a poetics that technically proposes to have very little at all, preferring a plasticity of images in a certain sense against higher conceptual transcendence? This can only be possible in the way contemporary art also seeks to de-physiologicalize aesthetic experience beyond the rational-moral (and socio-genetic) implications of our perception and its physio-cognitive process in us—placing it into the realm of artistic expression we call the abstract. It would seem clear, then, the possibility of this kind of artistic production as of the historical period of the Avant guard, is because of the specific physio-semiotic stability of a defined historical moment and its anthropological structure, being exactly that which can support an external countering of its cultural rationality through a defying of the rational itself; that is a placing of the ultimate meaning of what it is, in that which it purports specifically not to be. And so inversely, an anthropological context that lacks such a culturally rational stability could never support a form of artistic expression that renounces reason itself—it would maintain not even remotely a connection to any sense whatsoever, except as only physiological stimulus, that of course, would no longer be art; anthropologically, people would surely be busy with the attainment of comfort as of a different kind of necessity.


8.Constantin Guys (1802-1892) and Totemic Political Being

Lithography—and not photography—is more demanding initially of the mind, and especially in the case of Guys, who must artistically represent a still very much objective physiologically rational perception of events—that thus equally requires of the viewer a similar physio-aesthetic rationality of interpretation.


The construction of a modern pictorial and graphic ken, popularly and very much in the terms we understand it today, can only be considered to have established itself as of the technical possibility of the popular dissemination of the physio-aesthetic object of interpretation, massively and in the form of lithography contained in newspapers and periodicals.


The significance of this is huge, and in the form of a very much contemporary consolidation of a physio-aesthetic and physiologically totemic realm of the political, that is finally, a totemic form of individually collective being through a journalistic media; but still, the newly consecrated empire of the physio-aesthetic image, popularly and towards a coming Rebellion of the Masses must still be considered differently in the form of lithography (that has still to be physio-artistically “codified”), as opposed to direct photographic images; and different yet again from what later would be the combination of image and sound (film after 1928), and eventually, television.


Radio culture after 1920 is perhaps physiologically closer to silent film in regards to the effects on the perceiving subject, although the realm of direct and structurally conceptual thought radio can be a vector to, cannot be found directly in images (and thus sides reading and radio against silent film); but the combination of image and sound seems to produce a very much enveloping effect on the viewer as form of physiological isolation and detachment from higher, individual rationality—specifically because the experience seems to commandeer physio-rationality itself through a pitting of the linguistic against the physio-aesthetic perception of images, binding both together in a greater force of imposition over the individual´s perception and physiologically cognitive process of mind.



9.Physiologically Rational Atrezzo in Human Group Anthropology

-Allows groups to remain intact by standardizing to some extent individual physiological experience;

-Creates in this way a ritualization of physiological experience in collective circumstances.

-Supports itself as physiological experience in collectively understood, conceptual posits that make such a standardization of individual physiological experience possible.

-A logic can initially be in some sense only physical, regarding spatial circumstances the reaction to which, in order to maintain group integrity, must be become eventually ritualized in regards to all individuals, through repetition that ultimately creates a collectively shared sense of expectation based on previous experience; and whatever internal hierarchy of the group itself that may exist among individuals, is an example of a physical logic through the dominance of some over others—that is logical ultimately because all individuals in the group live in relevance to it.

-Events of natural awe are useful in this sense because they impinge forcefully on human perception which drives human groups, in order to in fact remain together, to create some form of collectively understood rationale that then serves to channel group experience itself. Entities perceived by groups that are physically remote and beyond all possibility of human imposition, are especially useful given whatever logic that is eventually created about them cannot be contradicted, and thus it is a logic that must be considered rational at least for all individuals within the group, and simply because the group in fact ends up articulating itself around such posits—thus making its socially functional rationality of obligatory relevance for individuality itself.

-Events of forceful awe and at least sensory imposition over human groups, become in themselves opportunities for collective, physiologically rational definition in the physiological invigoration of that perception and the subsequent collective need to define, the only way possible, physiological response; that is, through the auxiliary support of a collectively understood logic from which each individual can then approach her own singularly physiological and physical experience.

-In more sedentary contexts such a force of sensory impingement on human groups ends up compensating—as in fact physiologically rational stimulus and experience—for the limitations inherent to sedentary, collective life—and as if physiological experience in sedentary contexts had no choice but to develop more and more elaborate rational contexts, towards the maintaining of group integrity, and in order to provide physio-sensory realms of broader physiological possibility and individual expanse, given that actual physical experience in sedentary contexts is, in different ways and to different degrees, curtailed.

-The binding force of such posits are thus in the individual’s need to belong to the group, and can only be realistically conceptualized as a form of biological opprobrium individuality comes about through—as a form of conflict between the bodily-rational, bodily-moral side of our physical entity, in tension with the other, social and physiologically extrinsic side of anthropological individuality. Additionally, the greater part of individuality would then present itself as socio-genetic, that is, as inherently defined by the group itself.

