1)COMMON OPPROBRIUM ORIGIN OF MORALITY AND THE CULTURALLY-POSTED RATIONAL
2) DEFINE EXO SELF MORE CLEARLY:
3) NOTES FORM A VIVIR QUE SON DOS DIAS (9OCT16)
3.5) SUB VERSUS MAIN META SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
4) La Físio-política y verdadera Pax Americain
5)ART AND INCIPIENT CULTURAL DOMINANCE OVER THE POWER OF IMAGES
6) Explain an Exo-Self conceptualization in The Conversation (1974)
7) Notes on the Physiologically Rational and its violence.
8)A significance of “Watergate” in the following films?
9) soberanía sobre la realidad
10) From Nef Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization (1956,58)
11) RATIONAL BUT UNINTENTIONAL?
12) Exo-Notes from Snell
13) From The Paranoid Style in American Politics, by Richard Hofstadter
Harper’s Magazine, November 1964
14The “Exo-Self” Context of Economic Structure (Money)
15)La relación antropológica con la muerte
16)Suspension Anthropology and “Exo-Suspension” of Self
17)The Physical versus only The Physiologically Real
18) Physically Different Individuals Become Groups…
19)AMANPOUR (CPJ) 22NOV16
20) Canetti and Crowds
1)COMMON OPPROBRIUM ORIGIN OF MORALITY AND THE CULTURALLY-POSTED RATIONAL
Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.
Rationality is based on what is commonly understood to be true; common sense—or the better part of it—is founded in what the group “knows” to be true, for dependent is the individual on opprobrium-acquired notions of the conceptually real, although individual bodily experience and vulnerability allows for an uncommon and singular common sense regarding certain aspects of immediately physical, immediately physiological experience only the individual can truly experience and know. But how much of individual common sense and ken is based only on personally-lived, direct experience?
OPPROBRIUM MORALITY——OPPROBRIUM RATIONALITY
OPPROBRIUM-GENERATED, INDIVIDUALLY ACQUIRED MEANING
THE FOUNDATION OF MEANING IS ULTIMATELY IN INDIVIDUAL
So if in fact individual physiological and physiologically rational nature—as of the experiencing of bodily vulnerability—is the key to opprobrium-based, culturally-posited group rationality, likewise the ultimate means of reinforcement of group morality is also in the individual’s sense of bodily vulnerability:
Ultimate systemic viability of the cultural—its true but cryptic life force of its own entity—is really the individual’s experiencing of bodily vulnerability and the resulting vital fury and will towards self-affirmation and physiological imposition.
And so individual morality (individual moral meaning and sense of moral (or immoral) self) is then clearly BECAUSE OF THE GROUP and bodily vulnerability in this context is a virtual and totemic sense of non-rational and not conceptually articulated, but physiologically felt and perceived threat; that is thus physical threat removed altogether into the physiological, and permanently beyond immediate rational comprehension THAT OBVIOUSLY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY is being alive individually towards the group’s survival in the very bypassing of cognitive, rational process—that is, not as reflex in individuals towards self-preservation, but rather as an individual biological safeguard of group survival and cohesion.
- And thus rationality could then be understood as package, parcel and patrimony of really the group; that is in some sense also, finally, coherence itself as the ultimate guardian of collective possibility, and that makes more intensely physiological modes of human, rational being both positive and negative realms of really individual experience—which may necessarily exercise itself in episodes of elation and invigorated physiological fury (of whatever nature), but its very intrinsic entity cannot be publicly summoned out into the agora of collective oversight and rection.
- The rational and the moral are thus—once again—ultimately difficult to differentiate in that both are of this one and the same collective fabric and circumstances of group experience.
- Self-preservation of the individual’s will to life is thus commandeered through opprobrium to actually the group’s survival, and ultimately not that of the individual—which, in certain but historically repetitive circumstances leads again and again to a kind of anthropological drift and destrurctive off-centering of the cultural and physiologically semiotic mechanism of stability, that would in fact remove itself from the true but culturally cryptic foundation of moral possibility within human groups, that is—paradoxically from the standpoint of the culturally structural—the singular individual’s sense of only bodily vulnerability.
- OPPROBRIUM (bodily vulnerability) MORAL-RATIONAL COHERENCE (bodily vulnerability) GROUP STABILITY, COHESION AND SURVIVAL (bodily vulnerability) INDIVIDUAL SELF-PRESERVATION (bodily vulnerability, necessarily at times against the opprobic)
The anthropological problem of bodily vulnerability: sometimes it is not individual!
And thus the rational and also moral possibilities of group experience can be come undermined—that is typically throughout history (apparently) the very jeopardizing of group experience itself.
Individuality, anthropologically, is not individual, but rather culturally structural or paradigmatic—because bodily vulnerability in the individual is commandeered through opprobrium by the group—that is thus a physiologically real illusion of sorts and the very foundation of moral-rational, human group structure; but as the illusion prospers, culturally through time, it can naturally remove the individual’s physiological experiencing of bodily vulnerability further and further away from the actual physical and physically vulnerable, nature of real experience, what could be understood essentially as Spengler´s Problem, dilemma or conundrum.
That thus becomes the technically empirical foundation for arguing that human moral possibilities are in fact NOT compatible with a never ending stream of technological advances that blindly remove anthropological individuality from a physical sense of the human, individual self; that is, unless the greatest, unending effort is continuously exerted towards a rational, conceptual understanding of the true physiological substance of human experience—at least by somebody in your society and cultural experience, if you yourself can’t/won’t/are not interested—or find yourself too physiologically consumed in being you!
The Exo Cultural Self: as if I “needed to be racist” to know who I am especially in regards to the group I am an impossibly individual member of—so I know what I am in the perception of what I know my group is not (although I don’t, of course, rationally “know” this). And this similarly to the way primary and corporal individuality becomes as of one’s knowing what I am in what I perceive I am not. And as just the rational perceiver truly am I a savage force of imposition and will to be, that in some way is coldly “outside myself”—but intensely invigorated and at my side; or as a mode of physiologically, phsyio-rationally invigorated comfort I can step back into when I need to or am driven to, that may or may not know no mercy whatsoever in regards to others but that no matter how opprobically subject I am to higher modes of extrinsic physiological control and decorum, my perceiver self as adversary—no doubt—remains permanently.
“A mode of physiologically, physio-rationally invigorated comfort” because IT FEELS GOOD to be vigorously me—that is still a “rational I” but supremely vigorous as the “power self” that is a “tactically rational I” and not reflexively or expansively so…And thus would seem to be simply a rationality as rider of the physiological and its once-again-renewed existential deliverance “unto me and the rational self”.
And so when I know once again this “hyper” and tactically rational perceiving self, I am UNTO MYSELF KOWN once again out from under the weight of this that is the particular cultural physio-semiotics I am comprised by—but that, in sense, is not really—or fully—me.
I am more than just the opprobrium-driven me; and surely the opprobrium-formed self I know as of the cultural context that creates my individuality, could not itself exist if not for the physiologically rational and tactic other side of myself—for it is the bodily vulnerable, bodily furious side of what I am that REQUIRES (and thereby creates and SUPPORTS) the opprobrium-enforced and physiologically semiotic I of collective, cultural and social possibility.
And we are and understand what we collectively know are selves to be as individuals—actually through our bodies and physiologically, and less so through rational thought and the conceptual.
2) DEFINE EXO SELF MORE CLEARLY:
((1)INDIVIDUAL————————2) EXO SELF IDEAL [Opprobically constituted in
the physiologically totemic and virtual others individuality is a product of]
((1)) PHYSICALLY REAL
-Bodily vulnerable self
-Singularly real others
-Moral reality of physical context regarding singular others.
((2)) PHYSIOLOGICALLY REAL AND VIRTUAL
-Semiotic posits and ideals
-Totemic mechanisms of self-definition
-Becomes physiological enhancement of physical limitation; becomes meaning itself!
-Thus physiologically real only for the individual, but collectively common in its semiotic entity.
Thus physiological and physio-rational virtuality is not in itself communication! It is what is termed an event of the mind initially. Thus the rationally comprehensible implies ultimately (and also initially in the very foundation of culture as we understand it, LANGUAGE!) Because a mind is indeed a terrible thing to waste—but it is also a very lonely place!
A Culturally defined (false? removed?) sense of rational self
Physiology and the rider:
-Need to be physiologically immersed in invigorated movement (as actual physical movement, or invigorated physiological and/or physiologically rational process.
–Zombi as important figure of human social-anthropological nature.
