10. Logical-Conceptual Possibility from Socio-Genetic Physiology

1.Transcription of Human, Socio-Genetic Physiology into Logical-Conceptual Meaning:

Very much probably so that people continue to live ultimately in the mystery of their own physiological entity in the underlying, invigorated complacency the group provides, and until the impetus of physiological individuality reaches progressive degrees of maturity, then declining into the senectud of individual ontogeny. Moral dilemma (in a Judeo-Christian logic, for example) weights itself precisely against a phylogenetically established, physio and socio-cognitive, human nature, in itself a resource available to sedentary anthropological contexts towards their own tension and invigoration, and given that a formerly more hostile and dire physical world that conditioned such a phylogenetic evolution no longer exists in the same way…

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The culturally rational self is based on and primed by, the intimacy of the corporeally physiological, opprobrium-configured self. That is, the culturally rational, moral life of human groups is, in this working sense, due to a secrecy (or ‘opacity’) of individual corporeal, body life—under and peripheral to, the collective congruence of our rational understanding of ourselves. Established semiotic stability (atop the opprobrium-configured, physio-corporeal realm of human groups) ultimately must preserve itself in the stimulated invigoration of the very physiological complacency it provides anthropological individuals by recourse, once again, to the physiological—especially sensorial—realm of the body. By implication, then, any state of living definition of the culturally rational is also an inchoative state of still-to-be-projected physio-semiotic impetus of individual physiological energy and vitality, that only supports itself of a broader, opprobrium-configured, semiotic and conceptual structure, at a distance so to speak, while remaining in itself only a living, potential projection of individual, bodily vigor.

 

  1. Revision of Unabomber´s Revision

The notion of being somehow displaced in regards to our phylogenetic essence and technological change, goes back even further in our past to the transition from nomadic to sedentary human groups. This is in fact the foundation of culture itself as we know it, particularly religion—long before somebody the likes of the Unabomber. The story of Cain and Abel—for example—is the transcription of a paradox of sorts between a previous state of semi-sedentary human groups and agriculture; and that the unresolvable dilemma of agricultural (or sedentary) man becomes our physiological and physiologically sensorial entity whose violence is only manageable for us in the projection of our physiological vitality in the form of labour and the different professions, due to the fact that we no longer live simply in movement itself; for it is Cain’s decedents who found not only cities, but the artisanal professions of leather crafts, music, and metallurgy as what constitute really proxy activities into which human beings can violently throw themselves, in all their energy and fury, albeit collectively secure in the conceptually moral framework the sedentary individual is compelled to live in and effectively know herself through.  And the logic itself of not being lazy, for example, is really because of the problems our physiological nature causes in sedentary circumstances (1), if we cannot project our vitality through some culturally congruent, physiologically semiotic channel: the day to day security of collective, sedentary anthropological contexts depends on it.

 

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(1)Lorenz, Konrad; On Aggression (1963); Routledge Classics, 2002; pg. 245: Clearly, the task of compensation devolving on responsible morality increases at the same rate at which the ecological and sociological conditions created by culture deviate from those to which human instinctive behaviour is phylogenetically adapted. Not only does this deviation continue to increase, but it does so with an acceleration that is truly frightening.

  1. Myth itself is constant re-presentation of our physiological, socio-genetic and sensorial essence:

But becomes an object of logical-conceptual contemplation for us and is therefore a form of rationality in the social, collective congruence it constitutes. And in reference to it can one avail herself towards one’s own notion of the socially congruent self; that is, as an individuality who understands herself because of the physio-conceptual, physio-rational definition she can bestow on herself through resource to physio-social congruence, and in conjunction, of course with the force of biological opprobrium and its impingement on—that is in fact the true supporting foundation of—our physiologically rational, sensory experience (how she believes others see/regard her). And so collectively congruent, physiological and physio-sensorial entity becomes itself a form of physio-corporeal congruence, previous to whatever form of logic culture later imposes on it! Such a physiological entity is, in a sense, a form of underlying tautology….

 

 

11.Against the Current(1979) Isaiah Berlin (Princeton University Press,2001)

 The Divorce Between Sciences and The Humanities

I

(Pg.81) It is not surprising that the this view was most strongly held and most influential in the hour of the greatest triumph of the natural sciences—surely a major, if not the major, achievement of the human mind: and especially, therefore, in the seventeenth century in western Europe. From Descartes and Bacon and the followers of Galileo and Newton, from Voltaire and the Encyclopedists to Saint-Sion and Comte and Buckle, and, in our own century, H.G. Wells and Bernal and Skinner and the Viennese positivists, and their ideal of a unified system of all the sciences, natural and humane, this has been a programme of the modern Enlightenment; and it has played a decisive role in the social, legal and technological organization of our world. This was perhaps bound sooner or later to provoke a reaction form those who felt that constructions of reason and science, or of a single all-embracing system, whether it claimed to explain the nature of thins, or to go further and dictate, in the light of this, what one should do and be and believe, were in some way constricting—an obstacle to their own vision of the world, chains on their imagination or feeling or will, a barrier to spiritual or political liberty.