-Human language can likewise be understood as a form of physiologically rational atrezzo that sees members of the group producing physio-sensory entities of a phonetic-anatomic nature which then acquire an originally deictic, collectively understood significance—and that, because phonetics itself cannot be contradicted, allows for more and more elaborate genesis of further rational structures, in an historically ever-increasing horizon of physiologically rational, human experience and endeavor.

-The ability of the individual to then rationally approach her own physiological experience, can only be on the terms of the group itself and as a cultural possibility of the rational; also implied is the need for a culturally rational self as of progressively more sedentary anthropological contexts, perhaps because, if human groups remain essentially nomadic—and thus avail themselves of more physical and bodily physiological experience—the need to relate to others in more elaborate (and less strictly physical) ways is just as remote as the need to have a more developed social self.

-Rational synthesis of physiological experience is thus the hallmark of sedentary human groups as of the anthropologically structural need to in fact have a social self, and is perhaps the true path universally of all cultural experience—or at least its underlying direction—in regards to human contexts, however, that must also sustain themselves physiologically and not just in regards to physical necessity. But, of course, human groups that in fact rarely or never elevate themselves above the living desperation of only physical survival, are also permanently engaged physiologically, and thus have only primary needs for only a minimum, culturally rational definition.

But the term primitive in regards to human groups and their need for physiologically rational definition and support, cannot, however, be synonymous only with nomadic; rather the inaccessibility to greater, culturally rational development would seem to be due to the technical circumstances of limited physiological resources that, in the context of extreme and permanent physical necessity, are already consumed and are thus not expendable towards the creation of more elaborate physiologically sensory contexts of rational meaning, representation and process.

And, thus, in agrarian anthropological contexts, the structural need for culturally rational development, beyond primary group cohesion and integrity, must be understood as in fact a necessary engaging of the physiological nature of individual experience, beyond physical necessity itself, and towards a physio-sensory and virtual, anthropological security of simulacrum.


  1. Logical Dead Ends as Starting Point to The Rational

Physiologically Rational Atrezzo:

A logical positing in regards to the moon, for example, cannot be contradicted, but becomes the structural foundation for further rational inferences that are in fact structurally correct as of that initial logic—that thus possess a formally coherent, at least structural correction of rational argument, even if the original assertion is empirically false. What makes the original posit structurally relevant is the impossibility of contradiction and thus available to be utilized in a posterior and at least a formally correct sense.



Similarly, phonetic substance upon which phonology erects itself as the foundation of all further linguistic meaning, likewise has no connection whatsoever to meaning in itself—it is, like the moon, beyond all possibility of contradiction and thus can be used in its very stability of never being contradicted for further, more elaborate configurations of phonemic, eventually semantic-syntactic, meaning.



Biological Opprobrium itself:

Opprobrium is rationally opaque for the individual whose cultural rationality is then possible as of this permanent mechanism of individual, physiological response and definition; and in such a subjection of the individual realm of the physiological and physiologically sensorial, the edifice of a particular cultural rationality can never be undermined, being the rational opacity of opprobrium exactly that which supports—guarantees, in fact—the possibility of and need for, the culturally rational.



Rational stability, then, bases itself on logical dead ends that become the working foundation for further structures of meaning in support of, once again, human physiological process and collective contexts. Rationality could thus be conceptualized as intrinsically always limited, somehow, as its very possibility of definition, very much like forms of standardization must be imposed on economic process—in the end because they are collectively understood and adhered to, regardless of how empirically precise such measures of standardization actually are, or not—so that once again other types of process (also ultimately of a physiological nature) can take place and support themselves through universally understood pretexts. Similarly, the defining of a judicial rationality as context for further physiologically rational process and exchange between different and conflicting, human agency, is also based necessarily on the formally logical dead end of final respect for judicial verdict itself, whether right or wrong—and ultimately only because it is in its pronouncement.


Finally, this technical circumstance of limitation inherent to all mechanisms of anthropologically rational pretext clearly becomes the possibility itself of a socially regulated physio-semiotic order —that is the very force of the group over physical circumstances and towards its own living permanence, through time which can only be achieved through some degree of standardized defining of singularly physiological, living individuals; but of course to be structurally viable as a group, through time, such a limiting as definition of the individual must necessarily provide new contexts of physiological and physio-rational expanse to cater to the perennial (and genetic), physiological core of individual, human experience:


What defines collective order through the imposition of rational limitation is only structurally viable if it successively serves for the creation of new possibilities for individuals of physiological opposition to it, and in the singularly physical and physiological condition of bodily rational, bodily moral man; in the context of sedentary, ultimately physio-sensory, cultural virtuality, such a realm of individual physiological exercise and expanse could only be understood as a culturally contained, physiologically rational possibility of opposition, in varying degrees and modes, to the anthropologically structural itself—that, naturally, possess no significant threat to it.