3) NOTES FORM A VIVIR QUE SON DOS DIAS (9OCT16)
Conservatism tends towards extrinsic definition of the individual and individuality; or is the imposition of rational arguments and conceptualizations to defend just this aspect of human group and anthropological experience. It thus ultimately cannot maintain logical coherence despite its rationally presented nature of argument, given that its deeper purpose is to in fact stave off rational endeavor on the part of the human, thinking subject as form of physiologically semiotic stability and definition—in the very contention of the rational itself. Thus in this context is rationality to be structurally understood as physio-anthropological pretext that further removes itself from rational understanding in the fact that its deeper purpose of physio-semiotic process is unknown to the human subjects themselves, and in their own physiologically rational agency of imposition,
Tooth and nail and to the bitter, bitter end!
But anthropology itself tends towards the extrinsic exo definition of self, anyway. Of course: and so rationality could thus be conceptualized eventually as a force of cultural equilibrium against the deeper phsyio-psychological realities of opprobrium-configured human groups.
But rationality—alas—is itself also opprobrium-generated and will never completely remove itself form its own physiological substance and nature. How rational can rationality—defined in this opprobic sense—actually be?
Is science then, an attempt to break with exo-self nature of human perception and experience? For to postulate the nature of reality on only what I can observe, is also a way of defying my very physio-psychological dependence on my surrounding reality and environment, as if to affirm I am the observer of that which I am not, and thus no longer subject ontologically to knowing myself in what I perceive I am not. And man strikes out at reality by rejecting, in a way and as a cognitive technique, his very dependence on it, finally and very much as a form of aggression against it—that thus renounces the forging of physio-rational, physio-semiotic contexts based on physical limitation and the possibility of man’s rational positing on that which he cannot in fact rationally understand (that is precisely the reason why he can say whatever he wills about it and towards eventually his own exo-self, cultural, and anthropological advantage!) Science, on the other hand only gained momentum, historically, in its own self-confidence and ultimately—power of human self-imposition, but actually as a form of negation of his truer physio-anthropological entity!
And he never looked back!
Systemically, in what way is our own notion of self thus dependent on an imagery of the scientific self? Would not the scientific self naturally influence a broader and contemporary cultural self that is our own?
The structurally anthropological bases itself on really a human physiology of NOT knowing as of human physical limitation hence definition, which can only be considered core to human genetics itself; sedentary and agrarian experience, in its recourse to the physiologically real and virtual, builds on exactly this aspect of human, biological entity: How could the emergence of science and technical thought not be considered structurally significant in this regard as a serious force of change and alteration of the basic human mode of anthropological being, that is effectively one of also a physiologically virtual dependence, as well as physical? And I am in my perceiving what I am not, becomes—at least methodologically—the exclusion of the perceiving self altogether, and its final absorption by the object of analysis.
3.5) SUB VERSUS MAIN META SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
-Electronic devices—telephones, computers-and the sub electronic and signal systems they are designed with, but that the user is unaware of.
–Double bind principle of psychology
–Meta Data (computer systems)
-Alternate systems from which to interpret same symbolic entity; alternate paradigmatic structure of interpretation.
–The Polysemic: same signifier, but different linguistic interpretation.
–Words used as numbers; numbers used as words.
–Plaza publica versus off-the-board semiotic and financial agency.
-Democratic society VERSUS intelligence communities
-Published culture VERSUS internet
-Triangle conceptualization of communication between two entities who then individually may seek to leverage their position against the other, through a third party entity, element or circumstance; that is still a single channel of communication plus a parallel realm and source of some form of leverage (that is thus still a form of duality).
4) La Físio-política y verdadera Pax Americain
[párrafo final] A menudo, como vemos, los dilemas son construcciones retóricas. Forzando el debate sobre lo anecdótico,
Sirven para que no se hable de lo que es evidente:
Las anécdotas son la sal y la pimienta de la información,
pero bloquean la reflexión.
El lema de los escritores, Nulla dies sine linea, ha sido transformado así por los medios:
Nulla dies sine pugna. Ningún día sin pelea.
¿Está a favor o en contra de las estatuas franquistas en el Born?
¡Qué gran oportunidad ha dado esta exposición! Aquel país que, minorías a parte, se acomodó al franquismo con tanta naturalidad ahora, 40 años después, puede darse el gusto heroico de lanzar huevos sobre las estatuas de Franco.
5)ART AND INCIPIENT CULTURAL DOMINANCE OVER THE POWER OF IMAGES
Cave paintings that we are to understand as going back some 40,000 years ago could thus constitute the beginning of man’s culture trek to higher forms of dominance over the physiologically disturbing and, particularly, the power of images; for what is pictorial art but a human efferent use and agency of that which man normally only perceives through his eyes—normally and also constantly as the physiologically sensitive object of those images man is? Thus in the same way man would violently seek to physiologically go beyond his own limitation in regards to his immediate needs, and the remedying of immediate discomforts, so would he naturally drive ferociously towards the wielding of his own power to create images, over—of course—the perception of his fellows (probably initially in regards to friends and fellows—then later, his foes—such would be the amazement of his new found power!)
And thus clearly before the cognitive (and finally conceptual understanding) comes physiological experience, that only later becomes refined, made more systematic taking on the form of what we understand as rational; and this in regards to the evolution of language itself, culturally-posited rationality and whatever historical process of evolution, from some initial state to an in-whatever-way more refined and sophisticated posterior point. And of course in regards universally to our living, bodily present that is necessarily always physiological before it can be rational, or rationally understood, codified and culturally subjected—or simply defined.
6) Explain an Exo-Self conceptualization in The Conversation (1974) :
Harry Caul hardly relates at all in the physiologically immediate with almost anyone, except only in the protected context of work and the easy, very much standardized projection of the physiological self it requires towards culturally common, culturally programmed idealizations of individuality—where being yourself effectively allows you to comfortably extricate the more individually idiosyncratic, controversial realms of personality that inevitably disturb others and the negative consequences this entails for the individual. In this context, and without a more wholesome and physiologically direct connection to others, Caul’s sense of self leans more towards the culturally structural and physiologically abstract plane of the anthropological configuration of human groups, in which bodily individuality is subject to a universal force of opprobrium-configured, group cohesion and that is thus more of culturally structural self, in detriment to and away from the bodily self.
Caul thus relates physio-totemically to the people he only knows in a representational form, through the audio (perhaps also video) material he collects on them, but according to the needs and dictates of his clients (those power people who pay to know about and leverage themselves in some way against the surveillance-targeted individuals Caul monitors);
For in no other way can he actually relate to the different human dramas he intensely (but only partially) scrutinizes; and most crucially must he refrain from any moral involvement whatsoever, in regards to what he is observing and also with respect to the real and deeper motives of his paying client—to the point that he is professionally required to steel himself against the opprobic altogether which thus allows him to circumvent and even elevate himself above the social and anthropologically structural, ultimately obviating the very need for culturally-configured opprobrium-vulnerable individuality itself. And this, simply because he works in secrecy and behind the back so to speak of the human, societal group’s moral—or even rational—scrutiny.
But physio-totemically does the self relate to any and all idealizations individuals are subject to in their own physiological projection of whatever ultimately opprobrium-based nature, as of the culturally semiotic and those symbolic entities the group holds as relevant; or as the result of simply the individuals’ direct physiologically relevant visual perception.
Individual perception of the representational, however (and in the case of Harry Caul), if it is not permanently counterbalanced by the physiologically immediate need to also be in the integration of the two realms of anthropological individuality (an integration that is itself a physiologically immediate, bodily incarnation of only the physio-semiotic and anthropologically virtual self) through a physiologically immediate other, human physiologically rational process of mind begins to totemically relate to the representational itself, that is perhaps the context of a self that cannot become in its own entity specifically because of its omnipotence in just the representational, and that only in the bodily immediate, or in some connection to it, can the self morally be in a fuller, invigorated experiencing of the real.
So naturally does Caul resort to another means of fortifying his sense of self, and in a way he does in fact control (which it is in itself subjective and clearly physiologically totemic) that is his distorted, technically erroneous embrace of personal guilt with regards to the drama of the lives he observes, and given that, in the physiologically totemic isolation he has trapped himself in, he has no other way of garnering a truly invigorated sense of being alive.
It thus might be that in the absence of a physiologically immediate other, the exo-self road to richer self-integration is blocked, forcing the individual in fact deeper into a totemic—ultimately sterile—virituality of only a physiological and physiologically removed substance.
A virtual realm in which not even the omnipotent self—in her unchallenged solitude and isolation—is capable of relieving itself in some form of growth and expanse, except through internally directed ploys of ultimately a physiologically rational self-aggression.
The self in all its unforgiving tyranny it seems, dies when there is no “exo” element through which it can be by becoming, and crucially in the form of another human being and separate, living entity, who, unlike only the virtual and all things only physiologically totemic, the self has no immediate power over.
In your independent entity and animated autonomy, is the very possibility of my becoming…
What else could civilization be, but that?
Physiologically relevant is ‘opprobruim-configured’ and thus of consequence for the individual in even just her perception of the human universe, or in her culturally mediated contemplation of the real.
7) Notes on the Physiologically Rational and its violence.