(pg.82) This is not the first occasion on which this phenomenon occurred: the domination of the philosophical schools of Athens in the Hellenistic period was attended by a noticeable increase in mystery cults and other forms of occultism and emotionalism in which non-rational elements in the human spirit sought an outlet. There was the great Christian revolt against the great organized legal systems, whether of the Jews or the romans; there were medieval antinomian rebellions against the scholastic establishment and the authority of the church—movements of this kind from the Cathars to the Anabaptists are evidence enough of this; the Reformation was preceded and followed by the rise of the powerful mystical irrationalist currents. I will not dwell on more recent manifestations of this—in the German Strum und Drang, in the romanticism of the early nineteenth century, in Carlyle and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and the vast spectrum of modern irrationalism both on the right and on the left.

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  1. “Positivist” cultural contexts (defined in fact as staving off opprobic force of human biology from one’s vision of reality) are always historically compensated through the “resurrection of myth” (physiologically relevant vision’s of the real), probably because man’s imagination allows us not to have to live in only the misery of the physically real and immediate. The luxury of physiologically rational, sensory expanse is too important to human need in the context of sedentary life to forego.
  2. Social Congruence of whatever nature (positivist, mythological, religious…) to be structurally viable through time, must allow for the invigoration of individuals in a living present; thus if culturally rational identity is to remain in effect, individuals must live in the possibility of their own physiologically rational and efferent imposition—and structural stability anchored in the past becomes simply the platform for living human groups who then live in their own physiologically rational expanse; resilient anthropological structures allow for this possibility (gain in fact their very stability from physiologically rational invigoration of individuals in this sense).
  3. Science founds itself only on what it already has established rationally; all new phenomena can be considered explained only if subjected exclusively to the corpus of established knowledge. This is to say, the limitations of established knowledge define how we rationally (and culturally) approach our own physiologically sensorial being, but very much extrinsically to our actual experience (that is inevitably the essence of the socially congruent and rational). Culture stability, however, requires some form of collectively recognized authority, and science especially because of its limitations severs that purpose very well, for our experiencing of the sensorial is only transcribable so to speak, to the rational, but is itself broader than just our rational voice (because rational capacity and cultural voice is a mechanism of imposition of limits on physio-sensory and corporal impression—that is the origin of the need for the socially congruent and rational, and the relatively specific cultural individuality the corporeally singular individual must assume).
  4. Following also Bruno Snell* and what constitutes a theory on man’s living, physiological need to impose on his world—conceptually, if physical experience is eventually limited—points to a vision of human existence as inchoative in nature, consisting of a being in imposition itself: Homer’s metaphors constitute a form of physiologically rational aggression against the limits of our physical experience, and given that conceptual forms of rational imposition had yet to be culturally developed (core notion to Snell’s thesis); but metaphor and the process of analogy it is based on can only be understood itself as a form of primitive or proto rational process, that is very probably still for us today at the foundation of our cognizance, although we live culturally in a much broader force of rational-conceptual imposition developed over the millennium since Homer (and since the higher Greek culture that succeed him)—a mode of rational imposition that today tends to remove us from our deeper physiologically corporeal essence, as culture is of itself a process of deferring to some extent physical experience, anyway.
  5. Homer, then, lived and thought physiologically; and so still do we, but the positivist mode of cultural stability we live in, because it removes itself from the opprobic, must compensate for this through the physiologically sensorial exercise of the physio-corporeal individual within the natural confines of our socio-genetic and opprobic physiological constitution—exaclty that which science has freed itself from, or at least in its technical praxis. The divorce of Science is really in regards to this point: technical thought is rational, but we live in more of a physiologically rational mode of relating to the world our bodies depend on. But divorces always go better as a mutally understood agreement between the parts, which historically, in regards to science and the humanities—or between science and the reality of our socio-genetic, physiological nature—has not been the case.