  1. In Defense of Anthropological Simulacrum

-Intrinsic to the physiologically semiotic, and the totemic itself;

-Intrinsic to collective nature of human-group rationality.

-Intrinsic to circumstances of human-group individuality;

-Intrinsic possibly to life itself from the standpoint of death or non-life.

-Intrinsic to the physiological necessity of human beings as imposition (need, imposition, comfort, power)

-Intrinsic to physio-sensory necessity of human beings and the permanent circumstances of bodily entity and a knowing myself in my perception of what I know I am not; but a human-group and cultural knowing myself is also physio-sensory and opprobrium-configured, and is thus also a knowing myself in how I should perceive the world in a greater or lesser degree of conformity to how they see the world—If I am in fact still to belong to them or at least not find myself ganged up on and turned against, by them.

-Intrinsic to the socio-cognitive process of my mind and cultural rationality that is the chief defining force of my own individuality; for I live in a permanent mental simulation of immediate, human group circumstances that are, however, never actually physical—and so seldom ever physically real. What is this but a form of simulacrum of the terror of my physical dismemberment (or abandonment) by my own fellows, but that is a reality of only my physiologically cognitive entity and mind?

-Simulacrum ultimately because of the circumstances of more sedentary anthropological contexts, and the physiological need of man not to fully know, given we are ultimately trapped in the physical limitation of bodily experience and in a permanent physiological present!



12.Spectator Morality and Socio-Physiological Order in Sedentary Anthropology

Because physically singular perceiver does so always from the standpoint of individuality as imposition on the part of a specific, anthropological, human group, the moral relevance in perception is the adherence of the impression in the individual–or not–to a broader, group paradigm of general (but relatively defined) physiologically sensory appropriateness a specific human and cultural group has originally articulated itself around—and out of which a general, group-specific paradigm of individuality is produced and to be effectively assimilated in some degree or another by all singularly physical members of the group.


Rationality thus really begins in this physiological order of sensory impression in the only way possible, that is through biological opprobrium and the moral relevance this imposes on the singularly physical individual in her permanent struggle to belong to the social fold (struggle that is in fact permanent simply because complete union with the others is impossible in the physical definition of bodily, singularly physical individuals.) The rational-moral is thus initially only such as a of a living geometry, so to speak, of multiple singularly physical individuals and the imposed ordering of physiologically sensory experience so that the group may effectively remain a group, and despite the individually autonomous, physically singular physiological response to stimulus.


Biological opprobrium is thus the foundation and cornerstone, in regards to the strictly physical, collective experience of groups, but also allows for and develops a posterior, strictly physiologically sensory realm of a cultural possibility through more elaborate forms of logical order; that establishes, finally, a cultural rationality as we understand it, that, while also physiological itself, allows for a more sophisticated rational synthesis by individuals and groups of physiological experience.


A division of the body and the mind is thus a culturally produced and reinforced circumstance of anthropological contexts, and an overcoming of physical limitation human groups achieve by using an atrezzo of group-posited logic to in fact impose on, order and articulate physiological experience.


By no means, however, does this mean such a division of mind and body is actually real; or rather both mind and body belong in fact to the greater dominion of human physiology itself.



Use physio-sensory and physiologically aesthetic representation to compensate for the weight of physiological immobilization such contexts impose on the singularly physical individual. In a greater intensity and degree than in the case of more physical and non-sedentary contexts, sedentary human groups use physiologically rational and conceptual atrezzo in the form of ritual, spectacle and narrative to articulate also morally relevant (i.e. ‘opprobrium-configured’) images—pictorial and linguistic-conceptual-as a form, finally, of culturally structured compensation for physiological immobilization. And key to culturally structural viability in this sense is the establishing of order, once again in regards to the physiological circumstance and substance of experience, but in a way that is ultimately open to the possibility of innovation and the development of further spaces of physiological expanse—for the living who existentially adhere to a logical order posited in the past, while also requiring a certain element of freedom and non-definition to effectively be in the physiological substance of our living entity, both necessarily as of the body and in the mind.


And thus, human freedom could be understood as more than anything else a physiological freedom of exercise, and the anthropologically structural simulacrum of physiological and physio-sensory expanse.


13.Absence of Malice (1981)

Physio-titillation of moral dilemma for the anthropological individual

Is only possible, of course, in regards to an established, collective and physiologically relevant rationality, the singularly physiological individual lives in some degree of adherence to—and even in her defiance or transgression of that rationality; but without such a physiologically opprobic relevance of the group’s logically conceptual posits and what it knows to be true and good, there cannot exist cultural recourse to moral dilemma and the physiologically rational exhilaration it provides, and that is in fact crucial to the structural viability, through time, of sedentary anthropological contexts. And while a more primary, more intensely opprobic tension still remains in regards to only the bodily-rational, bodily moral configuration of a specific anthropological paradigm of singularly physiological individuality, higher forms of more physiologically rational and refined, conceptual tension-invigoration are, eventually, forfeited.