- The confusion of cause and effect as the ascribing of causality to what is only coincidental—or co-referential—could be understood as form of power available to the individual to in fact impose, once again, on two different circumstances or events which neither can be confirmed as one being the consequence of the other, nor likewise can such a relationship between both be clearly contradicted. Thus does an opportunity arise for the perceiving subject to physio-rationally relate two only coincidental elements very much on the terms of one’s own subjective inclinations; as a form of only working and tentative certainty that, when carefully done (that is to say, according to a minimum logical assessment of both particular and broader realities), supplies the individual with a tentative point of consideration, and possibe action. The question of convictions instead of hard facts as the motivating force of people’s actions is thus better approached as a physiological phenomenon, rather than only a form of demeaned and poor, rational judgement. In terms of evolutionary anthropology, finally, it is simply obvious that human beings availed themselves of this hybrid form of reasoning (physiological and rationally structural) to impose themselves once again on their realities and to an apparently very high degree of success, no doubt.
- To say that mental fatigue can affect judgement could also be understood similarly as a physiological impingement on the semiotic and conceptual. In regards to more mundane contexts of personal option before physically difficult tasks of labor and precision, the fact that one might, after enormous effort exerted towards the achieving of whatever originally proposed objective, conform finally to a lesser-than-proposed standard could very well take place first and foremost in the internal physiologically rational undermining of the original terms of technical completion, given that the task undertaken requires a truly enormous force of physical will and effort. It would thus be conceivable to compromise those original objectives, if a minimum sense of even partial completion can be perceived as having been achieved; but that physiologically would take place in the very physical duress and in regards to a rational game of rectification of the mind, and perhaps even illusion. And that thus similarly (as in the case of ascription of cause and effect) becomes a physiologically rational response to, simply, changing circumstances of ultimately physical prowess and individual, physiological and physiologically rational
- In both cases, however, physical limitation is enhanced, compensated for and in some way overcome, which would only seem logical—typical—if man is in fact to be conceived in his nature as pushing the very limits of what confines/defines him; or if we are to consider his deeper physiologically vital nature as also a hollow man entity that is thus a permanent and essential being in his permanent need to become.
8)A significance of “Watergate” in the following films?
Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977)
Apocalypse Now (1979)
Being There (1979)
Raiders of The Lost Ark (1981)
Escape From NY (1981)
Blow Out (1981)
War Games (1983)
9) soberanía sobre la realidad ¿a partir en realidad de qué carencia exactamente, si conceptualizamos el poder de imposición fisiológica humana como la capacidad real de conseguir el confort básicamente inmediato? Pues entonces nos permitiría englobar y unificar bajo un solo criterio las distintas formas de físio-imposición humana; esto quiere decir, por ejemplo, que el impulso religioso humano-a igual que una vision conspiritativa de la realidad-no son sino formas de imposición humana sobre la realidad, y desde una vertiente fisiológicamente racional; que obliga pues a fundamentar todo tipo de imposición fisiológicamente racional humana sobre lo desconocido-sobre precisamente aquello en que no cabe la contradicción formal y empírica-como un mecanismo de agrandamiento físico-humano en lo simbólico y fisiológicamente racional, que es igualmente una forma de compensación fisiológicamente racional a partir de la limitación física y respecto aquello que sensorialmente no somos capaces de apresar. Que en rigor pues quiere decir que no hablamos solamente de un fenómeno político sino respecto del modo humano de ser y estar en el mundo. UN EJEMPLO DEL ‘EXO YO’
Que soy yo pero tengo además muchos Yo-es exteriores, exteriores a mí y frente a los cuales me voy relacionando de distintas formas, pero siempre físio-totémicamente, siempre de forma fisiológicamente racional y según la fuerza extrínseca pero interior a mí que es el oprobio biológico-genético humano y que sólo el grupo humano al que pertenezco puede finalmente definir. Y sería que el yo más profundo mío, del que a veces me alejan las fuerzas regidoras socio-antropológicas (y esto creo que muy a mi pesar) es el yo sobre el que se monta todo el edificio antropológico del que soy inexorablemente producto, que es el yo por otra parte de toda individualidad corpórea posible, que es el yo opróbico-corporal y cimiento mismo de las posibilidades racionales, morales-y finalmente del mismo hecho significativo posible y potencial-de toda cultura.
Lo real solo fisiológico sirve para ir más allá de las limitaciones físicas de la misma manera que la imposibilidad de contradicción permite traspasar los límites de lo racional o lo empíricamente comprobado, igualmente como una forma de agrandamiento de las limitaciones en cierto sentido físcos.
10) From Nef Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization (1956,58)
Rational Imposition VERSUS Religious Imposition
Believes it lives in a perpetual moving beyond the culturally standard, culturally delimited/Seeks to preserve the impossibility of contradiction as key point of strength of its semiotics and posits.
Discovery becomes a physiology in itself that similarly turns culturally-rational posits likewise into simply functional, physiological pretext / Is a rationally-based pretext to the physiological.
Also opprobrium-based, group extension / Opprobrium-based mechanism of individual-binding, physiological relevance.
The Danger of the Self-Evident is that self-evident truths are not at all truths of discovery (although their origins can be rationally understood or construed) but rather tend to find their chief justification in their physiologically functional entity.
And the physio-mental process of language itself!
Individuality itself as Art?
Parallel to a process of culture itself as a subject/object relationship with its own posits and ideals, so too does individuality propose and then physiologically relate to an ideal of itself, as a necessary, totemcially external entity it can know itself off of, back on to itself that is not that ideal, but rather only—but significantly, crucially—a living and permanent tension towards becoming that ideal (that, as an ideal, implies the physiologically totemic self is indeed of its own deeper and independent entity; that this ideal is me in my will to be—that forcibly determines me as something more than that ideal—and thus it is I as a certain aspirer to it; and the ideal becomes a tool I use towards a becoming me that indeed makes me always something else, something even greater in my initial and permanent will to be in that ideal itself; and the ideal becomes really only a ”totemic accessory” to a greater, much more important “I”; and more significant than the ideal because we avail ourselves of ideals (which are in themselves eventually to be discarded in regards to a self that has in some way fortified itself of the ideal, but that can never actually be that ideal…; it is in this sense that being a self exceeds and “is greater than” just the ideal.)
Types of imposition
Given the empty nature of the human self as perceiver and in my knowing what I am in that which I perceive I am not, man’s being by imposing himself becomes the physical-physiological state and condition of a totemic man. Who is originally also a hollow man, and thus seeks forms of identity through a physiologically totemic connection to external entities from which he can know himself, and that is in fact a form of imposition, not just perception And just as striking out in some way into and against reality, modifying it and subordinating it in whatever manner (in regards to physical, spatial reality, as well the social and human, and crucially also, the conceptual) as the very modus vitale of hollow and totemic man, so is artistic expression also a form of essentially physiologically violent self-imposition in regards specifically to man’s needing an external, independent confirmation of his own existence—which is latently exactly what the posting of divine entities is, behind and below the logic of narrative itself. And the fervor of physiologically totemic religious entity is subliminally this very violent force of imposition albeit disguised in physiological, physio-existential, culturally rational experience. Finally, it thus would seem that man quite justifiably is afraid of himself and his own limitations, and thus disguises what is really a violence of will to be, behind a physiologically totemic façade of subservience to the postulation of a higher, ideal self he, of course, can never be but that as an ideal serves him towards his own elevation—and that seems historically could never have taken place but for this very real–but physiologically totemic and virtual–possibility of growth.
A certain form of laziness it is, then, to continue be physio-totemically intertwined with physiologically totemic ideals—in exaclty this sense that ideals and the growth they bring, do not lead to higher forms of individual maturity until they are in fact discarded and left behind.
And thus in very real sense morality itself becomes a physiologically totemic and cultural virituality, but that leads eventually to extraordinary—extra and greater, higher—possibilities of self. But beyond god—or any form of higher realm of the divine—of course would be man’s ability to see through anthropological virituality to what is really at the core of it; which is simply physical and physiological, bodily experience, that in collective and sedentary circumstances must be defined physio-extrinsically and through biological opprobrium, and this quite obviously from an historical standpoint in regards to the universal mechanics of human groups. Physiologically immediate experience is thus the true foundation of cultural virituality; and if individual physiology is not extrinsically defined by the culturally semiotic (in regards to what it means to be of the group according to the culturally rational and culturally appropriate and defined), it can only be structurally managed if the individual can herself live extrinsically in the interest of others, in regards to which one would no longer need to prostrate one’s self to the physio-semiotic posits of the cultural group and their divine task masters, punishers—and messiahs.
Although you are still gonna’ want to hold on to the judiciary, surely!
