Physical Experience of the Bodily Opaque.

Physical being has something to do with not knowing what exactly is beyond the body; or rather physical experience of sensory impression has much to do with our trying to formulate our knowledge of exactly what physical experience is. But if one is, however, already culturally convinced of just what that experience is, a big part of physical experience becomes rationally opaque to us as individuals. And what I like or prefer, becomes logically much more important than what actually is, especially in regards to strictly consumer society experience where money naturally reinforces reality itself as only finally purchase options in regards to that which I like or don’t like.

Traditional cultural sayings, in cultures where they are especially abundant, are immediately observable as varied, and ultimately contradictory to on another—that becomes, in a certain sense, a reflection of the complexity of affirming what really is from the standpoint of our physical experience of sensory impression. But the need to seek to effectively say what is, might point to a mode of individuality that refuses to renounce the physicality of our being in sensory impression, and that thus tenaciously clings to its own will towards rational self-definition, however ephemeral, ultimately futile, that may be.

To say—hence know—that which is, from the standpoint of sensorial being, is the culturally rational affirmation of our own physiologically corporeal substance of being, as a destiny of sorts of at least an anthropologically structural configuration civilization forces on us. And rationally affirming that which is, becomes the real renewal also of what we physically are, within the confines of a particular and specifically cultural, anthropological individuality;

Conversely, in our not having very much to say about what really is, perhaps we also disdain in some way physical experience (which the simulacra of human groups inherently tend to do, any way.)

A statistical understanding of that which is, however, beyond the possibility of physical sensory experimentation by a single individual, acts much more like a fictional extension of the power of our bodily selves, rather than a physical reinforcement of the corporeal self; because a statistical understanding is necessarily not produced by nor really in possession of, just the individual, but is rather a conjugation of multiple and accumulated vantage points in regards to the passing of human, sensorial time, a statistically composed vision of reality obviates for the beholder all sense of one’s own physical limitation (hence definition). The circumstance of science in its methodological elimination of subjectivity has, of course, always been key to its power of logical imposition; but such a circumstances was only historically possible originally—in regards to the Western tradition—under the force of anthropological stability of religion, and specifically the Catholic church of the Italian Renaissance; a cultural context in which observation removed itself from the force of our socio-genetic, opprobrium-configured nature, precisely because anthropological stability, in that historical context, could effectively allow for it (specifically in the person of Galileo.)

But science as a cultural conviction available to anthropological individuality, but no longer itself under the canopy of religious understanding, must generate other forms of certainly rational understanding of individuality—of that which is, but from the standpoint of human bodily, sensorial being, exactly because science’s power of synthesis and imposition obviates in this way physical subjectivity itself.

Individuality is anthropologically dependent on the group’s understanding of that which is as of physical and physiologically sensory, human experience in originally specific geographic contexts; and physical experience is, inherently, singularly limited experience for individuals who can only survive, however, as a groups—and very much in the group’s knowing that which is, the individual can at least know what she is not, making the better part of one’s identity to be found finally in the others, for it is only through the group’s knowing that which is, that I can ever hope to understand what I am:

Because what I am is indeed above all a perceiver, of singularly corporeal, physiological entity, who is to be found at least functionally in all cultural narratives of whatever nature that ever existed in the universal, living realities of human groups on Earth; in those also physiologically sensorial, collective contexts in which I had to know myself through the group’s knowledge of that which is, so effectively could I be in belonging myself as an individual perceiver to my fellow perceivers…

In positivist cultural contexts, however, the physio-corporal side of anthropological individuality must receive auxiliary, physio-sensory invigoration to effectively prime the other, cultural side of anthropological individuality (that is the very perennial reason one needs to be culturally rational), given that an empirical and positivist rationality articulates itself specifically outside of the biologically opprobic, socio-genetic nature of our being. But that which is, in positivist cultural contexts, in the crucial and very much aggressive obviation of the subjective, physical self, is not approachable from the standpoint of our physiologically corporeal entity:

Science technically, and indirectly, spurns the physical self, though it makes no methodological assertion in this sense; for Galileo, of course, lived a physiologically sensorial security of an anthropologically defined, cultural self, in the iron tight embrace of Catholic doctrine (and a functionally wholesome sensuality of Mediterranean life, no doubt) and thus could take his own physical entity for granted. But science divested of all religious reference is anthropologically insecure in and only of itself, specifically because better, more effective science takes place of course methodologically beyond the opprobrium-configured foundation of human groups, and so can go beyond human anthropological limits easily and in the blink of an eye, so to speak, as has become historically evident: For, just like in regards to the subjective self, part of its very power is its obliviousness not to that which is, but to what it really is in itself.