In this sense, Postmodernism and the suspicion with which it regards high modern culture, becomes the initial phase of a process eventually of distortion of cultural space itself—and that, if not understood and in some way curtailed—or at least defined—ultimately leads to an unbridled, culturally unsustainable primacy of only the physiological, in regards to which we have no choice but to understand as expression of opinion, and sundry forms of cultural experience that, while initially comprehensible as indeed a very much wholesome form of a Rebellion-of-the-Masses stability and anthropological configuration, cannot, however sustain itself over time, and in the gradual but progressively constant renouncing of its own cultural sphere of rational definition form which to approach its own physiological substance of experience.


And its cultural rationality becomes, more than pretext to the physiological itself, a vigorously growing mask and veil to hide the reality of its living state of exclusively physiological experience, and only primary and very much incapacitated ability to know itself any longer.




And one of the characteristics of what is usually understood as only an ideological conflict in only a difference of ideas, is in fact this difference in a physiologically invigorated sense of myth versus a to some extent dephysiologicalized (non-mythological) stability of parliamentary and thus only situational, strictly dialectic opposition between democratically legitimized factions.


And it would seem that in the fraught of dialectic struggle towards initially only hegemony of a democratic majority, political forces will often inexorably end up seeking to leverage the system itself through physiologically semiotic appeal and invigoration of the individual, exactly in the way human groups already anthropologically exist, configure, and reinforce themselves anyway. And this, especially if it constitutes something of a naturally existing resource at the core of human groups and societies, who, in the already existing anthropological stability of an opprobically blind, group adherence to only a physiologically functional and determined rationality (that is thus necessarily limited in its underlying logical foundations), political agency would frequently never have a clearly understood reason not to avail itself of it.


And so, to some extent unwittingly, political agency will naturally tend to create myth as a way of consolidating an only physiologically semiotic and mythological leverage over the other, rational side of the political and anthropological subject. But the danger of such a process resides clearly in the recourse to the physiological entity of anthropological individuality against and in detriment to the already defined rational limitation and balance of the human group—which physiologically invigorated political agency seeks (unwittingly in regards to ultimate consequences) to undermine and really subvert.


A naturally present form of inoculation form this danger, however, is available only really on the plane of the anthropologically systemic and from the standpoint of a higher culturally administrative agency and maintenance of human group, physiologically rational resilience—specifically in an administrative will and power towards the guaranteed and continuing existence of a genetic diversity of the social and physiologically rational fabric of society itself; that is, a structural force of difference towards stability as an obstacle to physiologically rational homogeneity of one or another, single and politically empowered agency—specifically as it attempts to physiological-ize the anthropologically crucial sphere of an already established, collectively congruent, rationality of the human group.




  1. Anthropology and the Human Circumstances of Simulacrum

The history of human rationality is the story, over the millennium, of human physiology in the contexts of human groups as primary survival units. Human groups use the recourse to collectively understood meaning as chief and universal strategy to their own sustained permanence, through time; ultimately because multiple, singularly fiscal, singularly physiological individuals can only remain as a group if there is some form of standardized homogenization of individual physiological experience—and rationality is exactly a means towards an ultimately collective synthesis of the physiological substance of human time, in our perception of it.


People in groups cannot be “physiologically unique’ in the exteriorization of the better part of their personal conduct and behavior, if the group is to remain a group and keep from violently dissolving itself!

Thus, a collective synthesis of the meaning of this that we are in our experience and in the experiencing of ourselves, naturally requires that each one of us possess a collectively comprehensible understanding of our own individuality, that is a structural dictate of the group and without which ultimate group viability and permanence through time, would be jeopardized. It thus becomes really a necessity of the group that you assume a specific human group’s paradigm of your physiologically singular individuality, that is finally a knowing yourself through and on the terms of the very group you are physiologically dependent on.

Rationality thus becomes the collectively understood, socially regularized domain of the possibility of self, or at least a socially functional socially structural self, outside of which—in a strictly collective, functional sense—there is nothing:

For the possibility of rational synthesis is the group’s possibility of meaning that crucially serves to fortify the group itself; and this to such an extent that from the standpoint of only the collective and socially regulated rational, being you is in fact being them.

Of course, on the singularly physical and physiological plane of your own bodily reality and experience, your being them is impossible—is permanently beyond the realm of physical, bodily experience, and from the standpoint of logic, absurd.

And yet this is in fact the underlying, universal paradox of culture and the reason for the cryptic characteristic of anthropological, human group experience.

Eventually, of course, the collectively regulated realm of the human group’s rationality ends up supporting itself of its cryptic partner that is the bodily rational, bodily moral, physiologically singular individual—as in fact a category of auxiliary invigoration to cultural stability, but that remains forever the crucial challenger to the rational, and the very reason culture must in fact be in the exercising of itself.