The Anthropological Self VERSUS Personality
[Vicarious models of physio-identity formation and experimentation: because as of agriculture I live necessarily in the projection of my physiological being (that is, in regards to this that I am and call myself), I also already live vicariously in regards to some form of ideal or model—quite usually imposed to some degree by opprobrium and moral sense—that is a model situationally and especially at first to some degree outside myself and extrinsic to me (that is, of course, the whole point of anthropological, semiotic rection of the individually physiological, anyway); and thus am I also prone to other and new physiological models—as ideals, when I come across them, or in regards to new physiological experiences that befall me (because surely even without a semiotic, rational idea and ideal as that which I shall be in my physiological projection of myself, new physiological experiences might also dictate, as of simply experience itself, new forms of physiologically construed identity arising through experience, first and not as the result of moral ideals or the opprobrium-based pressure of the moral; which is, of course, how the shadow abusers of contemporary political realism and manipulation see individuality, as exactly that which is physiological vulnerability through experience itself (through rape and murder, for example) that physiologically grows on the individual as of initiate and tentative, criminal experience (very probably because shadow abusers of typically American and Anglo-Saxon Intelligence Communities are physiologically accustomed themselves to abusing their citizens, usually—but not necessarily only—through ideas and the semiotic, as the de facto guardians of physio-semiotic and financially aggregate, human order of their societies.) And so would not likely believe very seriously in real independence of individuality itself, anyway. That is, they impose what is their on mediocrity—and from their own position of negligent, decadent advantage over their fellow man—on others. [Farrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrt!]
Thus the human proposal of the divine becomes also human, physiologically rational expanse, in regards to which human beings totemically relate in their own physiological projection and identity, that is the very possibility of a vicariously lived, divine-like experiencing of the dignity of the civilized individual (as really civilized because god-fearing self that is thus equipped suddenly to regard that same dignity in other human beings); and this in a culturally-structural, anthropological sense, off of which new spaces must also and eventually be physiologically sought, physio-semiotically wrought—such as the dignity of the body sensual of the Italian Renaissance that was perhaps the real beginning of science and behind the possibility itself of somebody like Galileo (who himself is as of the human corporeal in his very methodology and foundation of our contemporary understanding of objectivity and the empirical). And this historically, until something of a new Dark Age came along, at least in regards to the human corporeal and sensory, in the form of the Protestant Reformation that was a loss once again of the dignity of what is bodily human (but that, of course, did not completely succeed in imposing itself, as we all know…)
Depth: Always in the why behind my physiology probably usually in hindsight; but how I see things is the future of my physiological entity and my behavior, and that which will determine how I react (to what degree and in what degree of restraint); because physiological experience in some ways is the horse without a rider, at least momentarily and if you are not an athlete of life (that is the physical and physiologically rational, at the point of very-close-to-complete-unity; but never quite exactly)…
Life feels better when you are the horse (and jockeys are small and insignificant, anyway).
Provable Truths and Galileo: get his original wording in this regard that would seem to suggest he only holds himself to what he can observe, in regards to that which is provably true only in that sense, not intrinsically; that suggests a quality of the instrumental, and not absolute essence….(Hollow Man Conceptualization, once again!)
But what is absolute essence? For in some sense one can only be the very limitation one is defined by, and in regards to which do we develop our personalities—as athletes, for example—as of your specific physical attributes (height, reach, length of limbs) that necessarily define the physical how-we-do-things of each one of us, that inevitablely has a bearing ultimately on personality (how could it not?); and if indeed human essence is really imposition generally as the physiological will towards the attainment of comfort, it would seem difficult to understand essence in a human and vital extrinsicality…and intrinsic human essence is the physiological need of extrinsic imposition (a hollow man conceptualization, once again!)
The soul as conceptualization as of a longing for depth; that is a need to conceptually impose depth on physiological experience that we clearly perceive at times as not really having any at all—which frightens the hell out of culture itself, that turns a great part of culture into a permanent process of struggle to impose depth on experience: aesthetic depth, but more importantly—and not just in regards to the West—a conceptual (rational hence logical) depth, and which both become a form of phsyio-psychological reassurance in the power of art (as creator and user/connoisseur) and the broader force and tide of text-based cultures since the origen of written language—that is the power to rationally impose on the world as a Cognitive Potency (Cognipotencia (Eschotado)), and that has the parallel, illusory power of cutting into the nebulousness of physiological experience itself and from the standpoint of individual experience (that is probably the high point of 20th century art—particularly literature, in Joyce, Döblin, or Updike—of certain and true ableit artistic understanding of the decorum quality of even the conceptual, that thus sets the individual at odds with the edifice of culture itself, leaving her very much out in the cold, so to speak. Simply because individuals have bodies, but society or culture, or the group of my fellows and peers, do not; that is to say, from the standpoint of individual observation as of the bodily—because human groups as categories are necessarily abstract as the only way the individual will ever truly relate the them. Relating physically to the crowd and mob, is impossible as an individual in reagrds to individuals.) Physio-totemic quality of the others in the physiologically rational mind of the individual…
In regards to all things human and in terms of cultural attitudes, philosophical entities, forces and movements, understanding its real and truer connection to the bodily and how it relates to it—and even despite the message and words of its own propositions—is key to understanding its real anthropological entity and significance: ALWAYS IN THE BODILY!!!! Empirical Science and Religion, for example, are in this sense curiously similar on exactly this point as strategies of bodily removal and exile, in both cases, and in the face of contradiction of the fact that deeper moral impulse is always directly founded in the individual’s sense of bodily vulnerability especially in regards to a mechanics of anthro-biological opprobrium. But, in the extreme worst-case scenario of structural distortion, if you have in fact succeeded in removing the bodily from the real force of ideas and the anthropological, you have eliminated moral foundation itself. And so in a contemporary sense (as seems clearly to be the case here in NEF) there is simply no possibility of ethics the way we understand it, without a greater embrace of in fact the bodily itself.
Foundation of Anthropology and Cryptic Nature of Culture: Is because the body cannot be structurally and thoroughly renounced, and this despite the words, message and spirit of a particular geographically, historically determined semiotics; culture is cryptic because, despite a structural semiotics of physiological order that denies the physiologically corporeal and bodily, the structural itself cryptically services the physiologically primary of bodily experience as clearly a form of deeper technical, structural coherence that cryptically centers everything, in fact, on the bodily (that is the true, deeper essence of human groups—in their real survival and necessary invigoration—and is the chief and cryptic defining force of the culturally-posited rational itself)—but all the while without rationally contradicting nor undoing the culturally-posited semiotic; thus true coherence is an overriding, cryptic supervision and balance of cultural space behind the back so to speak of the culturally rational itself—because, yes and perhaps regrettably, physiological reality must inexorably be held in check BY FORCE to some extent (because the physiological nature of people is, at its deepest core rationally opaque—zoomorphic—that is undoubtedly the strong arm element and true muscle man of its own survival—that itself subordinates the rational, as really instrument of its own violent will towards imposition and physical self-preservation, and of which science is just a quite modern, relatively recent avatar of the same original thing albeit a top a never-before-seen power of imposition that is directly—not just potentially—beyond the limits of the anthropological itself—and so inexorably fatal at the species level, and especially if you live in a very sophisticated BUT TOTAL DARKNESS in regards to the mechanics of your own physio-anthropological entity.)
11) RATIONAL BUT UNINTENTIONAL?
Historically and in anthropological terms, how could logical—hence moral—coherence ever have become the central agglutinating force of the culturally-posited rational and thus of ultimately social experience itself?
And the answer is through religion, because religion is exactly this: a rational, logical imposing on the unknown that perseveres in its rationality only because it cannot be formally contradicted; and the rational perseverance of religion becomes a reversed imposition, back on the individual of a collective, physiologically rational and structural order of anthropological context—through individuality and its physiology of cognitive process, but in regards finally to a human, societal medium of ordered and stable, physiological and physiologically rational possibility.
Because religion depends crucially on its logical posits that become, of course, pretext to really the physiological; and because the physiological substance of human experience is ceaselessly a form of permanent becoming, the general context of religious anthropology leads inexorably to the rational-moral evolution—that is necessarily also the elevation—of those societal experiences within such contexts.
But would it then be a contradiction to suppose that what is originally a form of contrived stability (albeit not exactly intentional) eventually comes to rescind of that very rational mechanism and tool that had in fact allowed for such a societal evolution and ultimate technical elevation, above its own existential circumstances?
Not at all: such an evolving beyond our own limits of in fact our very definition, is perhaps the signature sign and hallmark of humanity and collective human experience.
For the moments in collective human experience in which man has gone beyond the very limits of his own biological and social entity are many—to the point that it constitutes a defining pattern of man’s experience on planet Earth, perhaps the core characteristic of collective, human nature.
The genetic appearance and evolution of opprobrium,
Human group’s staving off of the intra-group force of natural selection,
A culturally rational posting against the physiological as of sedentary and agrarian experience,
The use made of the physiologically rational and semiotic by civilization,
The evolution and rise of physiologically totemic, cognitive process that is the advent of agrarian individuality, and the rational-moral evolution this ignites.