 

II

(pg.97) But, Vico maintains, if you read primitive utterances (Latin and Greek antiguities, which he new best, provide him with the majority of his examples) you will soon realise that what we call metaphorical speech is the natural mode of expression of these early men. When we say that our blood is boiling, this may for us be a conventional metaphor for anger, but for primitive man anger literally resembled the sensation of blood boiling within him; when we speak of the teeth of ploughs, or the mouths of rivers, or the lips of vases, these are dead metaphors or,at best, deliberate artifice intended to produce a certain effect upon the listener or reader. But to our remote ancestors ploughs actually appeared to have teeth, rivers, which for them were semi-animate, had mouths: land was endowed with necks and tongues, metals and minerals with veins, the earth had bowels, oaks had hearts, skies smiled and frowned, winds raged, the whole of nature was alive and active. Gradually, as human experience changed, this, once natural speech, which Vico calls poetical, lingered on as turns of phrase in common speech whose origins had been forgotten or at least were no longer felt, or as conventions and ornament used by sophisticated versifiers. Forms of speech express kinds of vision; there is no universal, ‘literal’ speech which denotes a timeless reality. Before ‘poetical’ language, men used hieroglyphs and ideograms which convey a vison of the world very different from our own—Vico declares that men sang before they spoke, spoke in verse before they spoke in prose, as is made plain by the study of the kinds of signs and symbols that they used, and the trypes of use they made of them.

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Giambattista Vico (B. Giovan Battista Vico, 23 June 1668 – 23 January 1744)

 

 

-Otra forma de enfocar esto es suponer que la forma normal de razonamiento humano es por medio de la analogía que es exactamente lo que son las metáforas en su base y fondo; pero como estas sociedades antiguas aún no se habían desarrollado formas lógicamente sintetizadas de expresar y comprender las cosas, se comunicaban ¨`poéticamente¨ y por metáforas. Pero nosotros, aunque vivimos conceptualmente de la síntesis racional posterior, seguimos siendo capaces de una sensibilidad poética y fisio-sensorial, puesto que es la sensorialidad humana subyace de forma permanente a la congruencia social y es por tanto el agente principal críptico de nuestra propia racionalidad conceptual, mientras que para las sociedades anteriores este vivir conceptual no se había desarrollado aun (tesis de BRUNO SNELL). Pero hoy en día seguimos necesitados de un estímulo auxiliar fisio-sensorial que nos proporciona los medios audiovisuales, paralelamente a la conceptualización racional-empírica que desde la ilustración nos define. De esta manera se ha de considerar que nosotros seguimos siendo ellos, salvo que vivimos de una concepetualidad que, paradójicamente, no concibe su componente subyacente aun hoy original, de sensorialidad propia y fisiológicamente corpórea. Esto es, el hombre racionalmente sintetizador y empírico que somos nosotros vive a espaldas de su propia esencia fisiológicamente sensorial; sigue siendo sensible de hecho a ella, mas no tiene medio de vivir conceptualmente esta circunstancia puesto que su racionalidad es producto de y contrapeso respecto a su propia esencia fisiológica-sensorial. Pero, claro está, las sociedades conceptualmente primitivas (Homero) tampoco contemplaban conceptualmente su propia transcurrir fisiológica y sensorial: no tenían los instrumentos para ello, sino que forzaban los limites solo poéticamente de su propia capacidad cognitiva-semiótica.

 

ON LITERATURE

La literatura en la forma contemporánea en la que la concebimos nosotros, abarca ambos lados o ámbitos de la individualidad antropológica: se sirve de géneros socialmente congruentes para estructurarse al mismo tiempo que se funda en la sensorialidad fisiológica humana de la impresión (o sea lo que se conoce por la estética); en este sentido la consabida verdad que contiene la literatura se debe al hecho moral que representa, en la relevancia fisio-opróbica que impone, por una parte, al tiempo que se puede y se debe utilizar para alguna forma de síntesis racional, de contenido en última instancia conceptual o que se puede trasladar al mismo mediante la interpretación finalmente intelectual. Es decir, que en la literatura frente a la ciencia, sobrevive un modo de saber que es sustancialmente fisiológoco-sensorial, anclado en el basamento mismo corpóreo de los grupos humanos vivientes que se yerguen oprobicamente ante la realidad circundante-y sobre todo y siempre para nosotros- sensorial.  08SEP17

 

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–Such lingering turns of phrase are really our deeper physio-sensory sensitivity to the imagery of the body, its power, weakness or fragility. In fact, we use even today language in this sense and connotation especially as dominance or the subtle nuance of it, but in regards to language that is fully contemporary in its structure.

 

* Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought (Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Hamburg, 1946, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer, 1953)

 

 

 

12. Star Trek, The Original:

Physical Experience of the Bodily Opaque.