And to a very real extent, cultural stability is possible only if this underlying and rational silent partner to our cultural selves remains forever in the incomprehensibility of only the physiological substance of our experience:

Simply because knowing is our imposition over our way of experiencing, but knowing is not being; and, somewhat regrettably, the corollary to this is also correct:

Being for people necessarily implies not fully knowing.

And thus, perhaps inescapably, are we forced to confront the simply technical circumstances of our requiring of different forms and contexts of simulacra, given the nature of our physiological selves—but in our ultimate survival only as groups; a situation that is critically compounded by Positivism and the historical advent of only technically rational cultural spaces.



The Myth of Main Street (Luis Hyman, NYT 12apr17)


…Main Street is a place but it is also an idea:


It’s small-town retail.


Its locally owned shops selling products to hardworking townspeople.


Its neighbors with dependable blue-collar jobs in auto plants and coal mines.


It’s a feeling of community and of having control over your life.


Its everything, in short, that seems threatened by global capitalism and cosmopolitan elites in big cities and fancy suburbs….


What is a more accurate word and conceptualization for the English Myth as used in above context, and from a physio-anthropological standpoint; that is, as a conceptualization so powerful in people that it impinges heavily on how they project their own physiological nature and vitality? Evidently, the starting point is the opprobrium force of the Crowd Image (Canetti) in the physiologically sensory impression of the anthropological individual; economic process, when viewed as a human system over time, lends itself to our physiologically sensory embrace of an imagery of the human group, much in the way we relate to the conceptualization of cities and the flow of a moving and agitated demographics, through time.


Another meaning of myth is, of course, insubstantial, ultimately fraudulent; but the second nuance is derivable form the first meaning, that is, the opprobrium force of physiologically rational impression in the anthropological individual is structural support itself to the culturally rational—and so is therefore outside of our rational vision of the world, and given that human group rationality depends cryptically on it. It is logical, then, to consider insubstantial ultimately fraudulent anything that cannot readily be the object of language, or even our own socially rational thought itself. But this quality of being outside the socially congruent dose not, of course, mean the physiological substance of our being is not real, or completely beyond our capacity of perception of it; in fact, it comes to act as a form of invigorated stimulus to the very much welcomed complacency (initially, at least) of sedentary anthropological experience, in the form primarily—and supremely—of the aesthetic.


But it is also true that in this working divide of the physiologically sensory substance of our being, and socially rational congruence, individuals can be taken advantage of, simply because, in a certain sense, sedentary, human group anthropology must exercise an agency over physical individuality, anyway. And if there is no socially congruent reason to prevent other forms of political-economic agency from drawing on and availing itself of the structurally anthropological configuration of individuality,


What reason could there be not to?



  1. La vida es sueño porque es simulacro

Hay una clara funcionalidad—se diría estructuralmente antropológica—en el sufrir y padecer más que en un posible cumplimiento de objetivos logrados (esto es, las metas nuestras deseadas y de planificación inicialmente racional, lógica); aunque ciertamente dentro de contextos humanos colectivos no puede haber vida y proceso fisiológicos de proyección personal sin que se sujeten los deseos y la emotividad humana por planteamientos al menos nominalmente racionales, en verdad como finalmente pretexto en último extremo a la sustancia fisiológica de la experiencia vital nuestra. Por tanto, claramente nos situamos en el punto inicial de poder conceptualizar la experiencia sobre todo sedentaria de los colectivos humanos como esencialmente simulada en el fondo, y en un sentido técnico de simulacrum, que aquí se pudiera definir de forma amplia como procesos fisiológicos dentro de contextos colectivos que necesariamente han de asentarse sobre una limitación real, aunque no necesariamente reconocida, de racionalidad humana cultural.

La paradoja radica, adicionalmente, en el hecho de que, para el pleno desarrollo de la sustancia fisiológica de nuestra experiencia vital, y en la necesidad colectiva de que esta sustancia esté inicialmente sujeta al pretexto racional-social, el arrojo vital nuestro y fisiológico sea decididamente incompatible con el conocimiento definitivo e inequívoco de que vivimos una especie de patraña técnica antropológica que es, sin embargo, de la mayor importancia humana. Esto es, preferimos—en verdad lo exige nuestra naturaleza fisiológica—la paradoja antropológica y estructural que no tenemos más remedio que comprender, al menos intelectualmente, como un proceso simulado o de simulación en el sentido aquí esbozado.

De esta forma se establece un equilibrio entre las circunstancias colectivas de la supervivencia humana, y la mayor y más inmediata ferocidad de la fisiología individual; una especie de cuadratura del círculo en la que la racionalidad, que primeramente sirve para estructurar la vida grupal y fisiológica de los individuos sujetos al colectivo, cede sin embargo al ímpetu de supervivencia física-corpórea exclusivamente individual de los seres singularmente físicas y fisiológicas. Aunque más que un acomodar la naturaleza fisiológica singular, la racionalidad cultural se apodera de ella, siendo finalmente aquélla, en el nivel más profundo y basal, amo y rector estructural en las sombras del hecho cultural y su racionalidad, y eso claro está, a pesar de las apariencias y de la realidad racional.