Are all examples of a similar process of consolidation of our own universal, cultural humaneness that becomes in itself the possibility of the struggle that is civilization; that is anthropologically, the balancing of the physiological substance of human experience with collective sedentary circumstances, through the engaged defining of people’s universally rational cognizance.
Hardly, however, could this be understood to have taken place intentionally. But to this day, some 8000 years after agriculture, still are we hamstrung by our limited, conceptually intellectual understanding of our own cognizance—a cognizance and intellectual accumulation which indeed can only be marveled at in regards to its technical production and technology, but has never been able to explicitly differentiate between different types of rational phenomena—or at least this has never become a working tool of popular—nor even public—understanding.
There are, and have always been, universal forms of human rational being that are not conceptually understood, and which nether can we consider intentional—but are still nevertheless logical,
Or did you already know this?
Art is a form of “non-conceptual” conceptual communication through the aesthetic; the physiological subjection of a consumerist man that turns the culturally-posited rational into simply pretext, is another example of de-conceptualized cultural logic that similarly cannot be seriously understood as irrational—nor even, of course, fully intentional in regards specifically to the motivations of some form of financial-semiotic agency and power elite…
12) Exo-Notes from Snell
AIf the rock contributes to the understanding of a human attitude, i.e. if a dead object elucidates animate behavior, the reason is that the inanimate object is itself viewed anthropomorphically; the immobility of the boulder in the surf is interpreted as endurance, as a human being endures in the midst of a threatening situation. It appears, therefore, that one object is capable of casting fresh light upon another in the form of a simile, only because we read into the object the very qualities which it in turn illustrates. This peculiar situation, namely that human behavior is made clear only through reference to something else which is in turn explained by analogy with human behavior, pertains to all Homeric similes. More than that, it pertains to all genuine metaphors, and in fact to every single case of human comprehension.
Thus it is not quite correct to say that the rock is viewed anthropomorphically, unless we ad that our understanding of the rock is anthropomorphic for the same reason that we are able to look at ourselves petromorphically, and that the act of regarding the rock in human terms furnishes us with a means of apprehending and defining our own behavior.
In other words, and this is all-important in any explanation of the simile, man must listen to an echo of himself before he may hear or know himself.
It illustrates or we read into? Physiologically rational imposition of an afferent quality (that ‘we perceive’), but that is also efferent in that we impose upon one thing the very quality we take form another….
What is this but a violence of the mind in a physiologically rational struggle to expression? Metaphors—like the physiologically rational cultural impositions of religion—are instruments also of individual imposition we avail ourselves of whenever we individually need to show somebody something through language and what we mean in regards ultimately to some aspect of reality commonly approachable by all.
We impose, first; then that positing imposes on us. That is to say, the efferent is the afferent and this that is knowing ourselves in what we see we are not, which implies we are nothing at all except imposition itself; that is a physiological substance of experience that only would seem to resort tactically to the rational at all, that is in cultural contexts becomes a diachronic structuring of the anthropological resource of rationality itself. And the strut of the physiologically aesthetic to support and complement—to invigorate—rational being, is itself buttressed (and probably in fact more significantly) by the rational. And the question arises in regards to the anthropological that is, which one takes true supremacy?
BIn the clearly defined, the typical forms wherein nature has allocated her gifts among the beasts, men find the models for gauging their own responses and emotions; they are the mirror in which man sees himself. Rational thought embarks upon the delineation of a character by partitioning it into various properties and forces. And since reason distinguishes between thing and quality, between matter and force, nothing prevents it from ascribing the ‘same’ quality or power to different character. The earlier mentality, on the other hand, unaware of these distinctions, is fully absorbed by the totality of the image, and thus forced to describe peculiarities by means of comparisions. The sentence: ‘Hector is as a lion,’ besides constituting a comparison, besides focusing the formlessness of human existence against a characteristic type, also signalizes a factual connexion. At least this is true of the older writings. Thus man discovered a solid foundation, not only for his understanding, but for his very existence, in the kinship between himself and the beasts.
Homer’s similes assign a role very similar to that of the beasts also to the natural elements. We have already met with the storm, the wave, the rock. These comparisons likewise enable a man to see his real self, by making him turn his attention back upon external nature. Like the description of animals, the pictures of nature are by no means designed only to instill a mood…But above all they are regarded as the conductors of fundamental forces such as are alive also in man. Indeed man realizes the forces within him most distinctly when he musters them to combat the corresponding forces outside him.
Cultural evolution in the gradual ability of expression thus does not change the original starting point of expressionless, historical physiological substance of experience; this remains and despite the changing contexts that evolution creates for itself (contexts it creates that then afferently impose back on it). And thus the circumstances of agriculture (and what that implies for anthropology) are in some sense a problem compounded by cultural evolution, in the greater capacity of rationally construed expression—that is perhaps a progressive distancing (it evidently has been) of the rational, culturally-construed mind from the deeper (and thus more serious) reality of physiological substance of human experience. And that this were not understood by the culturally rational mind becomes certainly an empirical error. Or; Wight’s understanding of science as an objectifying of the human subject through her observation of the object could also be understood as greater divorce finally from physiological substance and the body—that what allowed Galileo to in fact be empirically observant against the physiologically-semiotic of the structurally anthropological (that is a Renaissance security and celebration of the bodily), eventually drifted headlong into a denial of it, and thus the logical undermining of higher, non-technical forms of understanding (that is a shoddy empiricism, to say the least).
CThe mythical paradigm, on the other hand, has the advantage that allows a more comprehensive glimpse into human behavior, with all its motives and consequences. To be sure, there are some similes which perform the same service; this happens when Penelope’s tears, as Odysseus, unrecognized by her, reminisces about her husband, are compared to melting snow, or the death of young Euphorbus is likened to the uprooting of a carefully nursed olive tree. But on the whole it can be said that they mythical paradigm is a more suitable instrument for interpreting the fate of man in simple and natural terms. The paradigm traces its origin form the same need which is also at the root of the animal simile, our need for establishing our place in the world order by means of comparisons, in order to arrive at a tolerable degree of certainty and stability. To-day we still experience the same need, but we prefer to be guided by the facts of experience, or by historical parallels, rather than by legends. Goethe’s Antonio says to Tasso when his world is collapsing all around him:
And when you seem to lose your whole person,
Compare yourself! Perceive what you are!
Whereupon Tasso answers:
Your reminder is timely;
Is there no example of history to help me?
Shall I not picture some noble man
Who suffered more than I have ever suffered,
So that I may compare and find myself?
Like the animal comparison, the mythical comparison is more than just an agent of impersonal information, for man senses a bond of kinship between himself and the mythic personage. Apart from the fact that the heroes form the genealogical link between gods and men, and that the various clans and noble families regard them as their ancestors, institutions, too, claim them as their founders. Thus the ordinary man is impressed with the conviction that he stands in the stream of a living tradition which springs from the fountain of a higher life: a conviction which is continually reinforced by the aetiological legends chanted at the festivals.
Apply this to a cinematographic ken of humanity, but in above all the physiological impact of images and that is to some extent an externally verifiable (and so rationally approachable) version of what the human physiologically sensory mind traces—and has always traced—in regards to other non-pictorial forms of representation (i.e. images construed through words as well as the ritually symbolic.) Do we not also feel impressed upon by the conviction that we too stand in the stream of some kind of living tradition which springs from the fountain of a higher life: a conviction which is continually reinforced by a physiologically rational and aesthetic form of aetiological legend, enacted right before our eyes and bigger than life itself–in the images, mannerisms and moral predicaments the actors and actresses of almost a 100 years of film have unto ourselves bourn us, but that is subtly also a form of evasion?
DThe striking generic figures of the Olympian gods had provided excellent models for human self-cognition, but the momentous legends of the heroic past supplied an even richer and more varied storehouse form which to equip a fitting portrayal of human nature. These tales are an improvement upon the technique of the simile because they are more flexible in their interpretation, ever ready to adapt themselves to fresh intellectual standards.
The gods of Homer had cast off their earlier theriomorphic guise (assuming they had ever gone through such a stage) and had traversed the long road which leads from the rigid tyranny of animal necessity to the amiable freedom of human diversity. Accordingly man, whose cognizance of himself followed the divine pattern, was released from the dead end street of a fixed design. In their myths, too, which were now taken out of storage and refurbished into works of great poetry, we discover a new desire for unfettered fabulation and innovation [EXACTLT WHY?] It was the poetry, and finally Attic tragedy, which through its myths set man on the way to understanding himself. To make clear the strange interrelation between myth and human insight into the self—for, to repeat, it is wrong to see in myth merely a solemn and rather detached recital of the past—we might do well to adduce an analogy form more recent times. Rembrandt’s scenes of the Old Testament permit us to trace the course of the artist’s own life, since the ancient stories become real for him only through the medium of his own experiences; but vice versa the old figures furnish him with a better approach toward his own life. Just so the Greeks discovered the human intellect—by reading it into the myths. The fate of Orestes makes it possible for Aeschylus to perceive the meaning of an ‘action’ in the proper sense of the term; at the same time he is the first to graft this particular element upon the ancient myth. As the echo which precipitates man’s understanding of himself becomes more human, so does man himself; as his thought processes become more rational, the secularization of myth follows suit.