Physical being has something to do with not knowing what exactly is beyond the body; or rather physical experience of sensory impression has much to do with our trying to formulate our knowledge of exactly what physical experience is. But if one is, however, already culturally convinced of just what that experience is, a big part of physical experience becomes rationally opaque to us as individuals. And what I like or prefer, becomes logically much more important than what actually is, especially in regards to strictly consumer society experience where money naturally reinforces reality itself as only finally purchase options in regards to that which I like or don’t like.

Traditional cultural sayings, in cultures where they are especially abundant, are immediately observable as varied, and ultimately contradictory to on another—that becomes, in a certain sense, a reflection of the complexity of affirming what really is from the standpoint of our physical experience of sensory impression. But the need to seek to effectively say what is, might point to a mode of individuality that refuses to renounce the physicality of our being in sensory impression, and that thus tenaciously clings to its own will towards rational self-definition, however ephemeral, ultimately futile, that may be.

To say—hence know—that which is, from the standpoint of sensorial being, is the culturally rational affirmation of our own physiologically corporeal substance of being, as a destiny of sorts of at least an anthropologically structural configuration civilization forces on us. And rationally affirming that which is, becomes the real renewal also of what we physically are, within the confines of a particular and specifically cultural, anthropological individuality;

Conversely, in our not having very much to say about what really is, perhaps we also disdain in some way physical experience (which the simulacra of human groups inherently tend to do, any way.)

A statistical understanding of that which is, however, beyond the possibility of physical sensory experimentation by a single individual, acts much more like a fictional extension of the power of our bodily selves, rather than a physical reinforcement of the corporeal self; because a statistical understanding is necessarily not produced by nor really in possession of, just the individual, but is rather a conjugation of multiple and accumulated vantage points in regards to the passing of human, sensorial time, a statistically composed vision of reality obviates for the beholder all sense of one’s own physical limitation (hence definition). The circumstance of science in its methodological elimination of subjectivity has, of course, always been key to its power of logical imposition; but such a circumstances was only historically possible originally—in regards to the Western tradition—under the force of anthropological stability of religion, and specifically the Catholic church of the Italian Renaissance; a cultural context in which observation removed itself from the force of our socio-genetic, opprobrium-configured nature, precisely because anthropological stability, in that historical context, could effectively allow for it (specifically in the person of Galileo.)

But science as a cultural conviction available to anthropological individuality, but no longer itself under the canopy of religious understanding, must generate other forms of certainly rational understanding of individuality—of that which is, but from the standpoint of human bodily, sensorial being, exactly because science’s power of synthesis and imposition obviates in this way physical subjectivity itself.

Individuality is anthropologically dependent on the group’s understanding of that which is as of physical and physiologically sensory, human experience in originally specific geographic contexts; and physical experience is, inherently, singularly limited experience for individuals who can only survive, however, as a groups—and very much in the group’s knowing that which is, the individual can at least know what she is not, making the better part of one’s identity to be found finally in the others, for it is only through the group’s knowing that which is, that I can ever hope to understand what I am:

Because what I am is indeed above all a perceiver, of singularly corporeal, physiological entity, who is to be found at least functionally in all cultural narratives of whatever nature that ever existed in the universal, living realities of human groups on Earth; in those also physiologically sensorial, collective contexts in which I had to know myself through the group’s knowledge of that which is, so effectively could I be in belonging myself as an individual perceiver to my fellow perceivers…

In positivist cultural contexts, however, the physio-corporal side of anthropological individuality must receive auxiliary, physio-sensory invigoration to effectively prime the other, cultural side of anthropological individuality (that is the very perennial reason one needs to be culturally rational), given that an empirical and positivist rationality articulates itself specifically outside of the biologically opprobic, socio-genetic nature of our being. But that which is, in positivist cultural contexts, in the crucial and very much aggressive obviation of the subjective, physical self, is not approachable from the standpoint of our physiologically corporeal entity:

Science technically, and indirectly, spurns the physical self, though it makes no methodological assertion in this sense; for Galileo, of course, lived a physiologically sensorial security of an anthropologically defined, cultural self, in the iron tight embrace of Catholic doctrine (and a functionally wholesome sensuality of Mediterranean life, no doubt) and thus could take his own physical entity for granted. But science divested of all religious reference is anthropologically insecure in and only of itself, specifically because better, more effective science takes place of course methodologically beyond the opprobrium-configured foundation of human groups, and so can go beyond human anthropological limits easily and in the blink of an eye, so to speak, as has become historically evident: For, just like in regards to the subjective self, part of its very power is its obliviousness not to that which is, but to what it really is in itself.