  1. El mundo por dentro, de Quevedo

Plasma muy bien la idea de la paradoja antropológica en la que estamos obligados a vivir, entre la supervivencia física exclusivamente en grupo, y la necesidad del desarrollo cultural para acomodar, en ese contexto colectivo, la naturaleza profunda fisiológica del ser humano individual. Pero la base primera, de todo y ante todo, es la aparición y desarrollo de una racionalidad de grupo frente a la experiencia fisiológica singular, que es al mismo tiempo la obligación impuesta, y finalmente asumida por toda singularidad física-fisológica, de un patrón grupal específica de individualidad cultural o de grupo.

A partir de esta funcionalidad lograda, de una cierta uniformidad fisiológica colectiva, los grupos humanos se sirven de un espacio fisiosensorial y de representación, esto es, de su propia agencia fisiológicamente racional, para así imponerse sobre las circunstancias físicas de su limitación física-corpórea, pero con el fin una vez más y siempre de fortalecer la viabilidad real y fisiologica-existencial del grupo, que de forma permanente ha de acomodarse en su seno la naturaleza real y subyacente—finalmente subracional y críptica—de la naturaleza fisiológica de la experiencia individual humana;

Con ello se hace necesario entender la racionalidad del grupo no como una forma de relación necesariamente congruente con la realidad (aunque en algún grado lo ha de ser, claro está), sino como un instrumento ante todo de estructuración de la experiencia colectiva fisiológica sin la cual la experiencia integrada de grupo, pero respecto a individuos físicamente diferentes, no sería sostenible en el tiempo.

Y es el conocimiento compartido que es racional en tanto compartido que permite al individuo someterse a un cierto patrón de reacción fisiológica al que los demás están acostumbrados—que ya de hecho éstos anticipan frente a las diferentes contingencias existenciales posibles—y que impide, por tanto, que el grupo se disperse en el mayor caos de la fisiología humana desabrida y de una violencia individual finalmente feroz y necesariamente mortífera.

Naturalmente la única manera que esta posibilidad geométrica y grupal de la racionalidad así esbozada pueda surtir un efecto sobre el conjunto es que sea en sí misma una necesidad imperiosa para cada individuo, lo que implica paradójicamente, que el origen de la misma no es de naturaleza racional sino instintivo, cuya asunción por el individuo deviene en realidad una forma de sentido individual de supervivencia. Esto es, por ejemplo, el porqué de la adquisición de un lenguaje particular por parte del sujeto antropológico, que es al mismo tiempo, por tanto, la obligación sine qua non del individuo de ser perentoriamente según los términos paradigmáticos del grupo de dependencia, y como una forma de patrón finalmente grupal de una individualidad en realidad cultural respecto de, e impuesto por, un grupo humano particular.

¿En qué otra cosa puede consistir la pertinencia al grupo, como precisamente aquello que puede asegurar que no le expulsen a uno del seno grupal-vital, verdadera matriz viviente de la individualidad antropológica?

Y se hace patente la mayor paradoja de nuestro ser cultural que es la de una racionalidad cuya forma de configurarse, en su origen y como armazón perenne de la colectividad universal nuestra de hoy y siempre, es la anomia fisiológica y la en verdad zoomorfa aflicción del organismo biológico que, como nuestra sombra, no deja de perseguirnos, como si dijéramos, siendo al mismo tiempo al mayor acicate real y feroz de que nos sintamos impelidos de hecho a vivir racionalmente como grupos y sociedades humanos, aunque, de forma quizá penosa, no somos—no podemos ser—conscientes de esto mismo nunca y de forma definitivamente cabal.

Paradójicamente también es el cierre y término de El mundo por dentro cuyo desenlace viene a ser una especie sin más de diatriba contra algo así como la plasticidad de la imagen femenina, y esto después de haber repasado diferentes ejemplos de lo que es, quizá de forma circular, la extensión máxima posible de la cultura humana, entre un saber racional—y por tanto moralmente certero al menos respecto del grupo-, y la hipocresía que se sirve de lo racional como, en realidad, tapadera hacia una satisfacción—¿o plenitud?—fisiológica del sujeto individual.

Pero, aunque en cierto sentido no nos es estructuralmente dado saber que no sabemos, pues que nuestro arrojo vital-fisiológico no lo toleraría, tampoco podemos quedarnos en solo una postura de dureza racional-moral; o sí ciertamente lo suficiente como para garantizar la estabilidad físio-antropológica, pero también con suficiente filosofía y espiritualidad tolerantes como para vivir en la más alta consideración moral de lo naturaleza y sustancia exclusivamente fisiológica nuestra, tal como las religiones más tolerantes (y todas ellas al menos en algunas características) ya lo hacen, aunque de manera normalmente indirecta; que es una forma de sobrellevar lo que es en realidad una discrepancia técnica entre dos planos distintos de los contextos humanos colectivos, entre la supervivencia humana sine qua non como grupo—que por tanto ha de someter y homogeneizar racionalmente la respuesta y procesos fisiológicos de los individuos—, y la feroz voluntad a la vida que solo el ser corpóreo individual posee.