EHomer’s myths reveal two features which anticipate the subsequent enlightenment. For one thing, the reflexions which the myths are designed to assist usually produce a greater sense of humility; the majority of the paradigms teach men to realize their status as men, the limitations upon their freedom, the conditional nature of their existence. They encourage self-knowledge in the spirit of the Delphic motto: ‘Know thyself,’ and thus they extol measure, order and moderation. As for the other feature foreshadowing the age of reason, the characters in the paradigms are not demons or bogey-men, but well-known figures with sharply defined contours, either gods or, more often, legendary heroes. Since these figures are tied to a definite locale, and since their genealogy is common knowledge, they stand on the borderline of history or experience; that is, after all, what distinguishes legend and saga from the fairly-tale. It is a characteristic of Greek mythology that the motifs of Maerchen are always re-moulded into the forms of saga. Saga differs from empirical reality in that it furnishes, along with the facts, also their deeper meaning. The later enlightenment argued the meaning which emerges form an event is a matter of human interpretation; but in the saga this meaning asserts itself as valid, a divine component of the tale. In this respect, too, the myth of the Homeric paradigm, and all myth in general, stands half way between the compulsive ideas of the early magic mentality, and the problems and uncertainties of later empirical and historical interpretation.
Neither the primitive magic mentality nor the type of thought which follows scientific lines is able to appreciate the nature of the mythical or, for that matter, the historical paradigm. For whatever the differences between them, neither approach admits any comparisons which are not based on an absolute identity. That is to say, both in primitive and in scientific thought all equations are patterned on the comparison of concrete nouns: one lion is like another, one piece of gold is the same as another. In primitive thought, a man may be like a god, or like an animal; in the sciences, only that which really ‘is’ has any validity but what we find in myth, in poetry and in history, namely the establishing of precedents for human actions and fortunes, to give them a broader and more universal significance, is rooted in a totally different category of speech.
Man really is not, but rather is a process always of some kind of becoming, that would roughly follow the physiological mode of the substance of human experience; but physiology is a process and transit, constantly from one state and condition to another, and is never just what is. Not static, but permanently in a state of transit and process; but, however, before the real and spatial object of empirical observation, what can possibly become of the human observer in regards to this deeper ethereal quality of human, physiological essence? Clearly the potential for our dehumanization is stark…
Just as, among all possible activities, there are a few ideal cases which alone carry a name, and which must serve as our models for defining the countless remaining actions, so there is a limited number of human fates, a few of them historical but most of them fictional, which we may use as standards in the measuring of men’s lives. These archetypal fortunes of the Greek myths are kept alive by the poets, Greek as wall as non-Greek, through ever-changing metamorphoses; and even Thucydides, stripped as his history is of all mythical adornments, considers his book permanently valid, because ‘these and similar things, as are written here, will always happen again’.
Trapped in my mind—or my physiology? Confined to sex—or imprisoned by the non-absolute nature of physiological experience, that is first and foremost my very own being in becoming, and thus the substance that I am of imposition itself? And civilization as of ever is forms of limitation on myself that then becomes new possibilities of different becomings, evolution and growth, finally.
Non-absolute and relative nature of physiological experience: Relative to new states of individual routine and security in the physio-semiotic and physiologically totemic, in regards permanently therefore to changing states of the collectively defined status of group constitution of individuality—that is thus an exo-self conceptualization of individuality (or the cultural, group-defined framework for it) as not individual, but rather structural, and where personality in fact becomes how the bodily physiological self relates to a cultural paradigm of its own individuality.
Ontogeny and Phylogeny in regards to two different realms of the physiologically virtual—where, following Snell, man’s own humanity is wrought from those idealizations he is progressively able to read himself into; but that this understanding of self, back once again into the opprobic context of physiologically extrinsic human groups (i.e. the human group of civilization or culture) poses the question as to whether the cultural self becomes also a form of totemic idealization for the individual, as well; that is yet another physiologically totemic context of the tension of becoming, between an ideal of self in regards to the approval—or viability—of it within the group and the group’s rationality and semiotics versus this other part of the self, that is probably the more intrinsic, bodily self and its ontology of vulnerability (that is, of course, the real but cryptic foundation of anthropological functionality, of the human group’s moral possibility and its very rationality.)
13) From The Paranoid Style in American Politics, by Richard Hofstadter
Harper’s Magazine, November 1964
The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of conspiracy in apocalyptic terms-he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization.
He constantly lives at a turning point. Like religious millennialists he expresses the anxiety of those who are living through the last days and he is sometimes disposed to set a date for the apocalypse. (“Time is running out,” said Welch in 1951. “Evidence is piling up on many sides and from many sources that October 1952 is the fatal month when Stalin will attack.”)
This enemy is clearly delineated:
He is a perfect model of malice,
a kind of amoral superman
Unlike the rest of us, the enemy is not caught in the toils of the vast mechanism of history, himself a victim of his
past, his desires, his limitations. He wills, indeed he manufactures, the mechanism of history, or tries to deflect the normal course of history in an evil way.
He makes crises,
starts runs on banks,
and then enjoys and profits from the misery he has produced.
The paranoid’s interpretation of history is distinctly personal: decisive events are not taken as part of the stream of history, but as
the consequences of someone’s will. Very often the enemy is held to possess some especially effective source of power:
he controls the press;
he has unlimited funds;
he has a new secret for influencing the mind (brainwashing) ;
he has a special technique for seduction (the Catholic confessional)
It is hard to resist the conclusion that this enemy is on many counts a projection of the self; both the ideal and the unacceptable aspects of the self are attributed to him. The enemy may be the cosmopolitan intellectual, but the paranoid will outdo him in the apparatus of scholarship, even of pedantry. Secret organizations set up to combat secret organizations give the same flattery.
The Ku Klux Klan imitated Catholicism to the point of donning priestly vestments, developingan elaborate ritual and an equally elaborate hierarchy.
John Birch Society The emulates Communist cells and quasi-secret operation through “front” groups, and preaches a ruthless prosecution of the ideological war along lines very similar to those it finds in the Communist enemy.*
Spokesmen of the various fundamentalist anti-Communist “crusades” openly express their admiration for the dedication and discipline the Communist cause calls forth.
On the other hand:
the sexual freedom often attributed to the enemy,
his lack of moral inhibition,
his possession of especially effective techniques for fulfilling his desires,
give exponents of the paranoid style an opportunity to project and express unacknowledgeable aspects of their own psychological concerns. Catholics and Mormons later, Negroes and Jews-have lent themselves to a preoccupation with illicit sex. Very often the fantasies of true believers reveal strong sadomasochistic outlets, vividly expressed, for example, in the delight of anti-Masons with the cruelty of Masonic punishments.…
The Double Suffer (and trapped in my physiological mind)
Norman Cohn “the megalomaniac view of oneself as the Elect,
yet assured of ultimate triumph;
the attribution of gigantic and demonic powers to the adversary;
the refusal to accept the ineluctable limitations and imperfections of human existence,
such as transience,
fallibility whether intellectual or moral;
the obsession with inerrable prophecies. , .
systematized misinterpretations, always gross and often grotesque.”
This glimpse across a long span of time emboldens me to make the conjecture-it is no more than that-that a mentality disposed to see the world in this way may be a persistent psychic phenomenon, more or less constantly affecting a modest minority of the population.
But certain religious traditions, certain social structures and national inheritances, certain historical catastrophes or frustrations may be conducive to the release of such psychic energies, and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass movements or political parties.
In American experience ethnic and religious conflict have plainly been a major focus for militant and suspicious minds of this sort, but class conflicts also can mobilize such energies. Perhaps the central situation conducive to the diffusion of the paranoid tendency is a confrontation of opposed interests which are (or are felt to be) totally irreconcilable, and thus by nature not susceptible to the normal political processes of bargain and compromise.
The situation becomes worse when the representatives of a particular social interest perhaps because of the very unrealistic and unrealizable nature of its demands-are shut out of the political process.
Having no access to political bargaining or the making of decisions, they find their original conception that the world of power is sinister and malicious fully confirmed.
They see only the consequences of power-and this through distorting lenses-and have no chance to observe its actual machinery. A distinguished historian has said that one of the most valuable things about history is that it teaches us how things do not happen. It is precisely this kind of awareness that the paranoid fails to develop. He has a special resistance of his own, of course, to developing such awareness, but circumstances often deprive him of exposure to events that might enlighten him-and in any case, he resists enlightenment.