Y el problema final de la sátira de Quevedo es que se queda corta, sin poder proceder a formular un estado más elevado de conocimiento racional que la cultura española de ese tiempo ya poesía, sin embargo, aunque fuera de manera críptica, indirectamente a través del rigor católico que fundamenta todo dialécticamente en una defensa, en realidad, del cuerpo vivo, ante todo (y aunque esto no lo dice abiertamente) dentro siempre de un contexto crucialmente social. Porque de alguna manera el autor (en la forma exaltada final de su personaje) lo estaba pasando demasiado bien en todo su furiosa crítica de las apariencias, sin poder dar mayor cuenta conceptual de que aquella forma femenina que tan ferozmente satirizaba que tenía, sin embargo, una gran dignidad fisiológica de sujeto antropológico, a quien nosotros, en nuestra capacidad racional limitada solo podemos acusar de hipócrita pero que no hace más que aquello que hace en verdad racionalmente defectiva la antropología nuestra universal, que es la paradoja de que los grupos humanos son racionalmente para sobrevivir de hecho a la fisiología individual; y que la racionalidad tiene que dar paso y finalmente acomodar la necesidad inherente a la sustancia exclusivamente fisiológica, fisio-sensorial humana e individual, de una manera u otra, siempre equilibrando estos dos extremos de los cuales solo uno es para nosotros racionalmente visible, respecto solo de un lado digamos de la báscula antropológica universal.

Y seguramente de manera universal también nos es lícito, en toda cultura y en diferentes grados y formas, el comportarnos hipócritamente quizá como mecanismo de empalme digamos estructural entre estos dos compartimientos de la individualidad antropológica, que son por un lado el ser social y por tanto sujeto fisiológicamente por una semiótica racional compartida (de configuración opróbica), frente a la individualidad corporal y singularmente fisiológica.

¿De qué otra manera puede los grupos humanos perdurar si no es, habiéndose asentado y conseguido estructurarse fisiológicamente según una racionalidad lógica a la que todos son potencialmente capaces de someterse, no proporcionan también márgenes de ambivalencia en las que al menos fisiológicamente nos sentimos más libres y sin que atentemos contra la estabilidad base grupal y estructuralmente antropológica?

Y con Quevedo, en El mundo por dentro, nos podemos mortificar riéndonos, no sin cierto cariño hacia los objetos humanos de nuestra risa; pero con algunos estrofas de Berceo, Juan Ruiz, o las narraciones desde luego de Cervantes, en cambio, cabe aproximarnos un poco más a la cuestión estructural antropológica más importante, que es la racionalización un poco más explícitamente lógica de la necesidad de compadecernos positivamente y en el mejor sentido de la condición singularmente física y fisiológica del prójimo, que es sin duda la nuestra propia, concepto, por otra parte, que no se puede decir que el catolicismo desatienda del todo, aunque lo fundamenta exclusivamente en una racionalidad espiritual, que sin duda hubiera sido de la mayor importancia histórica del desarrollo social occidental.

Y en este punto nos encontramos igualmente ante otra paradoja más, al menos desde la óptica de nuestra propia individualidad-tal como nos conocemos racional que es decir culturalmente a nosotros mismos-que es el hecho de que la antropología sedentaria, en su esfuerzo permanente pero racionalmente críptico por acomodar la naturaleza profunda fisiológica nuestra, requiera que de hecho no seamos socialmente lo mismo unos a otros (cosa que no tiene por qué entrar en conflicto necesariamente con la igualdad democrático-administrativa); esto es, que en las diferencias radican también saludables relaciones de tensión fisiológica que son también relaciones de significado fisiológicamente racional. Simplemente, porque esta forma de interrelación estructural-social, como tensión un tanto subracional, subcultural y por debajo de nuestra comprensión racional-o al menos no del todo comprendido-deviene en sí mismo garante de lo antropológicamente estable en tanto que logra acomodar la vitalidad fisiológica real nuestra, en toda su voluntad a la vida que es lo mismo que decir, verdaderamente, en todo su tesón y violencia por imponerse;

Pero este equilibrio estable e vigorizado, a través del tiempo, es posible, sin embargo, siempre que el lado socialmente regularizado y racional de nuestra ser y estar cultural se fundamente, se ejercite y se mantenga en contra; lo que acaba por crear un espacio, aunque estructuralmente contendido, de brutalidad fisiológica, siempre, claro está, que dicho espacio continúe estando antropológico y estructuralmente contenido, que finalmente no puede ser otra cosa sino un equilibrio vigorizado de una violencia al menos fisiológica, siempre alimentada, permanentemente en suspensión.


19.Physiological Resources and the Simulacra of Anthropology
1) The physiological substance of human experience takes place in higher, rationally constructed contexts of social congruence and agency; that is, bodily individuality lives in the sensory impression, but the social possibility of the physio-sensory, through time, is founded on the homogenization of physiological experience by means of what we know as rationality, but that is better conceptualized above all—and wether mythological, or in the form of a cultural positivism—first and foremost as socially congruent.
Such a social congruence, in conjunction with the physio-metabolic impetus of the physical individual under the permanent drive of biological opprobrium, combines to force the inexorable conceptualization of the cultural self as a dependent paradigm of the group, in regards to which the singularly physical-physiological, bodily individual forges a socially congruent mode of individual, corporeal being.
Because the physiological self is situationally outside and primer to the cultural self, it remains experientially opaque to the culturally rational sphere of meaning—or, that it is, the better part of physiologically sensory experience, in its technical subjection to the very possibility of the culturally rational, must necessarily remain divided from its socially congruent counterpart;
But, although a rationally elusive, physiological mode of knowing is indeed possible—that is the aesthetic itself, for instance—the anthropological existence of a socially congruent, rational understanding is in fact possible because part of physiologically singular individuality is excluded, towards the structural permanence of the group, through time.
In this way the resilience of physical self-perseveration only an individual can know, is in some sense transferred to the cryptic heart of human group stability; and thus from outside is the culturally rational sphere of physiological homogenization invigorated through its silent partner of the very much socially incongruent, very much non-negotiable individual will to life, at all costs.
And such a physiological invigoration of the sedentary, rational self, comes eventually through a form of physio-moral titillation the bodily individual experiences as the force of biological opprobrium in all her socio-genetic, corporeal fibers; but effectively has the physical world been all but substituted by a morally relevant, physiologically sensory simulacrum of the mind.
Against such a structural fortification of only physio-mental experience, sedentary anthropological stability then positions physiologically immediate interaction between physical individuals as its supreme force of counterbalance to its own opprobrium-configured artifice of guaranteed human group permanence, through time;
For, quite logically, the foundation of any form of the socially congruent can ultimately only be in the body itself, even if—or specifically because—the structural entity of sedentary human groups must, paradoxically, curtail, homogenize and make remote, part of physiologically singular, body experience.
And thus physiologically immediate, social experience not only compensates for the physio-opprobic structural requirements of sedentary, human groups, but it could in fact be conceptualized as the very working possibility of that structural stability, and in the exo-rational (to some extent exo-cultural) reinforcement of the bodily singular but socio-genetic, living individual,
Specifically and most powerfully in physiologically immediate others.*

*An objectification of the separation of living individuals, mediated by images (Baudrillard)


2) Further historical development of positivist cultural spaces and the expanded means of human communication eventually created, also allowed for alternative morally relevant, physiologically sensory contexts of individual, opprobrium-configured invigoration, and what constitutes a physically remote, representational form of reaffirmation of the anthropological self—by no means in substitution for physiologically immediate social interaction, but most certainly as an auxiliary space of simulacrum and physio-sensory exercise for the sedentary, anthropological individual.
In such an historical evolution to compensate for the progressively less physical, positivist cultural experience, the possibility of auxiliary physiological spaces—in the form of representation (artistic and political), entertainment, and sports—proceeded physiologically towards higher forms of simulacrum (texts, images, film, radio, eventually television) creating ultimately a form of spectator being, as an opprobrium-configured (so morally relevant), physiological exercise of anthropological individuality that in fact might very well be understood as inexorable in regards to sedentary experience itself; for the problem of a necessary rational sphere of the socially congruent is, once again, dependent on the impetus of physiological individuality that eventually must make physiological use of culturally rational development itself, as what could be understood as permanent need to restore myth to positivist cultural contexts.
Naturally, such a restoration of the mythological takes place on the fringes or outside altogether of rational understanding—specifically, in a physiologically aesthetic, subcultural realm of sensory invigoration, often so subtle that it is seldom rationally approached at all—except for professionals of the image (including writers or other artists) or by individuals and organizations in fields in which the culturally rational self is the object of physiological and behaviorist tactics of persuasion, pressure and intervention.
In regards to sedentary experience, the physiological but rationally opaque reality of individuals and their dependence on the group, becomes a physiological and physiologically sensory necessity of the impression itself, as a subcultural adjacency to the socially congruent—but that, in the structurally mutual interdependence between both, is only fleetingly noticeable, and really in the influence of one on the other.
And thus the argument also can be made that, in regards to non-sedentary, human experience, in which physical movement is imbricate with need itself and the group’s ability to achieve states of comfort, a need for the rational is consequentially less—whereas sedentary cultural spaces, as of agriculture, however, exploit human sensory physiology to cater to the same, underlying physiological reality: the physiological origin and circumstances of the socially congruent becomes, in this sense, a resource.



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