We are all sufferers from history, but the paranoid is a double sufferer, since he is afflicted not only by the real world, with the rest of us, but by his fantasies as well.
14The “Exo Self” Context of Economic Structure (Money)
That is a permanence through time of individual aspiration and the possibility of being by becoming—that becomes an anthropologically structural coherence with human biology and an accommodation of a hollow man conceptualization of the physiological self as perceiver, in accordance with the notion of man´s being in really the physiological substance of his own projection.
15(25nov16)La relación antropológica con la muerte
La genética humana se asienta sobre la amenaza física en todas sus manifestaciones y es esta misma amenaza que impera finalmente sobre los procesos fisiológicamente cognitivos humanos. De ahí que sea la vulnerabilidad física lo que fundamente real pero crípticamente toda posibilidad no solo moral de la cultura, sino que constituye la piedra angular asimismo del hecho racional humano-social, esto es, la base misma de toda racionalidad culturalmente constituida. Y así la estructura antropológica va, sobre este punto al menos, en paralelo con la biología individual humana.
El oprobio biológico humano es esta fuerza animal y verdaderamente zoomorfa que, sin embargo, fundamenta y acaba estructurando la racionalidad cultural, que es en su fondo y siempre, grupal, de tribu e incluso originalmente de jauría.
El llamado destino funerario nuestro se vuelve estructuralmente crucial para nosotros, en todas sus manifestaciones rituales y semióticas-y especialmente las más obvias y directas-por cuanto son momentos y contextos socialmente reconocidos oficialmente que significa también ´racionalmente´ al menos en un sentido socialmente articulado; pero claro, lo socialmente racional no es nunca completamente racional, sino que ha de posicionarse de forma permanente respecto al componente sub racional y culturalmente opaco que es-paradójicamente-la base real de nuestra entidad moral-racional precisamente porque nosotros individualmente (y esto frente a los grupos humanos sus instituciones y los conceptos abstractos que finalmente los definen) nos lo jugamos todo en el cuerpo y la existencia física de carne y hueso. Ni las ideas y ni los grupos humanos a nivel abstracto, no tienen por qué morir nunca, o al menos de forma física, evidentemente, puesto que para el individuo consciente no son nunca entidades físicamente reales*.
Y esto quiere decir, por tanto, que es el hecho físico individual que poseen la entidades solo físicas singulares, singularmente corpóreas lo que da el sentido moral a los grupos, las instituciones humanas colectivas y, también respecto las ideas que estos emplean para la fundición real racional de sí mismos; esto es, aquello que presta el sentido real y moral a las colectividades humanas y dado que intrínsecamente y de por sí no lo pueden ni generar ni siquiera poseer, simplemente porque el sentido moral posible de la vida es solo en su finitud y la precariedad que resulta para el individuo-más fisiológico que racionalmente-el riesgo consustancial a la vida misma que es su pérdida fulminante, e irrevocable declinar, pero
Unicamente respecto a este cuerpo y tejido biológico que soy yo en mi persona física.
Aunque eso sí, la comprensión culturalmente racional que tiene el individuo de sí mismo puede existir en verdad extrínsecamente en las ideas del grupo que llegan a ser, sin embargo, de obligación fisiológica para el individuo y ante la amenaza opróbica de su propia defenestración del grupo o aniquilamiento a manos del mismo-pero en el padecimiento real de su propia carne y tejido corporal.
Pero, como todos sabemos, este carácter extrínseco y socialmente reforzado no obstante de la conciencia individual, constituye un hecho básico de los grupos humanos y antropológicos que es un rasgo imprescindible de su misma viabilidad existencial y colectiva, a través del tiempo, lo que nos trae de nuevo al principio:
La supervivencia antropológica ha estado siempre-y lo sigue estando-en el grupo, pero la capacidad de perdurar de estos depende de una verdadera monarquía a la sombra de la individualidad corpórea y la vulnerabilidad en la que vive, que luego es en sí mismo la verdadera potencia moral posible de las sociedades que fisiosemióticamente se erigen sobre ella.
*Esto es, que el individuo pueda sensorialmente percibir en una verdadera dimensión colectiva del grupo, si bien somos fisioeséticamente sensibles a la noción del grupo que como tal-a la manera de una conceptualización fisiológica que es nuestra suseceptibilidad a la imagen mental de los objetos uniformados y agrupados de cualquier naturaleza-no concebimos racionalmente nuestra propia individualidad como en realidad un hecho en sí mismo grupal, sino que es una fuerza fisiológica zoomorfa y de carácter seguramente límbico respecto del sistema nerviosio humano.
O quizá sea que la existencia real física del grupo se limita realmente a la respuesta solo fisiológicamente opróbica del individuo; esto es, desde la óptica individual, ¿qué otra entidad física puede tener el grupo humano o la sociedad sino en la imbricación fisiológica individual con ella? Y así sumamos con ello la respuesta fisiológica individual a las ideas y nociones fisioconceptuales del conjunto específico humano viviente, hallando finalmente una individualidad de proceso, en tensión, multi-polar y jamás ni completo ni del todo fijado como absoluto. Huelga decir, sin embargo, que una visión solo económica de agregados humanos a través del tiempo si puede, efectivamente, limitarse solo al aspecto físico de los conjuntos humanos corpóreos, estos que comen, que se asean y buscan su propia y muy legítima confort físico y personal; pero en este caso resulta evidente que las ideas en las que viven los individuos se vuelven mero pretexto respeto lo físico y los réditos acumulativos que de ello y estructuralmente se derivan, que ya es de por sí una natural y necesaria distorsión estructural antropológica pero que, dejada a su inexorable naturaleza fisiológica no circunspecta-sin supervisión estructural real y necesariamente ejecutiva-es una distorsión antropológica que se convierte en negación de la misma. (Thatcher quotation: “I think we’ve been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it’s the government’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant.’ ‘I’m homeless, the government must house me.’ They’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour. People have got the entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There’s no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation.”)
16)Suspension Anthropology and “Exo Suspension” of Self
Much in the way the physical and ideal realms of the anthropological remain permanently tensed, the one in regards to the other, so does the physical side of the self remain permanently in tension with the exo-self idealizations towards which the self is to project its vital will to being, that is in sedentary anthropology an opprobrium-configured context of projection from physical, corporeal vitality towards opprobrium-defined and semiotic idealizations.
As if the self were only in essence a process of projection between these two poles (a self that requires of different exo-selves to actually be a self); that is a hollow-man conceptualization in regards also to the psycho-cultural plane of individuality, and thus is also a process of projecting and channeling an energy to be in becoming, as in itself only what it can seek to be in this becoming, as long as it never definitively attains what it seeks…
-An exo-self space and context is a physiologically totemic context, that is in fact the essential physiologically rational nature of it and the foundation of a more broadly conceptualized cultural virtuality.
-The physiologically real but fictional, is also morally real in its virtuality, though not—at least initially—politically real.
–Idealization in this context is the very hotspot of biological opprobrium as in fact the real cultural force of definition of those ideals and the reason they are morally real but in a physiologically virtual sense.
-Rational will towards meaning, or physiological force of impetus? That becomes physiologically rational will to imposition versus physio-intellectual force of imposition; and in each case meaning is naturally what human physiological process—in each case—endeavors to find, create, or borrow through (unfailingly) different forms of analogy and perceived juxtapositions.
-If the physiologically real but fictional is morally real, the foundation of the rational itself is also to be found in the same realm of the physiologically sensorial.
–Sensory Physiology is conceptualized category as component of human nature and comprises the following functions of human perception: The aesthetic, The rational, and Opprobrium; is conceptually in opposition to a physical or metabolic physiology in regards to thoroughly non-rational or unconscious physical process.
17.The Physical versus only The Physiologically Real
1.Phonetics are like physically real pretext to the physiologically semiotic artifice of phonology and language itself.
2.Much in the way ritual becomes a form of physical rationality against physiological non-definition;
3.Both in this way work to define and structure physiological experience that requires what constitutes rational pretexts which are functionally rational essentially because they define physiological experience by engaging it (as of whatever logical reason or only pretext)—that is thus the very definition and limitation of that physiological experience.
- The exo self nature of man is thus because of his need to be by becoming that is itself physiological process, in all its aspects and at all levels????????
Ritual: Physiological snapshots that acquire the functionality of the rational in ritual’s power to impose on, limit, and thereby define physiological experience; culturally physiological experience, because it is group-shared and self-imposed by the group, is also culturally rational experience because it is group-based, as indeed something like the phonetics of cultural (group) meaning and experience; ritual is physiological experience that is comprehensible (perceived as logical) by more than the just the individual herself; and this to the extent that cultural integration (‘identity of belonging’) is the individual’s comprehension of self actually through the group’s own posits and understanding; that is in essence and to some degree a physiologically extrinsic defining of self (which human personality, because it is in fact indissociably corporeal and singular, will then relate to opprobically, from the singularly physical-corporeal to what then constitutes a group or culturally-defined exo self of physiologically totemic entity and process.)
The chief anthropologically structural function of such a group-defined exo self element is to oppose and safeguard against individual, non-mediated physiological experience—but not by eliminating it altogether, given that structurally rational viability and definition is possible as long as the individual lives her integration into group experience as a cryptic physiological defiance of it.
In this way, it is the physicality of individual experience—as in fact the foundation itself of the moral and rational—that ends up opposing the culturally ethereal and non-physical entity of group constitution and identity; as a dialectic of permanently charged hidden tension and mutual definition by opposition, towards ultimately the group’s perseverance through time.
And thus does the physical entity of individual experience become tether to the cultural artifice of physiologically rational ascription of meaning by the group, that is the very safeguarding against excessive physiologically extrinsic removal of physiologically corporeal reality,
Only the physical individual is the real bearer of.
- Physically Different Individuals Become Groups in the Ideas that Unite Them (In what other way could they come together?)
Except that fiercely resilient human groups cannot actually be fiercely resilient only in just conceptualizations; or rather, conceptualizations only really agglutinate groups made up of physically different individuals if those conceptualizations are physiologically binding for each and every single individual. Thus can biological opprobrium be considered as something of an evolutionary anachronism in regards to the history of the human species, for while physiological individuality as really itself a product of the group was crucially successful for group survival in pre-agrarian contexts, our opprobrium-constricted individuality of today is probably to be considered—in the sum of all things considered and to the extent that is possible—as something closer to a handicap and obstacle, ultimately, to that same survival today.
Understand Nazi Germany from the standpoint of the opprobic!
19.AMANPOUR (CPJ) 22NOV16
-Post-truth: Post values
–Campaign in poetry, govern in prose
Physio-Semantic Shift and the Cool Hand Tyrant Play:
First the media is accused of inciting,
Then finally accused of being full-fledged terrorists and subversives:
[Then you get arrested.
An insidious “creep of extremism”
Historical process of the normalization of bigotry
(People should speak out against bigotry, unless the center holds against the insidious creep of extremism)
What begins by biting your tongue for political expediency
—or out of social awkwardness—
Soon becomes complicity with something far worse.
End note and words
Young people (and not so young!) have the moral mandate to get into good trouble; so lets get out there and try to remain relevant; and let us not be turkeys voting for Thanksgiving! …Happy Thanksgiving.
Social awkwardness is actually key to the phenomenon of physiologically semantic shift, in regards to human groups, and not just simply a circumstance of it. For it is the group that actually defines what it means to be an individual in regards to specific human groups, in specific geographic delimitations, bound by a particular cultural rationality, language and semiotic conceptualizations. An individuality that belongs by opposing and in defiance is of course the real force of optimum, structurally anthropological balance and viability; and an ultimately tensed conformity is what this really means. But defiance is actually the motor of conformity for all singular bodily individuals, in regards to a physical experience that is uniquely singular for all individuals, but that historically-anthropologically only survives because of the group. And the paradox is in the dichotomy of mind and body, or physical experience versus identity and the rational understanding of it; and the individual is physically singular, but can only really exist conceptually—rationally—in the ideas of the group; but, alas, groups do not really exist corporeally, only individuals do…
Social awkwardness is key because this is exactly how the conceptualizations of the group (its postulated and cultural rationality) become relevant and physiologically binding for the individual. And it is that what you are depends on what the group knows you to be; that is to say, on what you physiologically and physio-rationally embrace as the group’s acceptance of you—or at least its not open hostility towards you, that is your accommodation of your own self-understanding to what you feel (i.e ‘physioloigcally know’) the others will at least tolerate; that does not mean you simply comply—in fact always to some extent this means you will defy, but in a way that is ultimately on at least the limits of acceptability, principally because it is non-violent. For only can you actually be, rationally and as a conceptualization, in those ideas the others hold themselves to—and in the way your personality, as of your own physical experience, relates to those semiotics, and then in the positions you ultimately take of conformity and defiance in regards to that physiologically semiotic structure.
This also means that socially structural viability necessarily consists of different individuals in different subgroups, on different points of a defiance-conformity continuum in regards to a particular culture’s posted rationality and physio-semiotics.
Because both defiance and conformity each acquire their own culturally functional, separate entity—in their own physiologically construed, rational entities or narratives, that of course end up staking the better part of what they are in what they are not, but are opposed to and are in themselves the absence of; that is, their own self-conceptualization in or because of their opposite.
Despite, however, the multiple points of individuality in regards to such a continuum, defiance and conformity are in fact patrimony to all corporeal individuals in different degrees and to different extremes, basically because individuality is only physiologically understood (‘felt’ ‘experienced’) as individual, when in fact anthropologically individuality is a culturally specific paradigm of singular bodily being, towards ultimately the structural viability, invigoration and survival of the group.
The term creep in regards to a progressive shift, drift and semantic or conceptual syncretism ultimately towards the justification on the part of power of more decisive political action, can refer only to the physiological circumstances and substance of human experience, that is the true entity behind only an illusory conceptualization of the rational; for the culturally rational exists in itself as a form of opposition to the physiological, that which the group must impinge upon in individuals towards its own possibility of being—in the only way the group can actually exist, that is, in its physiologically semiotic entities and conceptualizations that, by means of biological opprobrium, are physiologically binding for the bodily vulnerable individual.
Because, following Margret Thatcher, it must be finally agreed upon that indeed there is no such thing as society—but rather only a force of genetic-based, physiological and zoomorphic violence the individual inexorably must define herself through, secretly and in the unspoken turmoil of what is really a legacy of the killing fields of a pre-agrarian, human biology. Society is thus only that which ultimately saves the individual from her anthropological self, for permanently is she compelled to conformity through defiance, and to defy as way of ultimately belonging:
And so yes, society is only its rationality, that is of course ethereal, anyway and so exists really only in the physiologically rational experience of the individual and her mind;
But similarly, if one politically ignores the non-corporeal (because it simply is very easy to do, for it does not physically exist), only physical human experience ends up really mattering, that ultimately becomes an experience that cannot conceptualize itself, which in itself is not necessarily a negative circumstance in regards a corporate-financial dominance of human, physiological aggregates over time and the anthropologies they comprise, that is of course the real unaddressed foundation of contemporary consumer society experience, anyway.
And Thatcher—or her bankers and financial ideologues—meant that, too, no doubt!
- NOTES21nov16 Canetti and Crowds
Before man was able to read himself into his divinities (Snell), he read himself into what he saw in the world around him, especially in the animated figures of living animals; and the first step towards an exo-self understanding of his own entity and being, might well be posited first in his observation of the animals, as a direct way of knowing himself in what he sees he is not. But quite quickly, however, he would find himself obstructed from further development of his own self-understanding in the very foil and exo-self object he was relating to, in its obvious limitations that become an impossibility to a further knowing of himself; and so because such a greater, superior foil to which he could physio-totemically relate to was not available, he had to posit it himself, utilizing the unknown as in fact his canvass on which to paint what he could in regards to logical notions of something obviously quite superior to himself (for what else could explain his presence among the animals, but miserably alone in his superiority over them?) And so because from the animals—and nature itself—he got no answer, nor even a significantly purposed and intelligent response at all, he found himself in the need to create something superior to himself, not really in his own image, but rather in better and enhanced image of himself, so that historically and in terms of cultural evolution, he could actually become that superior being, or at least partially and to whom he initially related only totemically out of his own physiologically rational need to transcend in fact his own physiological experience (what is rationality in a cultural sense but a contrast to and containment—a transcending—of the physiological?) as a pillar of social order, of course, but perhaps also a form of relief from the repetition, redundancy and entrapment that is his only physiological substance of experience. Thus is the idea of transcendence, from this standpoint, a form of integration and embrace of the different components of the self (cultural, physical/physiological, and physiologically rational) that is the resource of meaning and its adscription specifically to the physiological, and that could be understood as a ‘saving of man from his physiological self’—by in fact imposing ultimately on him a conceptual understanding of himself, and to whatever degree of empirical accuracy (that does not necessarily have to be at all, but rather only anthropologically effective!)
And it is agriculture that would seem to propel human beings down the road of physiological transcendence (i.e. ‘into to a culturally-posited rationality and semiotics’), and at least certainly as an outlet for the very impetus of humanity’s own physiological nature that, in the context of sedentary experience proper, inexorably had to fictionalize itself through man’s hypostatization of his own physio-semiotic projection; through no other means, in fact, could sedentary human groups keep themselves together once they no longer lived in actual physical movement and flight.